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INTRODUCTION
The election of 1916 holds a distinctive place in the national history

ot the United States. Presidential elections are frequently political
battles that affect the lives of only those directly concer.ned by changes
in the political administration of our government.

Especially is this true

when the results of the election cause no change in the party in power as
when the Republican Party continued its administration of governmental
affairs.

However, elections can and have had far reaching effects, when

the issues raised in the campaign were of a very vital nature or when the
questions deeply affected the lives of the people.

The campaigns and

elections of 1828, 1860, 1896, 1912, and 1916 are instances of Presidential
elections which vi tally affected and changed the lives of the people and the
history of our country.
The writer has chosen the election of 1916 as the topic of this thesis.
History records that the Democratic Party won this election and thereby
successfully succeeded itself for another four years and kept at the
nation' s helm Woodrow Wilson.

However, the writer is not concerned with the

campaign and successful election of the Democratic nominee.

:Most frequently

the efforts of the victorious party are kept before the public eye and,
being the winning questions and issues, they loom brighter and stronger
under the banner of victory.
questions,

and.~

Meanwhile, the minority party with its issues,

standards fades into oblivion under the ignominy of defeat.
i

It in 1916 the victory ot the issues, platform, and candidate ot the
Democratic Party direotly affected the history of the nation tor the
following tour years, then the failure, likewise, of the issues, platform,
and candidate ot the Republican Party in this election atteoted, it only
inversely, the tate of the nation during four very crucial years of its
history.

Granting that the success of the Democratic Party affected the

history of our nation it 110uld seem. to follow tll.at its success was
heightened by the failure ot the Republican Party.

Believing this to be

true, the writer has endeavored to learn of the activities and actions of
the Republican Party in the election of 1916.
Before starting on the topic proper it seemed worth while to com ider
briefly the election of 1912 because attairs and events in that election
directly influenced the one which followed in 1916.
Parly, having been in power for

~

1

In 1912 the Republican

years, had apparently become confident

and overbearing in its manner of handling governmental affairs.

It had,

consequently, incurred the enmity of many, not only those in the camp of
the opponents, but also many progressively minded men in the Republican
fold.

In the convention halls that year the wishes and demands of these

more alert, more progressive men were stifled by the 'steam roller' methods

ot the 'Old Guard' Republicans.

Ruthlessly and relentlessly the demands

and desires of this dissenting group were ignored.

Independently Jll8l1Y'

delegates and their friends lett the Republican Convention in Chicago and
1. Accounts of the eleotion ot 1912 were found in: William Thayer, Theodore
Roosevelt, Houghton Mifflin and Co., Boston, 1929, 286-377; Edward
Stanwood, History ot the PresidenT{, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1912,
285-288; and William ~Bryan, I ale of Two Conventions, Funk and
Wagnalls Co., New York, 1912, 2"52~.-11

assembling in Orchestra Hall in the same city, signified their intention
of organizing a new political party.

From this group developed the

Progressive Party.
The new group, inspired by their leader, Roosevelt, grew in numbers
and in political strength in the months between June and November, 1912.
The Republican Party was divided into two groups.

One faction, made up

of the regular Republicans continued their program. under the leadership of
their candidate, William Howard Taft, while the new Progressive group,
under the guidance of Roosevelt, enthusiastically campaigned throughout
the country.

These two groups, these two strong leaders, zealously worked

to be victorious in the election.

Consequently, instead of being a combat

between the Democrats and the Republicans, the political struggle became a
tri-cornered affair with the Republicans and Progressives struggling not so
much against the Democrats as against each other.

As was almost inevitable,

the sohi8111. in the Republican fold led to a Democratic victory and the
election of Woodrow Wilson.

For the first time in sixteen years, the

Democratic Party was to be at the helm of' the government.

iii

CHAPTER I

THE

~CONVENTION

PERIOD OF 1916

Beginning with the pre-nomination oa.mpe.ign in the earlier months of
the year a Presidential election creates much interest for the public at
large.

Newspapers, periodicals, meetings, and conversations continually

place the political activities foremost in the minds of the citizens.
Continuing through the summer the political speeches made on the campaign
tours heighten the interests Gt the political thought and only after the
votes from the last state have been recorded does the public relax and
return to normal ways of living.

Like an avalanche that is first started in

the spring the interests and political activities of the citizens in the
Presidential election continue or grow until the final count brings joy to
the victors and despair to the losers.
Early in January of 1918, rumbles of the forthcoming political battle
were heard.

Not from the camp of those in control in Washington, but from

those groups out of power, from the Republicans and Progressives came the
first sound of the political contest.

The burning question in the minds

of all who were keenly interested in political affairs was: Would the
Republicans and Progressives unite in order to defeat the Democrats?

In

1912, the Progressives had been strong ebough to cause the defeat of the
Republican nominee.

While the power of this new party had not been great

enough to elect its awn nominee, yet the tour million dissenting Progressive

1.

2

votes had been sufficient to cause the defeat of Tatt.

1

However, after

the election the new party failed to gain in numbers and in popularity.
By 1914 its decline had been definitely noted for in the Congressional
elections of that year the party received fewer than two million votes.
By 1916 the strength of the Progressive Party was being questioned.

2

How-

ever, that it still had strength, that it oould aid or hinder the Republican
Party, was not denied.

Could the Republicans afford to ignore or disregard

the Progressive group?

Did the Progressive leaders wish to enter the

Presidential campaign as a third party?
wanted to answer.

These burning questions no one

If a conciliation oould be effected, if a reunion of the

two groups could be brought about the chances of defeating the Danocrats
would become more certain.
Cautiously and carefully the Progressives made the first move.

Their

leaders gave out the statement that the Progressive Convention would be
called at the same time, in the same city as the Republican Convention,
namely, on June 7 in Chicago.

3

Two interpretations were made tram this

statement, either it meant that the Progressives were ready to enter the
Presidential campaign with the Republicans or that the Progressives meant
to induce the Republicans to nominate Roosevelt.

4

Seemingly, it was the

hope of the Progressives that the two Conventions would nominate the same
candidate and write the same principles in the platfor.ms.

Since the defeat

of the Democratic Party was the aim of both the Republioans and the Pro1. William E. Dodd. Woodrow Wilson and His Work, Doubleday, Page and Co.,
New York, 1920, 184.
2. Ibid., 184, and William Starr Meyers. The Republican Party, The Century
Co., New York, 1928, 419.
3. Meyers, 4to.
4. Editoriala "The Progressives Propose Amalgamation. "The Independent,January
24. 191§

109.

---

3

gressives the latter group showed a willingness to lay aside partisanship
5
and prejudice was the opinion expressed by one editor.
However, the
Progressive Party leaders announced that the party would continue its
allegiance to its principles of the protection of Amerioan citizens around
the world, to a program. ot complete preparedness, and that it wt>uld follow
6

only a leader who stood for these prineiples.

To this editor, this first

gesture of amalgamation indicated that
••• nothing but a shortsighted unwillingness
on the part of the Republicans to meet these
overtures in ungrudging spirit could now
seem to stand in the way of a complete and
harmoniou~ readjus~ent of the relations of
the two ~roups. 7
In the light of later events one "WOnders whether this gesture of the Progressives was

whol~hearted,

whether they meant to ever join the Republican

group or whether they meant they would merge with the Republicans on two
conditions, namely, that Roosevelt was the candidate and that his principles
became the platform.
The Republican leaders and wri tars maintained silence during the month
of January.

Only one incident worth not1ilg. occurred, namely, the speech

given by Charles Evans Hughes, a Justiee on the bench of the Supreme Court.
Before the New York Bar Association the Justice gave a very creditable
speech for which he was highly lauded and commended, but not one 1110rd was
written eoncerning the possibility· of his candidacy as a Presidential nominee.
5. Editorial: "The Progressives Propose Amalgamation."~ Independent,
January 24, 1916, 109.
6. Ibid., 109.
7. 11ii1. , 109.
8. Editorial: "Judge Hughes's Address." _!!!!Nation, January 20, 1916, 66.

8

4
Early in February the political situation was still very nebulous.
That the Progressive and Republican leaders were heartily in favor of
removing the Democrats tram their position of control was agreed upon by
all.

But this opposition to the party in power was united only in its

singleness of purpose, not in its program nor in its choice of leadership.
Two groups were struggling for party dominancy, not openly but warily.

All

indications gave evidence that the group leaders were quietly and carefully
sounding out the situation, were seeking to learn the strength of the various
factions.

Until the Convention was over eaoh group would diligently work

for the success of its aims and its ohosen leader.
The 'dyed in the wool' Progressives headed by George Perkins were the
most outspoken of the groups.

9

They indicated that definite plans were

being made for the Progressive Convention and that their program revolved
10
around Theodore Roosevelt as the Presidential candidate for the party.
However, even the Progressive Party was divided into two groups, namely,
into those who believed in the principles of the party and would only follow
their leader, Roosevelt, while the second group hoped for victory under the
banner of Roosevelt but were willing to follow a compromise leader.
The other large group was the Republican Party and it, too, was
divided, not into two groups but into three.

The first was that group of

regular Republicans known as the 'Old Guard' who, in the main, favored
Elihu Root as a Presidential oandidateJ the second group was made up ot
those who loyally and enthusiastically sponsored nominees from their native
9. George Perkins, Chairman ot the National Committee of the Republican
Party.
10.!!! ~ Tribune, February 11, 1916.

5
states; and the last group just co.ming into political prominence was
composed of those Republicans who believed that Justice Hughes of the
Supreme Court should be the standard bearer for the Republican Party in
the Presidential raoe.

However, definite aligmnents, outspoken affiliations

were not the mode of the moment.

Too much was at stake, a rash statement

too apt to be ruinous, so caution and taot were practiced by all leaders
in each group.

All were desirous of victory but were unwilling to forfeit

their particular desires by unification, at least, not until it became
absolutely necessary to do so.
Seemingly, the Progressive leaders were more willing to openly profess
their aims and plans.

Theodore Roosevelt was their choice although the

former President had made no public statement to the effect that he wished
to be considered as a candidate.

However, portions of a letter written to

a friend indicated that the Colonel was contemplating the idea of being a
Presidential candidate.

The letter stated:

Of two things, at any rate, I am sura.
In the first place I not only do not desire
but I will not take the nomination if it
comes as a result of manipulation or of any
maneuver whioh would seam to make it appear
that I am striving for my own personal
aggrandizement to secure it. Unless there
is a popular feeling in the Republioan Party
in the country at large such as to make the
Republican leaders feel that not for my sake
but for the sake ot the party and the country,
it is imperative to nominate me, why I won't
even consider accepting the nomination. In
the m xt place it is utterly idle to nominate
me it the country is in a mood either of
timidity or of that base and complacent
materialism which finds expression in the
phrase 'Safety First.' If the country is
not determined to put honor and duty ahead ot
safety, then the people most emphatically do

6

not wish
not take
anything
eighteen

me tor President. tor I will
back by one finger's breadth
I have said during the last
months •••• ll

From this lengthy statEillent one could conclude that Roosevelt would beoome
a Presidential nominee under certain conditions, the main one being it he
l2

were chosen as the candidate of' both the Republican and Progressive Parties.
The likelihood of' such a proposal had not arisen in the minds of' Republican
leaders.

Citizens and political leaders knew that Roosevelt was fervently

opposed to the Democratic administration and to the policies of President
Wilson but not all agreed as to the ulterior motives that would prompt the
13
Colonel to enter the Presidential race.
Many believed that the welfare

ot the nation rather than personal ambition was the dominant reason tor his
14
entering the political arena once again.
In Washington it was understood
that Roosevelt

was

not determined to force himselt upon the Republican Con-

vention but being desirous ot reentering the Republican Party it was
believed that the Colonel would abandon what seaned to be his special
desires in order to assure success to the Republican Party and failure to
15
the Democratic administration.
That ma~ of the voters wished to have the
former President beoome a nominee was evident frOm. the favorable sentiment
16
that was developing in many sections of' the country reported one paper.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

The Progressives seemingly felt that by being the first to declare
Henry c. Lodge. editor. Selections from the Correspondence of' Theodore
Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge. 1884=i'918;YI. Charles Scribner's Sons.
New York. !924. 479.
-Editorial: The Christian Science :Monitor (Boston), February 15, 1916.
The Christ1an-sc1ence :Monitor. February 26, 1916.
New York Tribune, February 16, 1916, and the Chicago Sunday Tribune,
February l6, l916.
The Christian Science Monitor, February 26, 1916. and The Chicago Daily
rrr'bune, February 13, 1916.
Tlje §higagg Supd§y TriRppe FebruarJ 6, 1916.

7

policies. by being the first to sponsor that prominent American. Theodore
Roosevelt. as a Presidential candidate they would be in a better position

to dominate the political situation at a later date. While they publicly
made it evident that as a party they proposed to go ahead and plan their
ovm campaign yet they made it evident that they were willing to meet and
discuss the political situation with their former enemies in the Republican
Party.

Late in February. the Republican and Progressive leaders met at a

dinner and while the Progressives stated their aims and named their candidate they. also. by their approval of several nominees proposed by the
Republican leaders. made it apparent that they might be willing to support
such nominees.

17

Meanwhile the regular Republican Party was having difficulties.
ma~

Too

factions existed within its fold. eaCh group anxious to dominate. eaoh

taction eager to place its nominee in the Whi-te House.

The one group known

as the 'Old Guard' working from its headquarters in the state of New York
was divided into several groups.

While some leading Republicans in the

state were advocating Governor Whitman for the Presidency. others proposed
Justice Hughes. while William Barnes. arch enemy of Roosevelt. heartily
endorsed Elihu Root as a Presidential candidate.

Of the three groups the

last mentioned was most powerful in the state and consequently Elihu Root
18
came to the foreground as the Presidential nominee of the 'Old Guard.'
Not only in the state of New York but also in many sections of the
country Root was looked upon favorably as a candidate.

On February 15 Root

made a stirring speech that had tar reaching effects tor it became the
17. The Christian Science Monitor. February 26. 1916.
18. New ~ Tribune, February 17, 1916.

8

keynote of the Republican Party campaign.

19

In it he bitterly assailed

President Wilson and severely criticised the pOlicies of the Democratic
administration, especially those policies relating to affairs in Mexioo,
to the tariff'J and he caustically denounced both the President and the
administration for their manner of' handling the nation's foreign affairs.
The speeoh was given wide publicity for it contained every battle cry that
the Republican Party intended to hurl against President Wilson and his
party.

It gave evidence that the Republicans were beginning to for.mulate

the grounds upon which they would challenge the Democratic administration.

20

Many were impressed by the striking similarity of Senator Root's opinions
on prominent issues and problam.s to those held by Roosevelt, so much so
that ma.ny felt that it sounded as if the speech had been written by the
21
former President.
Some felt the speech indioated that Root had thrown
his influence toward Roosevelt despite their political differences in
22
1912.
While it draw cheers from the most conservative Republicans there
was nothing in it to offend the susceptibilities of the most sensitive
Progressive was the opinion expressed by one writer.

23

However, Root failed to receive the support of' the delegates from his
own

state tor when the Republican State Convention met it decided not to

endorse aey candidate for the Presidency but rather chose to allow the state
24
delegates to attend the National Convention in Chicago uninstructed.
19. The Chicago Daily Tribiiiie, February 16, 1916.
20. "Thfd., and editorbla "Mr. Root's Speech." The American Review of'
ReVI'ews, March, 1916, 275.
21. The Chicago Daily Tribune, February 17, 1916.
22. '!bTd.
23.

1'6Id.

24. R. Ward. "The Inside of' a Convention."
1916.

~,!!!!Republic,

February 26,

9

Political friction within the state caused the decision.

Barnes, refusing

to endorse Roosevelt, sponsored Root, others sponsored the former President,
25
while another group was inclined toward Justice Ifughes.
Consequently
the fooal state of New York failed to aid in clarifying the political situation for neither Boot, Roosevelt, Whitman, nor Hughes were assured the
political support of that state.

Who was to be the Republican nominee?

New York did not answer the question.
at this State Convention.

However, some ideas were crystallized

It was believed that whether or not Boot became

a Presidential candidate he would be the logical person to write the platform of the Republican Party and that the candidate would have to fit the
principles incorporated in it.

26

Some felt that Root by his aci:iions and

words had indicated that in his opinion Roosevelt had 1:ihe necessary specifications for the Presidential office, yet the fOld Guard' made ii:; known
thai:; i 1:; was their belief thai:; Roosevelt; would eveni:iually suppori:i 1:ihe cause
of Root ali:ihough the Progressive Pari:iy had definii:iely indicated that it was
27
against the venerable Senator.
Ali:ihough the New York State Conveni:iion failed to agree upon a Presideni:iial candidate, 1:ihereby adding to 1:ihe complexii:;y of the national polii:iica
sii:iuation, the plai:iform. that was adopi:;ed by the Si:;ai:;e Convention,was i:;o
have nai:iional influence.
other Si:iate Conventions.

Ii:i was hoped that ii:; would serve as a pai:itern for
28

'.Americanism' was the keynoi:ie and 'Preparedness'

25. The Chrisi:iian Science :Monii:ior. February 19, 1916; New York Tribune,
February 17, 1916.
26. New York Tribune, February 8, 1916.
27 • Ibrd:-;-T'he Chicago nritr Tribune, February 27, 1916.
28. J'altorii'r'in The~hr s an Science Monii:ior, February 21, 1916.

10

a watchword.

It was significant that in the platform foreign af'fairs

rather than political issues were to be the focal point in the pre-oonvention campaign for while the Republicans were in accord in regard to the
dominant issues, an agreement on a oandidate was another matter.
In every Presidential election there always rises a group of men who
loyally propose and support as Presidential candidates prominent leaders
from their home states and these 'favorite sons' play a part in the preliminary rounds of the political skirmish.

In 1916 the list of 'favorite sons'

included Senator Burton from Ohio who was regarded as a most powerful figure
30
from the Middle West.
Likewise, Senator Sherman was considered a likely
candidate not only in his home state of Illinois but also on the Paoifio
31
Coast.
Friends of Governor Whi "lEan of New York had groomed him for the
Presidency but the opposing factions in the state had forced them. to drop
32
their plans.
In the West the stock of Senator Borah was being boosted as
33
Presidential, timber.
However in the earlier months of the year no one of
these potential candidates loomed particularly bright in the political sky.
The last faction to be considered among the divided Republicans was
that group of persons who were sponsoring Justice Charles Evans Hughes as a
candidate for the Presidency.

A peculiar situation in as much as the spon-

sorship was made without the approval of the Justice, in fact, with his open
disapproval.
30 •

In a letter written by the Justice his viewpoint concerning

.!!:! Christian

Science Monitor, February 21,1916; and,.!!:! Chicago Sunday
Tribune, February 19, l9l6.
31. Ibid., February 21, 1916
32. "specifications for a Presidential Candidate." The Nation,February 10,
1916, 153.
--33. The Christian Science Monitor, February 21, 1916.

11
the efforts being made in his behalf was stated as followsa
I am entirely out of polities and I know
nothing whatever of the matters to which
you refer. I am totally opposed to the
use of my name in connection with the
nomination and to the selection and
instruction of any delegate in my interests,
either directly or remotely.34
The immediate reaction to this statsnent made by the Justice was a mixed
one.

Some papers expressed the belief that Hughes was sincere in his

refusal and congratulated him upon the stand he had taken.

35

It was

believed by these editors that the name of the Justice had been presented
to the people in order to affect other nominations.

The tone used by these

writers indicated utter disgust that such tactics should have been employed.
Meanwhile, politicians were expressing their viewpoints, namely, that Hughes
in refusing to allow his name to be used in connection with the Presidential
nominations was beil2g sincere, but they felt that since he hadn't stated
that he would not accept the nomination this signified that he would accept
36
the nomination if presented by the party.
As. the days of February slipped
by more interest was shown not only in the general political situation but
in the candidacy of Hughes.

As one writer expressed:

Because of widespread confidence in his
character and admiration for his record,
the name of Charles Evans Hughes of The
United States Supreme Court has been
constantly mentioned ~n connection with
the Republican nominations for the Presidency, but there is no evidence of an
organized movement in his candidacy until
recently.37
Hi tohoock, former Postmaster General, was believed to have started the
boom for Hughes for selfish reasons. Republican Representative Slemp of
Virginia learning of the situation wrote to Justice Hughes who replied as
above. ~ Chioafo Daily Tribune,February 10,1916; and,!!!~ Tribune,
February 11, 191 •

12
It was believed in Washington that Hughes was more popular in the West and
Middle West and this was especially significant since the strength of the
38
Progressive Party was in those sections of the country.
To some this
meant that the Justice was acceptable to the Progressive leaders; others
felt that the members of the Progressive Party were not united in their
feeling toward the Justice, while others indicated that Hughes, as a candidate, was not acceptable to them because he was a reactionary, and had done
39
nothing to put him in the Progressive class.
With the closing days of February the political situation began to
take some shape.

The Republicans and Progressives were united in one idea-

defeat of the Democratic Party.

The Progressives openly were hedging, were

seeking to dominate the situation yet knew they needed the support of the
Republicans.

Publicly the Progressives gave the impression of being willing

to work along with the Republicans for the good of the nation, but actually
no other candidate than Roosevelt was acceptable to them.

As one Progressive

leader statedt

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

I propose to vote for a candidate who
honestly believes in progressive principles
of government and who is able and competent
to guide the Ship of State through troubled
waters without dishonor to the fl~ or danger
to the ship • • • We {Progressives) believe
Theodore Roosevelt is the only man in the 40
country who can fulfill these requirements.
_!!!! Chicago Daily Tribune, February 11, 1916; editorial in The Christian
Science Monitor, February 17, 1916.
Editorial: "Candidates." The American Review of Reviews, March,l916,276;
editorial in The ChristieilS"cience Monitor, Fet>ruary 17,1916; and The
Chica~ ri;~iTribune, February lO, 1916.
Edito a : Justice Hughes Out of Politics."~ Outlook, February 23,
404.
The Christian Science Monitor, February 28 1 1916.
1lie New York Tribune, February 21, 1916.
Former-"~rnor Bf;l.SS of New Hampshire as stated in The Chicago Daily
Tr?bnna, Febrnacy 27 1 1916,

13
so with Perkins and other Progressive leaders against Boot and the iOld
Guard' and f'or Roosevelt only; with Barnes and a portion of' the 'Old
Guard' against Roosevelt and strongly for Root, the name of Hughes appeared
in the list, if' 'favorite sons' can be discounted, as the only available
candidate for the party that must unite in order to defeat the Democratic
Party.
All during March the question as to who should oppose Wilson in
November continued to be unsolved.

Newspapers and periodicals warily made

efforts to sound out the thought and reaction of a public that for the
at least, was not wholly aware of the political situation.

t~e

For in March,

1916, the American affairs in Mexico claimed the focal attention of the
public only to be superseded, frequently, by ominous rumbles of affairs
across the seas.

As a leading American wrote: "Our relations with Germany

and the Mexican expedition have crowded politics to the rear, and only the
41
professionals are taking an interest."
But the election by the very nature of world conditions and by the
unusual situation existing in the Republican circles was bound to be an
important one.

A good, scholarly account of the political situation was

expressed by one editor who wrote that both the Democrats and those opposing
them were too confident of' victory and that the result would " ••• be
determined finally by the increasingly large body of patriotic citizens who,
especially in a time like this, place their country far above party or
42

prejudice."
No one was in a position to forecast. The paramount question
41. Charles Seymour. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House From Neutrality
to War, 1915-1917.:HOughton Miflin Co.;-New York, 1926,~.
42. Editoria"l:"'on Republican Candidates." The North Amerioan Review,
--March, 1916, 332.
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in the minds of many was: Can the elements comprising the opposition be
united effectively?
43

affir.mative.

In the opinion of one editor the answer was in the
.

In the years between 1912 and 1916. the differences between

the Republicans and the Progressives had been lessened•

pr~arily.

by the

Progressive leader himself and while Roosevelt wasn't ready to abandon all
Progressive principles. he had indicated that' they were of minor importance
in the " ••• face of more pressing problems."

44

The problems then became

not a question of whether the opposing groups could amalgamate. but rather
could they agree on the selection of a candidate. and could they draw up a
platfor.m that would. first. eliminate the possibility of a third candidate.
secondly. win the support of the individual voters.
'favorite sons' the race tor the
Roosevelt. Root. and Hughes.

Presiden~

Eliminating the

dwindled to three candidates:

In the opinion of this editor Hughes could be

eliminated because he did not have the necessary qualifications for the
PresidencyJ and, therefore, the question really became.

1

~ould

the regular

Republicans forgive Roosevelt and vote for him or would the Progressives
forget the part played by Root in the Convention of 1912 and be willing to
45

sponsor him."
Early in March Roosevelt added to the perplexity of the situation when
he issued a statement which announced that he prohibited the use of his name
46

on any primary ballot.

Many took this to mean that he did not wish to

run for the Presidency. However, on March 9th• the Colonel issued another
43. Editorial: "On Republican Candidates." The North American Review, March
1916, 333.
--44. Ibid., 334.
45. "''66Q. , 335.
46. The Christian Science Monitor, March 28, 30, 1916.
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statement which neither affirmed nor definitely denied his intentions to
enter the Presidential race and this action served to make the situation
more hazy than before.

His statement read as followsa

I will not enter into any tight for the
nomination and I will not permit any
factional fight to be made in my behalf.
Indeed, I will go further and say that it
would be a mistake to nominate me unless
the country has in its mood something of
the heroic - unless it feels not only
devotion to ideals but the purpose measurably
to realize those ideals in action.
It is for us of today to grapple w.L th the
tremendous national and interna tiona.l
problems of our ovm. hour in the spirit and
with the ability shown by those who upheld
the hands of Washington and Lincoln.
·
Vf.hether we do or do not accomplish this
feat, will largely depend on the action
taken at the Republiea.n and Pro~ressive
National Conventions next June. 7
In this statement he definitely requested that his name be kept from all
primary ballots so as to allow all the delegates as the convention "••• to
be free to make a choice of candidates and in accordance with the needs and
demands of the situation."

48

This statement of the Colonel's caused various reactions throughout the
country for some felt that this speech put him one step nearer to the
nomination, others gathered that it meant that he was sponsoring Hughes,
49
while those in the 'Old Guard' shuddered.
Undoubtedly they had cause for
their feeling for Roosevelt had ardent followers in many sections of the
47. Editorial: "Mr. Roosevelt and National Issues.• The Outlook, March 22,
1916, 654; The Christian Science Monitor, March W, 1916; and New York
Tribune, March 9, 1916.
-48. Ibid.
49. 'Ei'P'ressions of opinion as found in New York Tribune, March 9, 24, 1916;
and~ Chicago Sunday Tribune, March 5-;-i'9l6.
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country.

West of the Missouri River the allegiance to Roosevelt was strong

and vigorous, from the Northeastern states came indications of an earnest
desire that Roosevelt should be the eventual choice, and from Pennsylvania
came the word that Senator Penrose and his group would probably back Roosevelt.

Colonel House, a leading Democrat, was of the opinion that Roosevelt

with his ability for attracting the Western states and votes, would be the
50
logical Republican opponent to Wilson.
A poll made by two leading newspapers gave proof of a growing sentiment in favor of Roosevelt, although in
final analysis, these polls definitely indicated that most of the delegates
51
were going to the Convention uninstructed.
With so many factions fighting for supremacy and doing it so warily,

to detennine the actual strength of any one candidate was very difficult.
Many felt that Roosevelt was not helping to clarify the situation.
in the race or not?

Was he

Was the Colonel in a position to make a definite

declaration regarding his intentions toward the Presidential race?

One

editor felt that Roosevelt was in an unusual predicament for he could
neither allow his name to be used in the primaries unless he was ready to
commit himself to the candidacy nor could he allow himself to be nominated
Py the Republican Convention in Chicago on a platfor..wbioh enunciated views

contrary to those with which his public career was identified.

52

Seemingly,

the only course open for him. to take was one of waiting, of learning the
attitudes and wishes of the citizenry and abiding by their decision.

The

50. Seymour, II, 346.
51. The Chica£ Sunday Tribune, March 5, 1916; and The Christian Science
~tor.
rch 24, 1916.
--52. Editorial in The Christian Science Monitor, March 13, 1916.

1'1
voters of the nation were not in doubt as to the principles or the political
and economic viewpoints of the former President for by his deeds, actions,
and speeches he had made known to the people his position, his beliefs, on
foreign and domestic pxoblems and issues.

While the for.mer President was

willing to be the nation's executive once again, yet he was willing to
accept the nomination only under certain terms.

To gain a domestic or

international reputation, to lead as he had done in 1912 a. crusading group
under the Progressive banner were not his aims.

Rather to be chosen as the

nominee of both parties, Republican and Progressive, and to be elected the
chief executive of the nation during what apparently was to be a critical
53
period was his aim.
While Roosevelt

had~

followers he also had many enemies, for many

Republicans did not consider him the man of the hour. The events o£ 1912
54
were still fresh in their minds.
However, some o£ the stalwart leaders
of the Republican Party indicated their willingness to

aooep~

the Colonel

" ••• if'", as one editor stated, "it shall appear that he is the most avail55
able man."
Likewise, Roosevelt was gaining strength in Wall Street for
some of the financial and industrial leaders who had opposed him in 1912
56
were showing a. readiness to follow him in 191~.
During the month of' March Roosevelt gained in popularity and political
strength.

That the political situation was in his hands was the opinion of'
57
one editor.
If Roosevelt should declare that he would support the choice
53. ~r. Roosevelt and the National Issues." The Outlook, March 22, 1916;
and The Chicago
Tribune, March 28 1 !9!'6.
54. The Cllr'istia.n So enoe Monitor, March 22 1 1916.
55. I'Ofd.
56. Fred Davenport, "The Republican Trilemma." The Outlook,March 29,1916,73
57. Editorial in!!!! Christian Science Monitor, March 22, 1916.
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of the Republican National Convention the outlook would be clear; if he
should declare himself' in favor of' Hughes the breach between the two
£actions would be closed; and it he should formally announce himself' as a
candidate, he would, in the opinion of' this editor, receive the nomination
from the Republican Party at the Convention in Chicago.

58

One writer summed up the political situation by ter.ming it a trilemma
with three splendid men- Roosevelt, Hughes, and Root - seeking the
. 59

candidacy.

However, 1t can not be honestly said that Hughes was seeking

the nomination and the actions of' his friends in promoting his cause placed
the Justice in an exl:;ra.ordinary position.

He was caught between two very

respectable traditions; one, that ··a .. Justice of' the Supreme Court should not
seek the Presidency, and the other tradition that was deep in American
6)

feeling which said that no man had a right to refuse a call f'ro.m the people.
The writer

who

held the above opinion f'elt.that Hughes was hoping to abide

by both traditions by "•• .refusing to seek the office and refusing to make
61
it impossible for the office to seek him."
That Hughes was an extremely capable leader, a thorough student; of' the
law, an experienced statesman, and a man endowed with f.irm principles was
62
agreed upon by both friends and critics.
One suoh critic wrote:
He (Hughes) combines a. knowledge of practical
politics which oomes from an intimate knowledge
in political administration, with the farseeing
vision of the statesman Which comes from the
58. Editorial in The Christian Science MOnitor, March 22, 1916
59. Davenport, 16c:-eit., 738.
60. Editorial: "Let Hughes Declare Himself'." The New Republic, March 11,1916,
144.

61. Ibid.
62. 'i58.Venport, ~·~·, 738.
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knowledge of the history of the principles
that underlie our republican institutions
and the moral, social, and industrial needs
of our people. We yield to none in our
admiration for his unswerving integrity
and genuine .AmericaniSlll.63
The greatest difficulty in the way of the nomination of the Justice
was that the people had no means by which they could dis cover the views and
political alignments of Hughes.

Since his appointment to the bench in 1910

the Justice had made no speeches, written no articles that gave indications
of his viewpoints because, as he had himself stated: "The Supreme Court must
not be dragged into politics and no man is as essential to his country's
64
well being as is the unstained integrity of the courts. 11
Hughes, by his
previous actions, had indicated that his views on national policies were
strong and conservative, that he was neither a pacifist nor an advocate of
preparedness and although the public was not aware of the convictions Hughes
would take in national problems, it could be stated, wrote one editor, that:
"It is not possible to conceive Hughes in a position of responsibility and
65
then as going off on a tangent. He would do the sane thing."
However, an
admirer of Hughes felt that the detachment of the Justice from political
strife and friction added to his availibility in the minds of politicians
and cautious voters.

The fact that his current political views were not

known would make him less subject to political attack by the opposition it
66
was believed.
Since the great problem of the moment was the a.malge.m.ation of the
Progressive and Republioan factions, and since Hughes had played no part in
63. Editorial: "Justice Hughes and the Presidency." The Outlook, March 15,
1916, 602.
--64. Ibid.
_65. Fred Davenport, "Shall it Be Hughes," The Outlook, :March 15,1916, 628.
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the bitter quarrel of 1912 it was hoped that both factions 110uld be willing
to sponsor him as the party leader in 1916.
~ere

in

As so many leaders and voters

so bitterly opposed to both Roosevelt and Root because of their actions

the political upheaval in 1912, it seamed quite logical that Hughes

would be the man for the voters to follow four years later. While political
leaders and friends of the Justice were of the opinion that he would receive
the nomination yet no great interest in the candidacy of Hughes was shown
by the rank and file of the voters.

67

One by one the states held their conventions and in the majority of
the oases the delegates were sent to the Convention in Chicago w1 th no
68
instructions.
Seemingly there was a feeling among the voters of the
nation that the election would be a very crucial one, there was an awareness
that no one candidate loomed above all others, or rather that three
unusually splendid men dominated the political horizon. With the political
situation at home and abroad so vi tal yet so uncertain, w1 th Presidential
candidates having opinions either divergent or unknown, the voters adopted
the attitude of waiting to see what would happen, or, as one writer stated:
"••• there is a possibility of a change of feeling before the day of
decision arrives."

69

Meanwhile the stalwart leaders of the regular Republican organization
cominued their program of watchful waiting.

Late in March the National

Republtean Committee met to choose a chairman for the National Convention
66. Ibid., 628.
67. 1'EiVTYork Tribune, March 30, 1916; and editorial: _!!:! Christian Science

MOiiitor, March !2, 1916.
68. The Chicago Sunday Tribune, March 15, 19~6; and,!!!!~ Tribune, March
22, 24, 19l6.

69. "Presidemial Primaries and the 1916 Situation."

~

Nation,:March 30,
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but no selection was made and the meeting was deferred for another month.

70

Such dominating leaders as Barnes and Hilles could neither agree on a
71
chairmen nor on the keynote speaker.
A suggestion that the two groups,
Progressives and Republicans, amalgamate their Conventions was not well
received in the 'Old Guard' circles .for suoh a move would place the
Progressive leaders in a position to nominate Roosevelt and, while the
Republicans were unwilling to accept the Colonel, yet they were ready to
agree on another candidate, one 'Who would be satisfactory to the Progress72
Even the 'Old Guard' realized that a hope of victory .for the
ives.
Republicans in November would be lost without a united .front, yet their
immediate plans to attain that end were not an acceptance of Roosevelt.

The

'Old Guard', seemingly, was .fearful of adopting a bold .front, thereby losing
all possibilities of the Progressive support and yet by their hesitant
attitude they were allowing the Progressives to gain ground and the Roosevelt

bo~

to reach formidable proportions.

No doubt, these seasoned

political leaders felt that while their opponents were heralding to the
nation their plans and program they, by their silence, would profit by the
mistakes made by the opponents and would be in a better position to plan
counter attacks.
The political campaigns having been outlined in March, changed little
in the following month. While the Democrats were solidly united in their
1916, 349]Editorials: •candidates." !he American Review of Reviews, March
1916, 275; and The Chicago Sundal Tri'Duiie, Maroli 25, 1916-;70. The Chicago Sunday Tribune, March 19, l916.
71. 1lie Christian Science MOnitor, March 22,1916; New York Tribune, March 21,
!916.
-72 • .!!!'! ~ Tribune, March 13, 1916.
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efforts to renominate and re-elect Wilson. the Republicans were torn asunder
by the divergent groups within their ranks.

While the voters were cognizant

of the wisdom of choosing the next executive of the nation, both wisely and
carefully, yet their political decision was hampered by the strangeness of
73
the situation.
Seemingly, the list of active Republican nominees had
dwindled to two, Roosevelt and Hughes, yet the former, as one newspaper
stated:
"• •• is not a candidate and there is no
open assurance that he will accept the
nom'nation. The defensive ar.my bears
Hughes' banner, but cannot assure the
voter that the Justice will accept the
nomination if it be offered to him.74
Each was a candidate and yet not a candidate.

If the sincere hope of the

parties was to be realized, namely, the fusion of the Republicans and the
Progressives, then it

se~ed

to one editor that the wisest move was to have

the nomination seek the man, "• •• one who would make the strongest appeal
75
to the sentiment of' the country."

On March 31, Roosevelt set off a political bombshell by lunching at
the home of' former Ambassador Bacon and among the guests were General Wood
76
and Roosevelt's erstwhile en~, Elihu Root.
It was the first time these
two political leaders had met in five years and although the occasion was

supposedly not of a political nature, yet the meeting of leaders of opposing
.factions could not help but be significant.
the
73.
74.
75.
76.

Deep meanings were given to

so called reunion, yet strangely each group gave opposite interpretatio
Editorial in The Christian Science Monitor, March 22, 1916.
New York Tribune, April 3, 1916.
1'6I'd., editorial, April 6, 1916.
Account of the luncheon taken .from: New York Tribune, April, 1916;
~ Chicago Daily Tribune, April 11,""'!916; and !h!, Christian Science
Monitor, April 11, 1916.
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The Progressive leaders were elated for they were sure that the meeting
indicated that the Colonel had broken through the defense of the 'Old
Guard' and that Roosevelt was out to win the Republican nomination from a
77
united party.
It was pointed out that Root's keynote speech in the
previous month had been

1

pr~paredness 1

which was the slogan of Roosevelt.

78

George Perkins at a later Progressive conference emphasized the political
importance of Roosevelt's meeting with Root, reiterated his belief that
throughout the nation there was a growing sentiment for Roosevelt, and,
therefore, the Progressive organization would go ahead with its plans for
its Convention, and it expected to have a more representative body of
'
79
delegates in June than it had had in 1912.
Some leaders felt the coming
together of Root and Roosevelt indicated that an effort to

to~

a coalition

govermn.ent was in the offing while others, with a feeling of hopefulness,
believed the meeting assured victory for the Republican Party.

80

It was

one writer's opinion that the gathering together of men who had opposed each
other in 1912 indicated that the'differences over which they had disagreed
had been 'ironed out' and these leaders, having wisdom and foresight,
appreciated that the events of the day were leading to a national crisis,
81
the solution of which demanded a reunion of Republican forces.
Among the
'Old Guard' opinions differed as to the significance of the luncheon meeting.
Soma felt that it indicated that Roosevelt was considering the possibility
ot giving his support to Root while other Republicans ware confident that
77. Ibid.
78. l'DICT.
79. "fli'echristian Science Monitor, April 1, 1916.
so. ~Luncheon and a Mora!." The New Republic, April 8, 1916, 235.
81. Editorial: "Root, Roosevel~and Reunion." The Outlook, April 12, 1916 1
829.
-

~

------------------------------------------------.
24

the Colonel had decided to support Justice Hughes.

82

Within a week after the luncheon Roosevelt gave out a clear, ringing
statement of his views.

.

To a political

v~sitor

from Washington he stated:

Get it perfectly clear in your head that
if you nominate me it IIDlst not be because
you think it is in my interest, but because
you think it is in your interest and the
interest of the Republican Party and
because you think it is in the interest
of the United States to do so.B3
In no uncertain terms the Colonel reiterated that

ther~

would be no

•pussyfooting' on any issues raised by him, that the platform upon which he
could stand must contain a policy of ample and thorough preparedness, that
he wuld not tolerate any samblanoe of hyphenated Amerioanism for he
believed that:
Every American citizen IIDlBt be for
America first and for no other country
even second and he has not any right
to be in the United States at all if he
has a divided loyalty between this
country and my other.84
He clearly stated his attitude tq,w&rd war when he said:
I em not for war. On the contrary I abhor
tm unjust tmd lm.nton war and I would use
every honorable expedient to avoid even a
just war. But· I feel with all my heart
that you don't in the long run avoid war by
maldng other people believe that you are
afraid to fight for your own rights.85

82.
83e
84.
85.

New York Tribune, April 2, 1916.
The CJifO'ago Dally Tribune, April 6, 1916.
1'Drd.
I'SI'(t.

-
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In conclusion he said:
•. • the surest way to keep peace and to
keep it on terms that will enable Americans
to hold their heads high and net hang them
in shame is for him (Uncle Sam) to be so
prepared in advance and I mean prepared in
his own soul, as well as with his army and
navy, that when he says anything the rest of
the world will know that he means it and that
he can make it good. 86
The statement was stirring and typically Rooseveltian.

Not once did he

openly say that he was a candidate for the Presidency, yet very clearly did
he enunciate the terms under which he V«>uld consider accepting a nomination
for that office.

Perhaps it was his inimitable way of serving notice upon

his ancient foe, the 'Old Guard' that it would net do to try to run him. on
a platform that dealt with platitudes or on one designed to attract any
element in the voting population that might be repelled by an out and out
87
statement of principles. This was the opinion given by one newspaper.
The speech had far reaching et:f'ects.

•

It net only served to clarify

in the minds of the voters the policies and principles o:f' the :f'ormer Presi-

dent, but 'With damaging ef:f'ects it brought cut the :f'act that his opponent,
Justice Hughes, was silent as to his views on all the important problems
and issues of the day.

Once again there was a countryi1i.de boom for Roose-

velt, at least, these Republican or rather those anti-administration newspapers by their editorials and news articles lead the public to so believe.
It becomes very di:f'ficult for a reader to decide whether some of the newspapers of that period expressed the actual political sentiment of the people
or that their glowing reports were only an expression of the beliefs they
hoped or would like to have the voters express.

Eapeoially in the West and

~

--------------------------------------------------------~2~6

Middle West the newspapers gave forth the opinion that the people were
giving their allegiance to Roosevelt and to the principles for Which he
88

stood.

That he was the man the people wanted, the man the people believed

in, the man who could be trusted to lead the Nation in an honorable manner

during the critical times to come was the growing sentiment of many leaders
89

and citizens.

The Democrats in Washington were becoming fearful for to

them all signs pointed to a fusion of the Progressive and Republican
factions before June and to a harmonious Republi oan Party with Roosevelt as
90
the chosen leader.
This situation, naturally, was not to their liking.
Det'inite statements and information concerning the candidacy of
Justice Hughes could not be made by those who sponsored him as the Presidential candidate.

Conjecture was all they could offer.

It was the fir.m

belief of his friends that the Justice would accept the nomination if it
were offered to him for Hughes was reported to have said that "••• he could
not refuse the Presidential nomination if it came to him properly and that
91
he would not enter such a refusal."
The sentiment that the Justice would
accept the nomination if the conditions were propitious crystallized during
the month of April.

A movement was started to prove that the Justice was

'right' on the main issues on which it was expected the campaign would be
92
started.
Friends and critics alike agreed that the toughest barrier to
86. Ibid; other accounts of the speech found in: New York Tribune, April 6 1
mG; and The Christian Science :V..onitor, Aprfi"'6,"""i91'6.
87. New York Trrbune, April 6, 1916.
88. New York Tribune, April 3, 6, 7, 1916; The Christian Science Monitor,
Ipri~ 1916; and The Chicago Daily TribUne, Ipril 6, 1916.
89. Editorial "The Pre Nomination C~.w The Outlook, April 19,1916,880.
90. The Christian Science Monitor, April 11, 19l6.
91. ~ chicago Daily Tribune, April 6, 1916.
92. :t!ew York Tribune, April 5, 1916.
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cross, the greatest stumbling block, the highest obstacle to surmount in the
proposed nomination of Justice Hughes was the fact that no one knew his
oonviotions, his viewpoints on the current problems and political issues.
HiS position on the bench of the highest court in the land prevented him

from making any statement concerning them.

93

Those who opposed Hughes agreed that as long as he was a member of the
supreme Court, he should not express his viewpoints on current political
problems but as long as his convictions remained unknown they felt he could
94

not be considered as a Presidential nominee.

One writer summed up the

situation aptly when he wrote:
I£ the Republi oans nominate Mr. Hughes
they will nominate an unknown quantity.
They will nominate a man of the highest
character and ability, but one whose lips
are artificially sealed on the great
problems facing us.95
Another group who opposed the nomination of the Justice did so on the score
that the greatest service that the Justice could render to his country was
96
to continue "00 serve, ably and well, as a member of the Supreme Court.
Only from intimate friends and political associates of Justice Hughes
oould the Republican sponsors glean information as to the views and ideas
97

of the Justice on the current problems.

It was reported that the Justice

favored the development of the navy, the doubling of the size of the anny,
the upholding of the Monroe Doctrine; that he believed that at the outbreak
93. Ibid.; and The Chicago ftill Tribune, April 4, 1916. Likewise, similar
view expressea Tn an ad or~a!: "The Pre-Nomim tion Campaign." The Outlook, April 19, 1916, 880.
94. "Justice Hughes and the Presidency. 11 The Outlook, March 15,1916, 602.
95. Editorial:"The Pre-Nomination Campaign." The OUtlook, April,l9, 1916, 880
96. Ibid.
---97. New York Tribune, April 5, 1916.
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of the war the nation should have prepared for aggression; that American
rights and property should be protected by force, if necessary; that we
should not have interfered in Belgium at the outbreak of the war; an.d the. t
he was opposed to our withdrawal from the Philippines until the people in
the islands were ready for self government.

98

HOwever, secondhand knowledge was not satisfactory to the voters of
the nation and so the Justice continued to be regarded by many in a
suspicious manner.

Even those who admired him as a man and as a judiciary

were reluctant to consider him as a Presidential candidate.

That a member

of the Supreme Court should enter a political contest for the Presidency
was distasteful to many citizens.

One writer seemingly expressed the

opinion of many who believed as he did when he wrote:
• • • his convictions that no member of
the Supreme Court should ever entertain
any political ambitions whatever since,
in his view, the safety of the country
might sometime depend upon a general
confidence in the Supreme Court and
such a confidence could not exist if
there should be a possibility that its
decisions could be influenced by the
99
personal ambitions of any of its members.
Refutal of this conviction came from one who earnestly advocated the candidaoy of the Justice for, in his opinion, the Justice was not using his
judicial office as a •stepping stone to a political office' nor would the
100
courts suffer by his action.
Likewise, he felt that such action would
98. Jacob Schurman, "Hughes-Why." The Independent, May 29, 1916, 329; also,
editorials: "Nobody for Hughes.* The North American Review, May,l9l6,64150; and The Chicago Daily Tribune, April 9,19fr.99. William Garrill, "The Candidacy of Justice Hughes." The Nation,April 13,
1916, 405.
---lOO.Editorial: "Hughes not a Political Judge." The Nation, April 6, 1916,316.
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not become a precedent, that the bench would not be made a place for
nursing political ambition and if' Hughes were nominated it would not become
a " ••• ease of' a political judge gaining the end of' his manoeuvres on the
bench but of a man called to public service wholly irrespective of his course
101
as a judge."
On all sides the controversy was waged on the question:
Should Justice Hughes become a Presidential candidate?

To many it apparently

seemed unfortunate that a man as fine and splendid as Charles Evans Hughes
could not have been in a position to openly declare his willingness to become
a candidate for the Presidency.

Yet had he not been a member of the highest

oourt in the land would the political leaders and citizens have drafted him
as a candidate? Was not his prominence as a Justice on the Suprema Court
a major reason, a dominating factor in their conviction that he was a
desirable candidate for the Presidency?

The most unfort\mate angle of the

whole situation was the fact that in 1912 the Justice had indicated his
attitude to•vard the Supreme Court and the Pr13sidency.

'When questioned in

that year as to his willingness to became a candidate for the Presidency
he had said:
I hope that as a Justice of the Supreme
Court, I am rendering public service and
may continue to do so for many years; but
the Supreme Court must not be dragged
into politics and no man is as essential
to his country' s well being as is the
unstained integrity of the courts.l02
That in 191S Hughes still held to the above view can be deduced from the fact
that in the interim of four years no action nor statement had been made by

him refuting this conviction.
101. Editorial: "Hughes not a Political Judge." The Nation, April 6,1916 1 376.
102. Fred Davenport, "The Republican Nomination.""""''The Outlook, March 15,1916,
628.
-
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I£ this political struggle o£ 1916 had been waged between the two
contestants, Roosevelt and Hughes, the story would have been far more simple•
It vms the part played by the 'Old Guard' that complicated the situation.
That they were a dominant force can not be denied and that as shrewd, crafty,
experienced politicians they played a •waiting game' in the months before
the convention must be admitted.

Having no powerful candidate to propose

other than Root, "Who had few followers West o£ the Allegheny Mountains, they
were forced to choose between Roosevelt and Hughes.

However, this they

were not ready to do, so they adopted the course o£ playing one candidate
against the other and by so doing they hoped in the end to dominate the
situation and to nominate a oandidate o£ their own choosing.

While the

irreconoilables were not ready to support Roosevelt yet a victory £or the
103
Republican Party was their paramount aim.
To win without the Colonel was
their hope but eventually, i£ events so dictated, they would be forced to
accept him, but meanwhile they continued to be non-committal in regard to
him.

This attitude was not taken by such hidebound Republicans as Barnes and

his followers who, because of their intense hatred £or Roosevelt, definitely
104
intimated that party defeat was preferable to victory under Roosevelt.
These seasoned politicians were certainly in a predicament.

Roosevelt

in his stirring speeches against the Democratic administration had

practically drawn up the Republican platfor-m, had enunciated the principles
105
upon Which the Republicans could hope to defeat the Democrats.
The
ma orit of the Re ublicans, while StAtisfied to inau rate the principles o£
103. Editorial: "The Pre-Nomination Campaign." The Outlook, April 19, 1916,
880; and New York Tribune, April 7 1 1916. 104. The Christi&'n"'Scfenoe Monitor, April 8 1 1916.
los. "NeW York Tri'bune, April 6, 1916.
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Roosevelt into the party platform, felt that Roosevelt by his dominating
manner had overstepped his prerogatives.

As one leader stated that "••• he

(Roosevelt) is trying to dictate the platfonn, the nominee, and run the
106
~ole party, even before he is back in it.•
How some of the 'stand pat•
RepUblicans of the 'Old Guard' hated Roosevelt, for to them his perfidy of

1912 was still very fresh in their minds, yet they had to face the fact
as it was in 1916.

As one delegate from Massachusetts expressed it: "If it

shall appear that there is no alternative to Roosevelt and victory or some

other nominee and division and defeat, then it may be taken for granted that
the •regulars' of Massachusetts will prove neither stubborn nor rebellious.
107
It will be 'Anything to Beat Wilson at Chicago."
However, if it was to
be the Colonel because of his drawing power, then it must be with the control
108
of the party in the hands of the 'Old Guard'.
One of the first moves
made by this Republican group to accomplish their purpose was to draw up a
"••• platfor.m containing a ringing declaration of the attitude of the
109
Republican Party toward Americanism., preparedness, and the tariff."

By

espousing the two oauses closest to the heart of the Colonel, the wily
politicians hoped to outsmart Roosevelt and force his followers, first, to
agree to the principles written into the platform and then "00 accept any

man nominated upon it.
That the 'Old Guard' was unwilling to support Roosevelt unless forced
llC
to do so was true yet they were really not favoring Hughes as their candidate.
106. New York Tribune, April 7, 1916; and~ Christian Scienoe Monitor,
April 11 1 1916.
107. Editorial: The Christian Science Monitor, April 27, 1916.
lOB. Ibid.
109. New York Tribune, April 29, 1916.
110. New York Tribune, April 23, 1916.
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With many in the Republican group the Justice was a second choice and if he
1f8.S

the only one who could defeat Roosevelt, then all was well and good.

HoW"ever another candidate, one of their own group, and wi. th

ID.a.ey"

this was

If, as events developed, their allegiance to Hughes
111
became unnecessary, they were ready to cmnge their allegiance.
Continuing
Root, was preferable.

to be non-committal the members of the 'Old Guard' looked forward to the
events at the Convention for the final results.
Of the • favorite sons • little need be said.

The common opinion was

that their names would be eliminated after the first ballot.

While it was

true that at maey of the State Conventions the name of the leading oi tizen
was proposed as a candidate for the Presidency, yet these political figures
had little influence outside of the native state.

One editor expressed the

current opinion that the old idea of each state proposing a candidate was
gone.

112

In more recent elections the dynamic men, leaders in the nation's

limelight, overshadowed the state choices.
As the month of April came to a close, only a rash prophet would forecast the evenbs of June.

The Republican Party was stilldisorganized, but

hopeful of a harmonious reunion.

In order to win, the party must unite,

unite on a platform and on a candidate presenting a sharp contrast to the
113
candidate and platform of the Democratic Party.
The Republicans had hoped
to win as a result of the unpopularity of the Dsuocratio administration but
this probability had become remote. The Democrats, according to one writer,
111. New York Tribune, April 3, 1916; and The Christian Science Monitor,
IpririT, 1916.
112. Editorial: "A Bad Year· For Favorite Sons." The Nation, April 13,1916,
113. Editorial: "The Republican Dilenma." The Ne'i'Repu'61io, April 29, 1916,
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,ere forestalling Republican criticism of governmental affairs by adopting
a more active Mexican policy. by increasing the anny and the navy. and while
the Democrats were not able to propose definite convictions concerning
114
affairs across the waters, neither were the Republicans.
Therefore, the
Republicans were not able to use criticism of the Aaninistration as an
effective means to attain victory as they had previoualy planned to do.

The

Republicans needed an aggressive leader and a sharp issue and they oould not
get it unless they were willing to pay a high price, concluded this editor.

115

In the weeks before the Convention one 'WOUld expect to find definite
alignments being made, a closer harmoey o.f the three factions. efforts being
made to subordinate the hopes o.f each group in order to bring victory to the
party to 'Which• in the final analysis. all groups gave their allegiance.
However, this was not the true picture.

May was only a repetition o.f the

previous months with each group .fighting .for the advantage point, each
unwilling to give in one iota. each claiming to have the perfect nominee,
a.nd each confident; that victory was theirs.
During the month the amount of printed matter devoted to the forthcoming
political event; both in the periodicals and newspapers increased in volume
and in intensity.

All attention was .focused on the question: Who "WOuld be

the Republican candidate?

During the month those papers and periodicals

~ich favored Roosevelt as the Presidential nominee published his speeches,

lauded his viewpoints, extolled

his character, and did everything within

~heir power to promote his candidacy.
114. Ibid.
115. "i'bid.

-

The principles .for which the Colonel

~·~----------------------------------~~
M
~

stood were clearly and forcibly reviewed and summarized into four cardinal
points, namely, first, for a revision of the tariff' scaleJ second, for a
government honestly and efficiemtly administered; third, for a definite
116
program of preparedness J and fourth, for a strong foreign policy.
Vigorously and consistently during the previous twenty months the Colonel
had enunciated his viewpoints in regard to Mexican and European af.t'airs,
the very ideals which for years had been in full accord with "••. the best
traditions and prevailing sentiment of the Republican Party, 11 wrote one
117
staunch Independent Republican.
Another believed that the Colonel was
the only candidate who could put up an effective and significant opposition
118
to the Democratic administration.
The

Co~onel

because of his speeches and announcements from his home

in Oyster Bay was continually in the limelight and the attention paid to
him was summed up as being indioative of his popularity.

There can be no

doubt but that they who were working for him left no stone unturned to
accomplish their purpose.

Leagues and organizations were formed to further

his causa, a cause which in the opinion of his critics was on the ebb until
119
the Colonel began his nationwide speaking tour.
One of the most important
organizations formed was called the Roosevelt Non-Partisan League whose aim
116. The Christian Science Yon11x>r, May 31, 1916; William McDonald, "Why
JraEbllcan Party; Needs Mr. Roosevelt." The Outlook, May 10,1916, 88-92;
Theodore Roosevelt, "NoPigtails for Uncle Sam." The Independent, May 22,
1916, 273; and "Roosevelt, Hughes, or
?"Tiie Indepenaent, May
15, 1916, 231.
--~17. McDonald, loo. cit., 90.
~18. Editorials"""""Rep'Ubrican Debt to Mr. Roosevelt.".!,!:!!!,! Republic, May 20,
1916, 52.
~19. Editorial: "The Race Between Hughes and Roosevelt." Current Opinion,
June, 1916, 275.
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to express and crystallize public opinion in the behalf of Roosevelt as
120
a presidential candidate.
This league sent a long letter to the Colonel

1'18.S

explaining the purpose of the organization which, of course, was to further
the nomination of Roosevelt.
1 ation

In the Colonel's reply he stated to the organi-

that he earnestly approved of its work but that his nomination would

have to be made with a full understanding that it meant "••. hearty indorsement of the principles for which I stand," and he again reiterated his
121
attitude toward preparedness and peace.
A queer situation, indeed, when
a man endorsed the wrk of an organization the purpose of which was to
further his nomination when up to the moment the man had not signified his
willingness to be a candidate for the nomination.

Of course, after the

letter was published in the papers many believed that it was tantamount to
an avowal of his candidacy and that he was desirous of obtaining the nomin122
ation from both the Republican and Progressive Parties.
Other organizations under the leadership of business and professional
125
men were formed to aid Roosevelt in his political campaign.
The "WO~en,
too, under the leadership of Harriet Vittum banded together to further the
cause of Roosevelt since he, in the previous month, had made known his
124
willingness to sponsor the Federal Suffrage Amendment.
Labor, although not
organized into official groups, had given evidence of aligning its votes
120. Editorial: ~anted- A Statesman." The Outlook, May 31, 1916, 250;
"Issues and Men." Current Opinion, June 1916, 381; The Christian Science
Monitor, May 10, 1916; The Daily Chicago Tribune, May 18, 1916; and New
York Tribune, May 16, 1916.
121. rn:e-cEristian Science Monitor, May 12, 15, 1916.
122. Tne Chicago Daily Tribune, :May 12, 1916; and New York Tribune, :May 12,
1916.
-123. New York Tribune, May 9 1 22, 1916.
124. The ChiCago Daily Tribune, N.ay 22, 1916.
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with the Colonel.

labor was expressing oonfidence in him and was confident

that he would, if' elected, do everything in his power to push the social
125
justice planks of' 1912.
Seemingly, men, women, politicians, business men,
and labor groups were eager to see the i'orm.er President stand once more on
the portico of' the 'White House.
Naturally, many opposed Colonel Roosevelt.

The 'Old Guard', the

ultra... conservative Republicans, and that group of' the citizenry which might
126
be termed Gennan....America.n did everything to lessen his cmnces of' victory.
This last group had indicated its unwillingness to support the Colonel
because in his speech in st. Louis he had openly condemned certain groups of'
German-Americans i'or attempting to shape American politics and he had
127
vehemently denounced all Americans in the hyphenate group.
Lastly, it
was reported that those Progressives in the Vfest, who were lukewarm in their
attitude toward preparedness, had lessened their enthusiasm i'or Roosevelt
128
because his views on the subject were too extreme i'or them.
During the month of' May the Justice continued to be non... committal in
regard to the political situation.

Those who di si'avored his candidacy

continued their opposition on the several scores already mentioned, always
stressing their main points - that no one knew the views of' the Justice. His
129
supporters answered this charge.
One editor, in defending Hughes wrote:
125. New York Tribune, May 24, 1916.
126. 'i50dd~4; editorials: "The Republican Turning Point." The Nation, :!l..e.y
4, 1916, 472; "Nobody For Hughes." The North American Revfew, :Me.y,l916,
647; and The Chicago ~a;!Y Tribune,lla'y 36, 1916.
127. The ChioaFD811y Tri une, June 1, 1916; and The Christian Soienoe
~tor, June 1, l9l6.
--128. The Chicago Sunday Tribune, May 21, 1916.
129. Editorials: "Silence of' Justice Hughes and Its Ei'i'eots." Current Opinicn
June 1916, 5; "The Republican Party." The North Americe.n_Review, June
1916,803; "The Republican Debt to Roosevelt." The New Republic,May 20,
1916, 52
--
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"It is for his demonstrated quality, not for his unkno'Wn opinions that so

rns.!r/ Republicans in so many parts of tm country have been turning to him
130
for their best hope this year."
The personality of the Justice, his
impeccable claracter, and his splendid public record were of such a nature
as to inspire the con1'idence of the voting population.
"Vfe, the People, care more for what a man is than for what he says,"

stated another.

131

Did it

matter so much that Hughes remained silenb

seemed to be the view of these editors.
toward the disturbing affairs in Europe?

Suppose no one knew his attitude
Since the Republican Party had not

issued a party plank on that question perhaps a nominee was vdse to remain
silent on the issue.

Suppose Mr. Hughes had not given out a statement as

to the program he would adopt toward international affairs if elected?
Neither had the other nominees adopted so foolhardy a task.

Perhaps the

silence of the Justice was not so great a detriment to his cause.
Over and over again the papers and periodicals stated that Hughes was
the popular choice of the people; that they, the voters, were interested in
electing a "••• man brave, wise, honest, independent, and strong enough to
grapple successfully with whatever issues may arise. 11

132
Or as another

writer phrased it
• • • the people were contident that Mr.
Hughes would not fail to meet any situation
involving our Nation's dignity and honor
with an intelligence, a oourage, a spirit
and a disregard of consequences to himself
equal to that of Mr. Root, or of Mr. Roosevelt or of any other livin .American.l33
ug es an T e Progress ves.
e Na on, May
,
,
"Nobody For Hughes."~ North Aiiierican Review,May 1916,

o.
•
131.
132. Ibid.
133. Editorials: "Hughes-Why. "~~rrg~:h:~egt May 29, 1916, 329; similar
news found: ~ughes and t
o
• 1 The Nation, May 26,1916,529;

"

n
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one periodical made an interesting report of the favorable attitude of the
voters toward the candidacy of Hughes as expressed by them in letters sent
134
to twenty nine leading newspapers throughout the country.
Early in May
one leading Democrat wrote:
The Roosevelt tide has receded and that
of Hughes is advancing. Roosevelt has
overplayed his hand and the reaction has
set in. He may be nominated but it does
not look like him today.l35
Polls taken in Congress and in legislative and political groups in various
sections of the country reported results in favor of Hughes yet the limitations of these polls were so evident that the results gave scant indications
136
of the will of the voters.
While the supporters of Roosevelt were claiming victory for him the
friends of Hughes were making the same claim for the Justice.

Those who

argued for the nomination of Hughes favored him because they were of the
opinion that he was the most popular choice among all classes of the

nation~

that he had proven himself a highly efficient executive and competent
leader, that he would act as a harmony candidate who would heal the breach
137
of 1912 and reunite the Republican Party~
that the people wanted him
because he did not want to run, and that "• •• on issues growing out of the

39
.A.lthough the views of Hughes remained unknown it was assumed that the Justice
vrould not consider an invitation to l-eave the bench and make a campaign for
the

Presiden~

if he were not as strongly opposed to the policies and
139
methods of President Wilson as was Roosevelt.
However, granted that Hughes had a. good chance of winning the nomination the question still remained, Would he accept the nomination? While
his silence had been interpreted to mea.h his acquiescence, yet it was
generally agreed that he would withdraw from the contest or refuse the
nomination if an "••. unseemly struggle for delegates occurs in which a
Justice of the Supreme Court would be made to appear as a contestant" wrote
one political writer.

140

Justice would withdraw.

It was believed that i f Roosevelt opposed him the

141

Early in May the group knovm as the 'Old Guard' came out into the open
and entered the campaign in an active way.

Opening headquarters in the city

of New York they set about to accomplish their purpose, namely, to dominate
the Convention in June, to have their candidate or one who was agreeable to
them nominated in Chicago, and to defeat the Democrats in November.

Elihu

Root was their choice as the Presidential candidate even though they were
aware that although he was popular and well received in the East, be was
looked upon with disfavor by the voters of the territory west of the
Allegheny Mouta.a.ins.

142

During the first months of 1916 the 'Old Guard' had

138. "A Ballot of Republicans in Congress." The American Review of Reviews,
June 1916, 726.
---139. Ed.i toria.l: "Need of a Positive Attitude." The .American Review of
Reviews, June 1916, 648-649.
140. ~e Chicago Daily Tribune, May 23, 1916.
141. The Christian Science MOnitor, May 31, 1916.
142. The Christian Science Monitor, May 3, 1916; The Chicago Sunday Tribune,
May 7 ,1916; and New~ Tribune, May 4, lS,J:'S, l916.
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been confident that any Republican candidate would be victorious in the
election in November, but it had been the opinion of many that this attitude
143
The 'Old Guard' must have been aware that oilly
was a sheer bluff.
Roosevelt or Hughes could defeat President Wilson.

However, defeat of the

Democratic administration and a victory for the Republican Party was their
sole goal.

They well knew that it was absolutely necessary to have the

votes of the Progressive group apd in order to be assured of this they had
announced a straightforward platfor.m thereby hoping to secure the support
of Roosevelt and the Progressives whom they felt were more anxious to defeat
the Democratic administration than to enter the political arena as a third
144
If they oould eliminate Roosevelt as a contender for the Presiparty.
dency and at the same time be assured of the support of the Progressives
they hoped to convince the Convention that Elihu Root muld be the man to
145
bring victory to the Republican Party in November.
To attain their end
they had maneuvered and manipulated, had pitted Hughes against Roosevelt,
hoping thereby to eventually eliminate both men and to be able '00 put up
146
their own candidate.
However, when it became so evident that the voters of the nation were
showing a decided interest in both Roosevelt and Hughes, the'Old Guard'
became so concerned that secret conferences were held and plans were reorganized.

Since they were unwilling to accept Roosevelt their only alterna-

tive was to be content with Hughes.

However, if Roosevelt could be elimin-

143. New York Tribune, May 15, 1916.
144. Editorial: "Roosevelt and the Progressives." The North American Review,
June 1916, 801; New York Tribune, May 24, 19l"B";and The Christian
Science Monitor, May"S'r," 1916.
145. New York Tribune, May 2, 1916.
146. "E'Crrtor1a1"i'""'Wli'"o1s Back of Hughes, the People or the Old Guard?" Current
0 inion June 1916 32
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ated and Hughes did withdraw, the stage would be set to their liking, yet
if Hughes did not withdraw they would be forced to accept the Justice
"••• with appropriate relief in escaping Roosevelt but with misgivings of
147

the future..," was the opinion of one newspaper man.
seemingly was alarmed.

The 'Old Guard'

With the Convention so near and with the poli tioal

situation practically the same as it had been at the outset they could be
definitely sure of only one thing, namely, they were quite certain of the
support of the delegates from the state of New York and this was a point in
their favor, for w.i thout the support of the pivotal state of New York it
148
was felt that neither Roosevelt nor Hughes could win the nomination.
On the eve of the Convention the Republican Party was definitely
divided into three factions, each with its chosen candidate, each working
desperately to assure victory for its chosen leader.

MOst assuredly the

delegates and political leaders must have entrained for Chicago with mixed
apprehensions as to the outcome of the Convention.
147. The Chicago Daily Tribune.., May 23, 1916.

148. New York Tribune, May l5, 24, 1916.

CHAPTER II
THE PROGRESSIVE AND REPUBLICAN CONVENTIONS
Before considering the interesting subject, the political conventions,
a survey of the nation as to political thought and economic conditions
seamed to be in order.

A review of the newspapers and periodicals of May

and June had led one to believe that the

people~

the actual voters of the

nation, were not extremely interested in the conventions nor in the election
in November.

More space was given to other news items, mainly to the

disturbing affairs in Mexico and in Europe.

~ither

these, by their very

nature, were of more vital concern to the people or else the citizenry,
having the 'steam roller' efforts of 1912 still fresh in their minds were
aware that the political leaders of the parties would run the Conventions
to suit their ovn1 plans.

Then, too, the primaries had failed to play the

part expected of them, owing to the fact that neither Roosevelt nor Hughes
1

had permitted his name to be placed on these state primaries.

Throughout

the nation and especially in the Middle West there seemed to be a feeling of
apathy, a lack of interest in the approaching political Conventions to be
2

held in Chicago.
l."Issues and Men." Current Opinion, June 1916 1 380.
2. Fred Davenport. ''Political 'Ihinking in the Middle West." The Outlook, May
31, 1916, 266-269; editorial. "Is the Country in a Heroio~od." The
American Review::.£ Reviews, June 1916, 650.
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The reasons for this feeling were not difficult to find. The nation
was experiencing an era of prosperity, was enjoying the benefits derived
3
£rom high wages and flourishing business conditions.
The general consensus
seemed to be that business was striding forward at a great pace; wages were
increasing rapidly; workers were in great demand, in fact, the demand overbalanced the supply; domestic consumers were buying heavily; and the nation
4

and the workers were benefiting from an era of increased prosperity.
Whether this prosperity was real or would disappear with the cessation of
the war in Europe was a mooted question.

5

However, a prosperous, well-fed

nation of people was not likely to become overwhelmingly interested in a
political battle.
The voters may have been disinterested b?t not the throngs which
traveled to Chicago to view or to participate in the political drama that
was scheduled to begin on June 7.

Days before the doors of the Coliseum

opened for the Republicans and the portals of the Auditorium swung back to
welcome the Progressives the lobbies of the Michigan Avenue hotels were
thronged with the politically minded; not only with the important leaders
whose sincere hope it was that a conciliation between the members of the two
parties oould be effected, but likewise, with the lesser political figures
who may or may not have known what it was all about.

6

----·--------------------------------3. Editorials in The Christian Science MOnitor, May 5, 12, and 28, 1916;
editorial: "An~a o£ High Prices." The American Review of Reviews, May
1916, 533-535.
---4. Editorial: "The Golden Egg." The New Republic, May 27 1 1916, 79-80.
5. Theodore Price. "American Busines"S'"'as Af'fected by Peace and Preparedness~'
The Outlook, May 24, 1916, 225-229.
6. The Chicago Daily Tribune. June 1-6, 1916; and Chicago Examiner, June
1-6, 1916.
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On the eve of the Conventions several writers expressed their viewpoints as to the emotional attitudes of the delegates and their political
parties.

One wrote:
The Republican Party is f'i ghting within
itself for its soul, for a policy and
a leadership of national altruism and
power i'ul Amari cani sm.

Another stated that the party was "••• disunited, distracted, and demoralis ad ••• " and was " ••• without any definite policy or coherent program •••• "
while a third saw the whole situation as an example of 'Republican

7

:f'umbli~

In the week prior to the opening of the conventions the newspapers
were filled with articles favoring the nomination of Justice Hughes and
impetus was given to his cause by the announcement made by the Executive
Committee of the Progressive Party.

It reported that the Progressive Party

was ready to support the Justice on two conditions, first, if the Republican
Party absolutely refused to nominate Colonel Roosevelt; and second, if the
Justice made a declaration of his principles immediately upon his acceptance
of the Republican nomination and that these principles proved him to be in
sympathy with the principles of Americanism for which the Progressives under
Roosevelt's leadership had been fighting.

8

While the friends of Hughes

viewed this announcement as a good omen, those less friendly interpreted
it otherwise.

It was known that the Justice was not likely to make any

public statements until after June 13, at which time he was scheduled to
make reports on important cases before the Supreme Court and since the
7• "Eve of Conventions." Viewpoints of various newspapermen as given in
Current Opinion. June 1916, 380.
a. George Harvey. Editorial: "The Republican Party." The North American
Review, June 1916, 802; similar statement in Chica~Herald, June 5,1916;
and The Christ a Science Monitor
5
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progressives had definitely stated that they would not take him unless he
did express his views it was believed that the Progressives were hoping,
therefore, to force the Republioans to take the Colonel.

9

A friendly spirit was exhibited between those working for the Justice
and

working for the Colonel, a spirit that resulted in several con10
ferences at which both groups outlined their aims.
While the Progressives
t~hose

clearly stated their aims, their principles, and their loyalty to Roosevelt
as the Presidential candidate the Republioans were less oommital, stating
only that it was their hope that if the Republican Party adopted a sincere,
straightforward platform and nominated a man "••. equal to the important
tasks which will confront the next President ••• " the Progressives would lend
11
their support.
The Republican leaders agreed to send a copy of their
party platform to the Progressive leaders and both parties agreed, at these
informal meetings, to consider the possibility of a oompromise candidate
12
other than HUghes or Roosevelt.
About this time rumors to the effect
that Roosevelt was definitely committed to the idea of running as third
party candidate if the Republicans refused to nominate him began to be oiroulated but they had no foundation for at no time had Roosevelt made a
13
direct statement to that effect.
9. The Chicago Dail~ Tribune, June 5 1 1916; and Chicago Herald, June 5 1 1916
lO.Earnest Abbott. Postscript." The Outlook, June 7, l916, 356; New York
Tribune, June 5, 1916; The Chicafo Daily Tribune, June 3, 1916:-These
conferences included su~epubl can leaders as: B. Penrose, J.Dwight,
wm. McKinley, Charles Rilles, and Senator Lodge; also such Progressive
leaders as: George Perkins, Oscar Davis, and George Meyer.
ll.Editorial in The Christian Science Monitor, June 1, 1916; similar statements in: The-chicago Daily Tribune, May 29 and June 6, 1916.
l2.New York trrbune, June 6, 1916.
l3.New "ff'rlC Tribune, June 5, 1916; The Christian Science Monitor, June 5 1
l916; The- Chica~o Daily Tribune, May 29,19l6; "At the Chicago Conventions"
~~ RepublfO, June 7, 1916, 164; and Oscar K.Davis, Released for
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These conferences while promoting an amicable spirit between the two
political parties caused strife within the Progressive ranks for those
more radically minded were greatly disturbed by the actions of their leader,
George Perkins, because in their opinion he was making too many efforts to
placate the Republicans.

On June 6, seventeen state delegates met and

informed Perkins that they had not come to Chicago to be •supinely
acquiescent• in what the Republicans might wish to do and it was their
opinion that the Progressive Party should conduct its convention without
14
reference to the Republican convention.
Governor Johnson of California,
likewise, issued a statEment to the effect that "••. he was not in favor
of dickering with the Republican chiefs on any basis but the nomination of
Roosevelt.

There is but one logical outcome to the situation confronting

the Republican and Progressive Conventions.

It Mr. Wilson is defeated or

ought to be defeated it will be on the clear out, definite issue of preparedness and Americanism. This issue has been made by one man - Theodore
15
Roosevelt.''
Perkins had the double task of making friendly overtures to
the Republican leaders and, at the same time, restraining the wishes of the
more radical Progressives who preferred party defeat to a fusion with the
16
Republican group.
Publication, Houghton Mifflin and Co., New York, 1925, 449.
14. The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 6, 1916; similar viewpoints expressed
rn-New York Tribune, June 5, 1916, and Chicago Sundal Herald, June 4,
19ls:15. Chicago Sunday Herald, June 4, 1916
16. Chicago Sunday Herald, June 4, 1916; The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 6,
7, 1916; and ~ ~ Tribune, M:ay 29-;'T916.
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The 'Old Guard', the group which because of its overwhelming power
had controlled the Republican Convention of 1912, was in Chicago and, in
the opinion of some of this group was determined to rule the Convention of
1916.

17

1~ether

it could or not was problematic.

In the first place it

was at a disadvantage because it could not advance a popular candidate, and
the one prominent figure, Justice Hughes, it was unwilling to sponsor
18
Just what plan or program
because it knew it could not control him.
the 'Old Guard' intended to adopt at the Convention was never revealed by
its leaders, at least, not officially to the press of the day.

Though

silent, and non-committal these leaders nourished a slim hope that if they
could play Roosevelt against Hughes, the convention might be split in two,
thereby offering the 'Old Guard' the opportunity to bring forth as an
alternative their candidate, Elihu Root, or one of the more popular
19
If the above events came to pass then it could be justly
'favorite sons.'
said that the 'Old Guard' managed the Convention, however, one old member
of this seasoned political group expressed the opinion that the delegates to
20
the Convention of 1916 could not be managed.
This Convention was different from the one held in 1912 not only because a majority of the delegates
had come uninstructed but also because of the nine hundred and eighty six
delegates present only one hundred and seventy five had been to the earlier
17. Editorial: "Republioan Possibilities." The Outlook, June 7,1916,301
18. ~·J also Chicago Herald, June 6 1 19l~The Christian Science Monitor,
June 5, 1916.
19. Abbott, loc.~., 419. Some viewpoints found in~ Chicago Dail{
Tribune, June 5, 1916; The Christian Science Monitor, June 5, 191 ;
and Chicago Sunday Herald; June 4, 1916.
20. Earnest AbbOtt. "The Progressives at Chicago." The Outlook, June 21,
1916, 419.
---
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convention and, therefore, the convention was less likely to be influenced
21
Then too, the new method of selecting delegates by
by the old leaders.
vote at the primaries, adopted in some states, had lessened the power the
political leaders usually had exercised in the selection of the delegates,
22
although not as effectively as had been hoped. A scathing, bitter denunoiation of the 'Old Guard' was made by one, an admirer of Colonel Roosevelt,

~

saw the Republican convention of 1916 as one that was definitely con-

trolled by the all powerful bosses of the party and he viewed the convention
not as a body of men free to act as they were instructed or in the manner
they deemed wisest but rather as pawns in a game, a game the plays of which
had been quietly worked out by those unseen political leaders of the 'Old
23
Guard'.
On June 7 the Republican National Convention was called to order by
24
the temporary chairman, Warren G. Harding of Ohio.
Almost one thousand
delegates from all parts of the nation were gathered to deliberate upon the
selection of a Presidential candidate for their party.

The group while

divided as to its choice of a candidate expressed a feeling of unanimity on
one point, namely, that the man chosen to be the candidate must be one who
was a party man and the delegates were determined not to choose a man from
25
outside the party.
These delegates appeared to the members of the press
in several divergent roles, for while one called the assemblage a heartening
21. Editorial "The National Conventions."~ North American Review, July
1916, 1.
22. Editorial "Chicago, The Political Focus." The American Review of
Reviews, June 1916, 643.
23. Editorial «Republican Possibilities." The Outlook, June 7,1916, 301-302.
24. Daily accounts of this convention founarin The Chicago Daily Tribune,
June 8-11,1916; Chicago Herald, June 8-11,1916; also consulted New York
Tribune, June 8Qll, 1916; and The Christian Science MOnitor,Jun~l~
25. Fred Davenport. "Two Chicago Conventions." The Outlook,June 21,1916,419
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sight made up of men who were "••• obviously of sires who held their
26
Freeman's Oath as no less sacred than their religious faith ••• ," another
writer saw the convention as a group of serious, determined delegates, not
•handpicked' but delegates who were "••• men of' substance and of assured
party position who would have the party point of view, and who would not by

s.ny manner of means be stampeded to anybody who was not a party Republican
27
Others viewed the delegates in a less favorable light, as a docile
•••• "
group composed of'

"~ ••

politicians great and small to whom party regularity
28
was the breath of' their nostrils •••• "
or as "••• a gathering together of'
distributed privileges, o£ tariff-protected manufacturers, business lawyers,
and pillars of society from all over the union.

It was the quintessence of'

all that is commonplace, machine made, complacent and arbitrary in American
29
Life;"
or as a gathering of politicians who had not erased the disastrous
30
events of 1912 from their memories.
On the first day of the Convention quietly and without much enthusiasm
or fanfare followed the usual procedure of convention routine under the
experienced guidance of such prominent leaders as Smart, Crane, Watson,

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Harold Howland. "The Conventions at Chicago." ~ Independent,· June
19, 1916, 476; Walter Lippmann. "At The Chicago Conventions." The New
Republic, June 17, 1916, 163; and Chicago~~. June 7, 1916.--Editorial "The National Conventions." The NOrth American Review, July
1916, 1.
Davenport, loc.oit., 419
Howland, lo~it., 476
Lippmann,Toc.oJ.t., 164.
P..obert Mccoriiifok."' "The Next President." ~ Century, June 1916, 161
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garding, Penrose, and Lodge.

31

Senator Harding gave the keynote address in

which he stressed the need for forgetting the differences of 1912, for
reuniting the groups, and for "••• rededicating here and now the Republican
32
party to the progress and glo~J of the Republic •••• 11
A long speech in
which he covered such national problems as national defense, protective
tariff, business conditions, national expansion, and foreign relationships.

3

According to the newspapers the speech aroused little enthusiasm from the
audience, a fine speech, polished and repolished, written so as to hurt no
34
one except President Wilson and a speech definitely aimed at peace.
In
the opinion of one reporter the speech, while splendid, was not outstanding
and the reception given it by the delegates indicated that any chance that
34
Harding might have had of becoming the convention's 'dark horse' disappeared
On the same day the Progressive Party opened its National Convention
a.t the Auditorium..
the Republicans.

The tone of its meeting was quite different from that of
The Progressive convention was 'all soul' wrote one,

36

an assembly which was eager, alive, earnest, and as "••. solid a body of
idealists as ever assembled •••• " reported another.

37

convention different in spirit but also in purpose.

Not only was the
The Progressive dele-

gates, uncontrolled and unbossed, were fired by a singleness of purpose;
31. Meyers, 31.
32. Republican Camp~ign Textbook, 1916. Issued by Republican National
Committee, Washington, 19l6, 20.
33. Ibid., 20-29.
34. ~Chicago Daily Tribune, June 8, 1916; Chicago He~, June 8, 1916.
35. Cliicago Herald, June 8, 1916.
36. bavenport. loc.cit., 420.
37. Earnest Abbott.-wprogressives at Chicago." The Outlook, June 21,1916,
423. Same vim7 held by Davis, 449.
----
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they knew vmat they wanted and they proposed to get it.

They were determi

to nominate Roosevelt, and they were ready to put themselves behind him
again and to wage another bitter, heartbreaking £ight on behalf of the
38

things he represented and in which they believed.
On the first day the Progressives, too, followed the usual routine
progrrun of a convention.

Temporary Chairman Robbins delivered a brilliant

and persuasive speech in whiCh he reiterated and reviewed the purposes
and the plans of the party.

39

That the Convention solidly agreed with him

and was enthusiastically in favor of Colonel Roosevelt was evidenced by the
noisy and long de.monstration, lasting one hour and a half, which interrupted the keynote speech of Robbins.
caused a rift in the convention.

40

How to accomplish their set purpose

One group, the irreconcilables, was

enthusiastically determined to nominate Roosevelt, adopt a

platfo~,

home without paying any attention to the actions of the Republicans.

and go
41

The other group led by George Perkins, realizing the importance of a reunion
of the two factions if Wilson was to be defeated in November, counseled
moderation and deliberation.

It planned to arrange conferences with the

leaders of the Republican Party hoping, thereby, to bring the two conventions to an agreement as to the choice of a Presidential candidate.
Officially the Progressives closed their first meeting without giving their
sanction to these conferences, nevertheless, an unofficial meeting was held
38. Howland, loc.cit., 4761 and Lippmann, loc.cit., 165.
39. Meyers, 4n; C!ircago Herald, June 8 1 l'm;~e Chicago Daily Tribune;
and Howland, Ioc.cit., 476.
40. The Chicago Darfy-,ribune, June 8, 1916; Chicago Herald, June 8 1 1916;
and AbbOtt, loc.cit., 424.
41. Howland, loc.cit:-;-476; Abbott, loo.~., 424; ~Chicago Daily
Tribune, June 7, 1916; and Chicago Examiner, June 7, 1916
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that night.

42

Nothing was actually accomplished for the Progressives

continued to insist upon their candidate and while the Republican leaders
quite definitely refused to consider him they did show a willingness to
43

discuss a compromise candidate wh? would be agreeable to both parties.
In their second meeting the more radical Progressives again tried to
force the nomination of Roosevelt but Perkins prevailed upon them to wait,
and finally these recalcitrants agreed to the selection of a committee
composed of George Perkins, Charles Bonaparte, Horace Wilkinson, Governor
Hirem Johnson, and John M. Parker, which group was to meet and confer with
44

a similar Committee from the Republican convention.

The Progressive

convention after tabling a report on their platform adjourned in order to
give the joint Committee ample time in which to confer and again in the
45

evening the convention reassembled but accomplished nothing.
The Republicans, in their meeting on Thursday, continued their routine
schedule.

First, approval was given to the seating of the delegates, then

the temporary organization was made pennanent, and Senator Harding became
the Chairman of the convention.

46

After the report of the Rules Committee

had been adopted and while waiting for the report from the Committee on
Resolutions several leading Republicans, Depew, Cannon, and Senator Borah,
gave lengthy and

1

timefilling' speeches.

tf. Chicago Herald, June a, 1916; and

Finally the convention adjourned

~ York Tribune, June

a,

1916.

43. Ibid.

44. Davis, 449; Chicago Examiner, June 9, 1916; and ,!!:! Chicago Daily
Tribune, June 9, 1916.
45. Rowland, loc.oit., 476; and The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 9 1 1916.
46. Accounts o"f""'"tliTs meeting fou'iid""in The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 9,
1916; and Chicago Herald, June 9, 19I'6.
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until the afternoon at which time Senator Lodge read the platform for the
party.

This platform, while receiving the close attention of the delegates,

tailed to arouse any controversial discussion and was unanimously adopted
47
by the convention.
In the platform the Republican Party committed itself
to a policy which guaranteed protection of every American citizen "••• in
all the rights secured him by the Constitution ••• ," a policy in which the
party, while denouncing the administration for the methods it had used in
handling the Mexican situation pledged itself to aid in restoring order and
maintaining peace in Mexico; and, likewise, reaffir.med its approval of the
'
Monroe Doctrine, and indicated that it favored those
efforts which would

bring the United States into closer relationships with the countries of
South America.

48

The party went on record as favoring "••• an adequate and

complete policy of national defense ••• , a sufficient and effective regular
ar.my ••• ,"and a strong and well prepared navy, capable of defending both
coasts.

The plank on the tariff definitely reiterated the party's faith in

a protective tariff "••• to American industries and American labor ••• " and
stressed the need for a creation of a tariff commission.

The party believed

in "••• encouraging business and will seek to advance all American interests
•••" and, therefore, advocated the building of an adequate, privately owned
merchant marine.

Other items favored by the Republicans included the

control by the Federal government of the transportation system; the enforcement of Civil Service laws, and "••• all Federal laws passed for the pro47. Ibid.; and Howland, loc.cit., 477.
48. ~lican C~paign ~tOOOk, 1916, 48-52. The entire account of the
platfor.m was taken from this source.

54

tection of labor;" and "••• the extension of the suffrage to women but
recognized the right of each State to settle this question by itself."
In conclusion the platfonn made an appeal to all Americans "••. to prove to
the world that we are Americans in thought and in deed, with one loyalty,
one hope, one aspiration ••• " and called upon the citizens to be true to the
"••• great traditions of their common oountry and above all things, to
keep the faith."
The platform was clear and scholarly in tone and "••• showed an honest
effort to include those policies of the Progressive Party that were
possible of acceptance by all Republicans of whatever factions" wrote one
49
historian.
Another WTiter, while expressing a like belief, felt that
the platfor.m had failed to express views sharp and strong enough, and,
therefore, it would be up to the candidate to put the necessary vigpr and
50

vitality into it.

The plank favoring woman suffrage was considered a

victory although only a partial one since each state was given the final
decision in the matter which fact was, in itself, a noteworthy item since
it was the first time a Republican platform had carried a "••• straightaway
51
state right plank."
Universal training, prohibition, and arms embargo
52
were three planks which failed to be written into the platform.
After the adoption of the platform Chairman Harding read the request
fram the Progressive convention which invited the Republicans to appoint a
49.
50.
51.
52.

Meyers, 420.
Davenport, loc.cit., 422.
The Chicago~IY:Tribune, June 9 1 1916.
Ibid.

-
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0

CJII]Illittee which was to confer with a like committee from the Progressive

convention.

Being agreeable to the request the Republicans selected

senators Smoot and Borah, William Murray Crane, A. Johnson, and Nicholas
Murray Butler to serve on the Joint Committee.

53

Before the afternoon

session adjourned the convention agreed to give voting privileges to the
six delegates from Ha•vaii, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands which
increased the convention to 989 delegates and the necessary plurality for
54
a nomination became 495 votes.
The CoiiDllittees from the two conventions met in a three hour conference
55
but failed to reach an agreement.
The Progressives remained firm in
their conviction that Roosevelt was " ••• the one man on whom the tvro parties
could unite logically and with hope of success," WTOte one reporter,

56

and the Republicans refusing to consider him stated that no progress could
be made until the Progressives were reaqy to eliminate him and were willing
57
.
•
other poss~.bl e nom2nees.
The Progressives were unwilling to
t o d ~scuss
commit themselves until they had reported back to their Convention, and,
58
also, until they had received a message from the Colonel at Oyster Bay.
It can not be stated that all matters of' importance ware decided by
the delegates in the convention halls.

Too many group meetings of' the

leaders before and during the conventions were held privately in the hotels
53. Meyers, 420; and Chicago Examiner, June 9, 1916; and~ Chicago Daily
Tribune, June 9, 1916.
54. The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 9, 1916.
55. Meyers, 420; Chicago EXaminer, June 9, 1916; and~ Chicago Daily
Tribune, June 9, 1916.
56. Howland, loc.cit., 477
57. The Chicagp-nii!y Tribune, June 9, 1916
58. Ibid.
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80

that as one writer bitterly expressed it, the delegates were "••• but

pawns and pieces ••• " and the real players were not at the Conventions but
59
at the Blackstone Hotel where the real game "... is being played."
In
one of these combined conferences there was proposed a suggestion that
Colonel Roosevelt be invited to Chicago to address the conventions separate
or at a joint session and to present a peace pact.

It would be necessary

however for the Colonel not only to declare himself out of the race for the
nomination, but also ready to enter into an agreement on the selection of
60

a Republican candidate.

William. Jackson, Republican from Maryland,

acting upon his own initiative sent a telegram. to the Colonel in which he
outlined the plan.

Roosevelt in his reply to Jackson stated:
In answer to your telegram., I can only say
that the matter lies with the Republican
Convention, and that if the Convention
desires me to address it I shall be glad to
do so.
I very earnestly hope that the Republicans
and Progressives assembled at Chicago will
keep steadily in mind the gravity of the
crisis not only for America but for the
world, and the need that their action in
dignity, foresight, and patriotism, shall
rise level to the crisis.
I hope their aim will not be merely to
nominate a man who can be elected next
Nove.mber but a man of such powerful character,
steadfast convictions, and proved ability,
that if elected, he will again place the
nation where it belongs by making it true to
itself, and therefore, true to all mankind.61

59. Ernest Abbott, "Postscript." The Outlook, June 10, 1916, 356. Similar
reports of group meetings founa-in Chicago Herald, June 8, 1916/
The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 8, 9, 1916; and New York Tribune, June
s;-1916.
-so. The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 8, 1916.
61 • .!!:2. Chicago Daily Tribune, June 9, 1916.
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The Colonel expressed his personalviews in regard to the policies of
president ·Wilson and in his conclusion he carefully evaded a direct answer
62
to the question "Would he withdraw from the Presidential race?"
In the session on Friday, the names of the various Presidential candidates were presented to the Republican Convention; the names of Hughes,
Roosevelt, and the 'favorite sons' vihich included Root, Burton, Weeks,
Coleman, Dupont, Sherman, Fairbanks, Cummins, La Follette, and Governor
Brumbaugh.

63

Before the balloting

co~nenced

the convention listened to a

report from the Joint Committee but since the Committee had not reached a
conclusion there was nothing upon which the Convention could £\ct.
The voting began and the results of the first and second ballots
indicated that the Convention did not know whom it wanted nor had it a
Presidential candidate whom it was ready and eager to nominate.

The second

ballot differed little fram the first except that Governor Brumbaugh of
Pennsylvania had withdrawn his name in favor of Roosevelt.
the ballots were:

lst

,

Burton •••••••• 772
Cummins ••••••• 85
Dupont •••••••• 12
Fairbanks ••••• 7~
Hughes ••••••• 25~

2nd
7~
85
13

as*

324

The results of

lst
La Follette •••••••••• 25
Roosevelt •••••••••••• 103
Sherman •••••••••••••• 66
·weeks •••••••••••••••• J.05
Some scattering votes 64

2nd
25
98i

65
79

The group sponsoring Justice Hughes tried to force a third ballot but was
blocked by the various factions backing the

1

favorite sons.'

This situation

quite pleased the 'Old Guard' for they were confident that if the vot:iing
62. Ibid
63. ll:eports of this meeting found in The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 10,
1916; Chicago Examiner, June 10, !9!6; Howland, loc.cit:;-475; and
"The National Conventions." The North American Revfsw; July,l916, 2-4
64. Ibid.

-
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?[OUld remain scattered among the

1

fe.vorite sons' there would be a hope that

after the sixth ballot the Justice would be forced out and then they could
come forwe.rd. unite on a 'favorite son' or a 'dark horse', dominate the
convention and the nomination, reported one paper.

65

The delegates realized

the graveness of the situation. sensed that the only hope for success lay
"••• in a union
reported.

66

be~~een

the warring factions of the party •••• " wrote one

The Convention. therefore, decided to adjourn in order to allow

the Joint Connni ttee the opportunity to meet once again and renew its discussions.
Meanwhile in their Friday session the Progressive delegates had
listened to the report of the Joint Committee and they felt encouraged not
only because the Republicans had no candidate of their own to suggest but.
also, because the Republican leaders had brought forth no arguments to ans67
wer the claims of the Progressives for the nomination of Roosevelt.
waiting to learn how the Republicans received the report of the Joint
Committee the Progressives listened to a report on their party platform and
68

then carefully discussed it plank by plank.

In an eloquent and forcible

manner the platform enumerated the aims of the party and reiterated the
69
principles upon which it had been founded in 1912.
It stated that the
United States in its place among the nations of the world was subject to
65. The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 10, 1916.
66. Tile' Chicago Daiiy Tribune, June 10, 1916.
67. Ernest Abbott. 11 The Progressives at Chicago."~ Outlook. June 21,1916,
4"2"5.

68. Howland, 1oc.cit., 476
69. The folloWing-resume of the Progressive platform was taken from the
Chicago Herald, June 9• 1916.
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certain basic duties, namely: "To secure the rights and equal treatment of
our citizens, native or naturalized, on land or sea, without regard to race,
creed, or nativity; to guard the honor and uphold the just influence of
our nation; and to maintain the integrity of international law." With so
ma,ny of the European nations at war it was the duty of our goven2ment to
seek to keep peace, but not a "••• peace at the price of submission••• " for
there must be "••• an unfaltering determination and a prepared ability to
defendour rights and to fulfill our international obligations."

Regarding

the situa.tion in M:exico the platform stated that the disorders in our
neighboring country had "• •• brought conditions worse than warfare ••• 11 and
had weakened "••. our national self respect."

One of the foremost national

concerns was the "••• adequate provision for the common defense ••• " and
that this task should be shouldered by those who had an "••• undivided
allegiance to America ••• ," a determination to keep "••• America's great
heritage and traditions unfal terlng in the first place."

In order to

further this plan for preparedness there must be a navy restored to "••• at
least second rank in battle efficiency; a regular army of 250,000 men;"
"••• a system of military training adequate to organize vdth promptness
•••" and "••• behind that first line of the army and navy a citizen soldiery
supplied, armed, and controlled by the national government."
Once again the Progressives wrote down their principles of social
justice, namely, the passage of a child labor law, the extension of the
workmen's compensation law, and the removal of the artificial causes of the
high cost of living.

In order to further the cause of social justice it

would be necessary to insure prosperity for both business and industry.

60

ThiS could be done by the regulation of business "••• so as to promote its
growth and prosperity ••• " with a just distribution of its returns and a
healthy expansion of foreign trade.

The Progressives favored the conserva-

tion and and development of our natural resources; the reestablishment of a
merchant marine; the development of interstate national highways; the
establishment of a "••• a new standard of governmental efficiency through a
complete civil service system••• ;" the creation of a permanent, expert
tariff commission with a view of intelligently and scientifically adjusting
of the tariff, so as to build up rather than to destroy American business;
and a protective tariff which was
Th~platfor.m

esse~tial

to the nation's prosperity.

was not a proposal of new principles but rather a plea that

there be an urgent and immediate performance of these principles by the
citizens of the nation and by their leader who should be a man capable of
directing the execution of these national needs.
On the issue of suffre.ge for women the platform stated:
We believe that the women of the
country who share with the men the
burdens of the government in times
of peace and make equal sacrifice in
tii11.es of war, should be given the full
political right of suffrage.70
One significant incident in the reading of the platform was the proposal of a plank favoring Prohibition.

vVhile the Progressives after some

discussion rejected the plank they did so not because they opposed the
proposition but rather because they were fearful that such a plank would
distract the attention of the voters from the real, paramount issues of the
70. Chicago Examiner, June 9, 1916

61
7l

political crumpaign.

However when the members of the Convention were

asked to indicate their personal belief in Prohibition a great majority
72

arose.
At the evening session the Progressives continued to do little but
listen to reports by telephone of the actions of the Republican Convention.
This procrastination angered Governor Johnson who in a passionate speech
stated that he was not in accord with the plan of waiting, that he felt
that the delegates had an "••• obligation to keep the Progressive faith
intact •••• " and therefore he was in favor of the immediate nomination of
73
While the Progressives were eager to nominate their candidate
Roosevelt.
yet they were earnest in their desire to give the Republicans every chance
0

0

'T4

for considering Roosevelt as a candidate.

Their hopes were bolstered

when they learned that Brumbaugh had retired his name in favor of Roosevelt.
After the Republicans had adjourned, following their second ballot, the
Progressives, too, adjourned.
Again on Friday night the Joint Committee met and after hours of
discussion was unable to reach an agreement.

By this time it had become

evident that the Progressives would not give up Roosevelt and the Republican
had, seemingly, quite decided upon the Justice.

The Republicans were con-

fident that Roosevelt would not under any circumstances head another third

Rarty

n.
72.
73.

74.
75.

ticket, confident because, in the opinion of one historian, they had
:Bowland, loo.oit., 476; Ernest Abbott, "The Progressives at Chicago. II
The Indepenaenf; June 21,1916, 426; The Chicago DailX Tribune, June 10,
!9I6; and The Christian Science Moni":tOr, June 26, 916.
Ibid.
CliiC'ago Herald, June 10, 1916
Abbott, loc.c~t., 426.
Ibid. - - - -
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been furnished with information to that effect;

76

and so, in their opinion,

there vms no need to consider the Colonel as a fUsion candidate.

77

Very early on Saturday morning affairs began to take more definite
shape.

At five o'clock theProgressive members of the Joint Committee

received a message from Roosevelt in which he restated his views as he had
expressed them in his

telegr~

to Senator Jackson and to the surprise of

many, the Colonel suggested that the name of Senator Lodge be offered as a
compromise candidate to both Conventions.

78

The Republicans of the Joint

Committee, likewise, cwne to a decision, namely, to present the name of
.

79

Justice Hughes to the Progressive -convention.
When the Republican Convention convened later in the morning all
hopes of reunion with the Progressives were gone and affairs moved rapidly.
Roosevelt's communication suggesting Senator Lodge as a compromise candidate was tabled and the names of one 'favorite son' after another were
withdra,vn.

80

At the end of the third roll-call the ballot indicated that

Justice Hughes was to be the Presidential nominee for the Republican Party.
The results were:
Hughes
•••••••
La Foll~e ••••••
Lodge
•••••••
Roosevelt ••••••
Some scattered81

94~
3

7
1~

On the next ballot the choice was made unanimous.
nomination of Charles

w.

Immediately after the

Fairbanks as the nominee for the Vice-Presidency
82

ihe Convention adjourned.
s. Davis, 449.
77. Henry Pringle, mheodore Roosevelt,Harcourt,Brace & Co.New York,l931, 586
78. lodge II, 486. Letter of Roosevelt to Conferees of Progressive Party,
June 10,1916.
~ Christian Science Monitor, June 12,1916.
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Between the late hours on Friday and the morning hours on Saturday
the majority of the delegates had swerved their allegiance to the Justice
and no satisfactory written explanation for their sudden and overwhelming
change of attitude could be found.

"It seemed like a landslide or a stamped

but it was more serious and thoughtful, with more of' deliberate purpose and
conviction i'or great accomplishment than a mere stampede can imply," was
83

the opinion of' one historian.

Another felt that the delegates had done

the thing they had not wanted to do "• •• and their only consolation was that
the one thing they dreaded more had not been forced upon them."

84

The

Republicans had conducted their awn convention, nominated their own oandidate and, seemingly, had been little influenced by the presence or the
tactics of the Progressives.

Although they had been polite to them, and

had attended the joint conferences, nevertheless, they had ignored the
85

Progressives was the opinion of' one historian.

Yet that was not the true

picture, for although the Progressives had been unable to convince the
Republicans to accept: Roosevelt, still the "• •• nomination of' Hughes was in
86

itself a concession to progressivism," stated another writer.

The

Republicans were cognizant of the fact that victory in November would be
impossible without the support of the Progressives and so they wisely chose
not just any Republican but an able, independent candidate and, also, wrote
80. Accounts of this meeting found in Chicago Sunday Herald, June 11, 1916;
The Chicago Sunday Tribune, June ll, 19lo; The Christian Science Monitor,
J'Uiie 12, 1916; Harold Howland, "The ConventTOiis at Chicago." The
Independent, June 19, 1916, 480; and Meyers, 423.
--81. Ibid.
82. cnrcago Sunday Examiner, June 11, 1916.
83. Newton Wyeth, Republican Principles and Policies, The Republican Press
Company, Chicago, 1916, 217.
--Howland, loc.cit., 480.
Bishop II-;--:41-2Li mann
164

64
their most progressive platfor.m since 1860 with the hope that many of the
£our million progressive voters of 1912 would line up with the Republican
87
£orcas in 1916, was the view expressed by journalists.
The critical state
o£ affairs in the nation and in the world, the widespread antipathy toward
Colonel Roosevelt, and the inability of the followers of the various
•favorite sons' to unite on one man were given as the reasons Why the
Republicans finally chose to nonunate Justice Hughes as the candidate who
88
could best unite the divided forces of the Republican Party.
Meanwhile at the Auditorium amid much excitement and emotional stress
89
the Progressives were continuing their Convention.
The assemblage had
learned that early in the morning Roosevelt had sent his message to the
Joint Committee suggesting that Senator Lodge be considered as a compromise
90
candidate. The delegates resented the suggestion, could not understand why
Roosevelt had made it; and so they tabled the suggestion, likewise, the one
made by the Republican con£erees that the candidacy of Hughes be considered
91
by the Progressives.
Once again the Conventionwaited in order to learn
just what action was taking place at the Republican Convention.

The Pro-

gressives, while extremely anxious to nominate their own candidate wanted
87. "Roosevelt." The Outlook, June 21, 1916, 402; editorial: "A Word of
Thanks to Mr. Roosevelt." The World's Work, August 1916, 371;
"Rise of Hughes in PoliticS:W The AmeriCan Reviev1 of Reviews, July 1916
3; and"The Nomination of HugheS:W The Nation, June:l5, 1916, 135.
88. Ibid.
89. Accounts of this meeting found in Ernest Abbott, "The Progressives at
Chicago." The Outlook, June 21, 1916, 423-427; Harold Howland, "The
Convention"S'"at Chicago." The Independent, June 19, 1916, 475-480;
Chicago Sunday Herald, June-11, 1916; The Chicago Sunday Tribuna, June
11, 1916; The Christian Science 1~nitor;-June 12, 1916; and Joseph B.
Bishop, Theoaore Roosevelt and His 'rime - As Shown in His Own Letters,
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1920, 412.
---90. Lodge II, 486; and The Chicago Sunday Tribune, June 11, 1916.
91. Howland, loc.cit., 478; and The Chicago Sunday Tribune, June 11, 1916.
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to make sure that they had kept faith with Roosevelt and had allowed the
other Convention an opportunity to consider the Colonel's last proposal.
When they were informed that the third ballot was being taken at the Coliseum the important question was put to the Progressives and at twelve
thirty-one~

just two minutes before the Republicans had officially hominated

Justice Hughes, the Progressives by acclamation chose Theodore Roosevelt as
92
their Presidential candidate.
The Convention then adjoun1ed and at
Three o'clock eagerly reassembled to receive a telephoned message from the
Colonel.

For two hours there was suspense while the routine of the Conven-

tion continued.

Speeches were made, John M. Parker of Louisiana was nomin-

ated as candidate for the Vice-Presidency, pledges were subscribed to the
campaign fund, and finally Roosevelt's reply was read.

It stated:

I am very grateful for the honor you have
conferred upon me by nominating me as
President. I can not accept it at this
time. I do not lmow the attitude of the
candidate of the Republican Party toward
the vital questions of the day. Therefore,
if you desire an immediate decision I must
decline the nomination. But if you prefer
it 1 I suggest the. t my condit"ione.l refusal
to run be placed in the hands of the Progressive National Committee.
If Mr. Hughes' statements, when he makes
them, shall satisfy the committee that it is
for the interests of the country that he
be elected they can act accordingly and
treat my refusal as definitely accepted.
If they are not satisfied they can so notify
the Progressive Party and at the same time
confer with me and then determine on whatever
action we may severally deem a~~ropriate to
meet the needs of the country.
92. Abbott, loc.oit., 426; and The Chicago Sunday Tribuna, June 11, 1916.
93. Bishop Ir;-412; and "A Presidential C~didatE; Nominated." The American
Review~ Reviews, July 1916, 12.
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It vvas not the unqualified acceptance they had dared in their exalta94
tion to expect. "It fell like lead upon their exuberant spirits," wrote
one reporter while another stated: "The foundations of their faith seemed
95

svrept away • • • "
They adjourned.

and it was a tragic sight to see an assemblage so crushed.
Many left the Convention halls puzzled, disheartened,
96

overwhe~ned,

and some were bitter, ever so bitter.

Those who tried to

justify the actions of the Colonel claimed that eventually the delegates
.auld appreciate how wise and foresighted the Colonel had been.

97

That

Roosevelt acted as he had because of the crisis facing the country, because
of his intense hatred of the policies of Wilson's administration and his
98
keen desire for its defeat was the opinion of another.
Once again the
Progressives were split asunder for some of the MOose leaders, it was
believed, would follow the Colonel while others, the irreconoilables, were
99

determined to keep the party intact.

One Progressive leader appreciating

that his FS-rty vms doomed said "••. we still have an opportunity for service
in supporting Justice Hughes.

I believe the great majority of the rank and
100
file of the oountry will fall in line."
While it was believed that Roosevelt's action sounded the death knell
for the Progressive Party yet high praise was given to the Colonel. Roosevel
had ah~ys been a splendid leader, enthusiastic supporter of the party's

94. Howland, loc,oit. 480
95. Abbott, loc.oit., 426.
96. ,ihe Chicago SWiday Herald, June 11, 1916; The Chicago Sunday Tribune,
JUne 11, 1916; and The Christian Science M~tor, June 12, 1916.
97. Howland, loc.cit., "48'0"
98. Abbot~, loo.cit., 420
99. ~ Chicarc; 15a'fly Tribu~, June 12, 1916; Chicago ~xa.miner, June 11,1916
P.Orman Ray, An Introduction to Political Parties and Practical Politics
Charles Scribner's Sons, NewY<Ork, 1924, 34; and AbbOtt, loc.oit.,
•
• Henry A. vVhi·te quoted in~ Chicago Daily Tribune, June 'i2; I9I6.
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principles~

•

and loyal to his followers; but when the events of the hour

presented an opportunity to further the "• •• true cause of Progressivism
" he did not hesitate to accept the situation regardless of the effect
•••
101
it might have upon himself was the opinion of one editor.
The Colonel
had to make sure that the hopes of the Progressive Party lay rather with
the support of the Republican candidate than with an insistence upon his own
candidacy on a third ticket.

In this editor's

opinion~

Hughes in his

letter of acceptance had enunciated the same principles for which Roosevelt
had been so forcibly preaching and,

therefore~

every sincere Progressive

102
could actively support the Justice.

Similar viewpoints were taken by
103
those who openly approved of the decision made by the Colonel.
The spectacular decision of Roosevelt did not

piSS

without some

measure of censure being heaped upon the Colonel's head and upon the leaders

of the party.

"While it was felt that Roosevelt bad declined skillfully

yet he had done so "••. without a note of comradeship for the men and women
104
who had adored him," wrote one who had been present a-t:; the Convention.
In his opinion the leaders had fooled the delegates, had been unfair with
tham~

had tried to use the Progressives as a threat and a bluff to force

Roosevelt upon the Republicans~ and "••• everyone seamed to realize the
105
emptiness of the threat except the naive Progressive delegates."
Granted

that the Convention of the Progressive Party ended in an unexpedted manner

lbi.

Editorial: -The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 12~ 1916.

162 • Ibid.
103. Abbott, loc.oit., 426; editorials: "A Word of Thanks to }Jr.Roosevelt."
The Worl"d'S Work, August 19ih6, 370; "What Was Demonstrated at Chicago."
'Tile Independent;' June 19,1916, 473; and"The End of Armageddon." The
ffierary Digest, July 8~ 1916, 94.
-104. Lippiruann, loc.cit., 165.
105 • Ib"J.d.
--

-
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yet the most sincere praise was given to that highly motivated body of
106

delegates for the service they had perfor.med to the nation.

By their

presence in Chicago they had forced "• •• the issues of supreme moment upon
a reluctant Republican Party and a dormant people," and without them the
Republicans might

l~ve

seen fit to choose some one less desirable than
107

Justice Hughes, WTOte one who believed in Progressive principles.
Immediately upon receiving the notification from the National
Republican Convention that he had been nominated as their Presidential candidate Justice Hughes sent his letter of acceptance to the Chairman of the
Convention.

It read:
I have not desired the nomination. I
have wi shad to remain on the bench. But in
this critical hour of our national history
I recognize that it is my paramount duty to
respond ••• and to that call in this crisis,
I can not fail to angwer with the pledge ofall
that is in me to the service of our country.
Therefore I accept the nomination.l08

In the body of his speech Hughes stated very clearly and convincingly

that he "... stood for the fir.m and unflinching maintenance of all the
rights of .American citizens on land and sea ••• ; " that he " ••• desired to
see our diplomacy restored to its best standards ••• ; " that he stood for
"••• Americanism that knows no ulterior purpose; for a patriotism that is
single and complete ••• ; " that he believed " ••• in making prompt provision
106. The Christian Science Monitor, June 12, 1916.
107. &bbott, loc.oit., 427. Similar viewpoints expressed by Howland, loc.cit.
480; and Lippman, loc.oit., 419.
108. Republican Campaign Te~ook, 1916, 30. A complete copy of Hughes'
speech of acceptance found in Appendix A.
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to assure our national security."

He continued: "We are devoted to the

ideals of peaoe ••• We have no policy of aggression, no lust for territory,

no zeal for strife." Hughes believed that the nation should be prepared
industrially and economically as well as in military matters; that there
should be a wiser and more fair readjustment of the tariff'; that the
prinoiples of the civil service laws should be enforced; and he declared
tbat he fully endorsed the platform of the Republican Party.

In conclusion

he wrote:

I have resigned my judicial office and I am ready to devote myself
110
unreservedly to the campaign.
To President Wilson the Justice WTOte: I hereby resign the offiee of
111
A1sociate Justice of the Supreme Court ot the United States.
As briefly
and as courteously the President accepted the resignation.
Hughes, in his letter of acceptance, did more than acknowledge his
willingness to became the Presidential nominee for in it he clearly and at
great length stated his position on all the vital questions of the day iD.
IUoh a manner that it was believed the Progressives would find no f'ault with

112
his enunciations.

His acceptance pleased many f'or it was believed that

the combination of' Hughes and the Progressive Republican Party platform would

attract many of the Progressive voters, would reunite the factions, and
113
would make the outlook for 1916 a bright one.
109. Ibid.
110 1'6Id:.
111. Chi'Ca11a.o Examiner, June 11, 1916; and.!!!! Chicago Daily Tribune, June 11,

J

.

1916.

112. 'Editorials: The Christian Science Monitor, June 12, 1916; The Chicag<>
Daily Tribune, June 12, 1916; and "The National Convention"i:"" The North
lmerican Review, July 1916, 4-7.
113. Ibid.
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on

June 26, the Progressive National Committee met and disoussed at

great length the letter which they had received from Colonel Roosevelt.

In

it he expressed his refUsal to became the Presidential candidate for the
PrOgressive Party and in it he gave his wholehearted endorseme:rxt to the
oandidaoy of Hughes.

In this letter Roosevelt praiaed most highly the men

and women who had. served as members of the Progressive conventions, lauded
the ideals to which they had subscribed, and reviewed the splenclid work of
the party "••• in awakening the public

to a better understanding of the
114

problems of social and industrial welfare."

Regretfully he faced the

tact that the people of the nation were, evidently, unprepared and unwilling

to accept a new political party.

Therefore the Progressives while not

abandoning their convictions must face "••• the situation and endeavor to
get cut of it the best that it can be made to yield from the standpoint of

115
the interests of the nation as a whole."

In this long letter the ColoDel

in his usual stinging manner criticized the Democratic leaders and President

Wilson for their handling of foreign affairs and, ·beli•ving that Wilson and
hia party should not be given the opportunity to govern the nation for
another four years, the Colonel appealed to the Progressives to consider
only the welfare of the mtion and to nominate the man whose integrity was
the highest and who morally and intellectually was fitted to be at the
Dation t s helm.

114. Republican Campai~ Textbook 1916, 33; ~ugnes, Roosevelt, Union."
The OUtlook, July , 1916, 53~. A copy of this letter may be found
inAppendi:x: B.
115. Ibid.
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The Committee after tive hours of discussion and oratory fina.lly
deoicled by' a vote of thirty-two to six to endorse the candidacy of Hughes

and directed the Executive Committee of the Progressive Party to ally itself
. orith :Mr. Hughes • campaign and to do all in its power to aid in his

116
election.

Once again George Perkins had to resort to maneuvering for

the minority group, led by John Parks-, being of the opinion that this

cCQII!d ttee had no right to turn the party over to Hughes, retuaed to a.ooept;
117

the resolution.

The actions of Roosevelt received favorable commendation from both
newspapers and periodicals.

It was felt that if the majority of the Pro-

gressive voters paid heed to the plea of Roosevelt then Wilaon and his
party would be doomed.

118

Once again high tribute 1m.s bestowed upon the

Colonel by those who felt that his decision resulted

f~

an unselfish

desire to place the interests and welfare of his country above his cma
political fortune.

119

To the Republican leaders his letter came as a.

heartening note for they appreciated that Roosevelt in taking the broader
Tiew and in sponsoring the man for whom he had never expressed a heartfelt,

personal admiration 1m.s proving himself worthy of his splendid reputation.
!hey more than welcomed his cooperation.
116. New ~ Tribune, June 26, 1916; The Chicago Ia~ly Tribune, June 27,
l916; and The Christian Science MOiiftor, JWle 2 , 1916.
117. Ibid.
118. ~es, Roosevelt Alliance.• The Litera~ Digest, July 8, 1916, 57.
119. Editorials: The Chioa~ Daily Tribune, June 27, l916; "Mr. Roosevelt's
Funeral Oration." The ation, June 29, 1916, 687-688.
120. Editorials: The Cli!'Oago Daily Tribune, June 27, 1916; The Christian
Science Moni'tOi', JUly 27, 1916; "Tlie Hughes-Roosevelt miance. tt The
Literary Digest, July 8, 56;" "A Word of Thanks to Mr. Roosevelt."'ri'he
World's Work, lugust 1916, 370.
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By his refusal Roosevelt delivered a mortal blow to the party he had
rounded.

The problem which it faced was a diffioul t one to solve.

While

the party had no Presidential 08Jlciidate, yet Parker cominued to be the
Jl()ntinee for the Vice-Presidency; while the na.tio:aal organization was
£11nctioning yet many of the state groups had disbanded and had merged with
121
These irreconoilables, who
the Republican forces, in most instances.
telt that the betrayal of Roosevelt was cowardly, were detennined to meet
again and to outline their plans for a campaign by the Progressive Party.

122

Their numbers would be augmeuted by those groups who, prior to 1912, had
been Democrats and by those western Progressives who oould not agree with
123
Roosevelt on preparedness.
But in the opinion of most writers the
influence that the Progressives would exert in November would be negligible,
although it was agreed that their 'revolutionizing spirit' would oontillue
124
to be felt no matter to what political group they tinally became pledged.
On the day of the meeting of the Progressive National Committee Hughes
sent two messages, one to this Committee &lld one to Roosevelt.

His

teleg~

to the Committee was a long one in whioh he expressed hia sincere appreciation for the Progressive endorsement and proceeded to give them an extended
125
statement of his views o:a the current questions facing the nation.
The
message indicated that the Republican candidate was definitely tor adequate
preparedness and that the hyphenates need expect no quarter from him.

In

121. Ray, 34; and ~r. Roosevelt's Funeral Oration." The Nation, ·June29,1916,
687.
122. Ibid.
123. ""'HUghes-Roosevelt." The Literary Digest, July 8, 1916, 57J and The
Christian Soienoe Monitor, June 27, 1916
--124. WHugbes, Roosevelt, Union." The Outlook, July 5, 1916, 534; and
~. Roosevelt's Funeral Orat1on." The Nation, June 29, 1916, 687-88
125. Republican Campaign Textbook, ~,-s9"; ,!!f! Chioag.2_ Daily Tribune,June
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1108 t

em.phatio tel'DL8 he oritioized the Democratic administration and gave

}ds endorsEillent to some ot the measures which the Progressives had advocated.
10

vigorously.

By' his appeal he hoped to convince the Progressives that

they' and the Republicans were finally united in the common cause to promote

natioJIB.l honor, national security, and national eti'ioienoy.

In his oriti-

oism of Wilson's administration he pointed out the mistakes that ha4 been
made, condemned the DEillooratio officials tor their failure in Mexico, and
eonoluded his appeal with the statEillent:
I am deeply appreciative ot your endorsement.
I find no diti'erence in platform or in aim
Whioh precludes the most hearty oooperation
and the most oomplete unity. It is within
the party that the liberalizing spirit you
invoke can have the widest and most eti'ective
influence. I solioit your earnest effort tor
the common cause.l26
In his letter to Colonel Roosevelt, the Republiean oandidate not only

thanked the former Progressive leader tor his endorsement but also aske4 for
his cooperation in the ensuing campaign and expressed a desire to meet w1 th
127
him at an early date.
Two days later these two leaders dined together
and discussed the great political questions i'aoing the nation.

To the news-

paper reporters they gave out the statement: We talked very tully over all
128
matters and are in complete aooord.
Roosevelt in a letter to Senator
27, 1916; and New York Tribune, June 27, 1916
126. Ibici.
127. 'Re"Pliblioan Camp.ign Textbook 1916, 40. Copy ot the letter may be found
in Ippend!X c.
128. The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 29, 1916; similar statem.ent in New York
l'rlbune_, June 29, 1916; and~ Christian Soience Monitor, June'29,'1'9!'6'.
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LOdge expressed himself as being satisfied with the Viewpoints taken by
gughes and believed that the candidate in his campaign would stand for the
129
JDOre important issues of the Progressive Party.

129. Lodge II, 486. Letter in Roosevelt to Senator Lodge. June 29, 1916.

CHAPTER III
ISSUES RAISED BY THE REPUBLICANS IN
THE CAMPAIGN

The active politieal campaign did not immediately begin in July.

Time

.as needed by the political leaders. ample time in which to line up their
torees. to organize their workers. to outline their program. to conciliate
aad

b~d

together those of the Progressive group who had returned to the

Republica.D fold; and time in which to watch with clear • sharp eyes the evershift~g.

complexion of foreign and domestic affairs for oonditions across

the sea might affect both the policies and the program of the Republica.
Party".

Hughes and his followers tully realize« that their problem of oustiag
the Democratic Party from office was a very clifficult one for the party in
power has always had the advan. tag eo us position.

To oo nvince the oi tiz enry

that for the best interests of the nation the Republican Party should be
returned to the White House was not to be an easy task for the differences
between the two political parties were aot espeeially marked.

Charles Evans

Hughes and Woodrow Wilson by their very characters and nature offered 11 ttle
tontrast or argument.

Too mAnf agreed that these two men were of the

highest moral character • had long political records which had earned them
the respect of the nation. that they had given evidence of their ability as
75

76
leaders and of neither could it be said that he was 'incompetent' or
l
tde,Dgerous.'
Likewise 1 the party platforms offered little opportunity :f'or
political disagreement for their similarity rather than their contrast was
2
the notable feature or, as expressed by one editorial, their differences

in respect to domestic issues were less marked than ever before in our
3
political history.

rhis editor felt that both party platforms demagogical

declared for progressive labor legislation; both relegated the issue of
equal suffrage to the states; both advanced the developnent of the merehant
marines, the one by subsidies, the other by gover.tmlental ownership; neither
proposed changes in anti-trust laws; both held forth helping haDds to
agrioul ture; neither group had nade satisfactory statemettbs ia regard to the
problem of national preparedness; and on the tariff issue their tiffereD.oe
4

was of degree only.

Seemingly, the Republican Party had become "... more

radical aDd the Democratic Party more conservative than usual, with the
result that they had reached substantially common ground" was the editor's
5
eonolusion.
Another writer found nothing in the RepublioUL Part7 to
inspire the voter, saw in it a political straddle which on one hand made

8.11

appeal to the large number of people who held resentment against Presideat
Wilson for allowing the Germans to insult our nation while on the other hand

1. Editorials: "How Campaign Will Be Fought." The .American Review of Reviews
August, 1916, 143; "Political Pledges." TheNorth American Review,
August 16, 1916, 166-171; fhe World's Wor£;" "Why Hughes Siiould Be
Eleeted." August 1916, 369; and "Independents and the Campaign." rhe
Nation, July 6, 1916, 51.
--2. Editorials: "Hughes Problem in the Campaign." The World's Work, July 1916
243; "Independents and the Campaign," July 6, '!91"6, 51; "Pratl'orm.s."
The Independent, July 10, 1916, 44.
s. ldi"toriai: "Political Pledges." fhe North American Review, August 16,1916
166-171.
---4. IbU.•

-

s. 11;'I1.
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~de

a diplomatic effort not to offend "••• the large number of voters who
6

were 'Willing to pay this price to have maintained peace."
With domestic and inter-national affairs in rather a critical state
the political situation before the people revolved not around the usual
cli:f'terances of party policies but rather was more aonoerned with the quality
7
o£ leadership as portrayed by the parties and by their ohoseD. oaniidates.
fbe question of Whether Wilson or Hughes should be placed at the

he~

of

the government seemed to be more important than outlines of the oampaiga

tor the respective parties.

8

Since the viewpoints and policies of President

Wilson aDd his followers were known to the voters it became the foremost
problem of Hughes to enlightea the citizens as to his staad on the questioas
9

before the public.

The Republican Party through its nominee 110uld have to

make known its stand on military preparedness, international diplomacy,
and om our relations with the Latin-American countries.

During the politioal lull in July the Progressive Party was in the
limelight.

Both the Republicans and the Deaocrats realized that the passing

of the Progressive Party did not mean the exbinction of the Progressives
aad each political group was competing with the other in offering hostage
10
to the Progressive vote.
HOw best to conciliate and placate those Repub6. Editorial: "Hughes' Problem in the Campaign.• The World's Work, August
1916, 243.
--T. Editorials: Ibii.; "Independents and The Campaign." The Nation, July 6,
1916 .. 51; an(l""""'1oll tioal Campaign." The .Amari ce.n Rev!ii of Reviews,
August 1916, 143.
a. Editorials: "Political Pledges." The North American Review, August 16,
1916, 166-171; "Hughes' Probl~inLthe dampalgn.w The Worrd•s Work,
August 1916, 243; and "How the Campaign Will be Fought," The Aiietican
Review of Reviews, August 1916, 143.
--9. "W'ReoaTlof Judge Hughes." The World's Work, August 1916, 397-410; and
Paul Kellog, "Items in Interna'€Iona! PO!Tcy." ~ Nation, August 3,1916,
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110ans who had become followers of Roosevelt in 1912 was the problem facing

gugheS and his ];arty.

Therefore. one of their first moves was to include

siX prominent Progressives in the Republican National Campaign Committee
ot eighteen and Hughes let it be known that it was his hope that looa.l

boards following the example of the national board wguli taolude
11
other Progressive men in their local campaign organizations.
Hughes and
~paign

hiS aids realized that it would be diffioult for members of the Progressive

PartY' to line up with men whom they had been fighting for four years aa.d
10

every effort was made to make their return less diffioult.

To the

Progressive conference being held in California Hughes sent a telegram
expressing his appreoiation of the support that he was receiving from Pror;ressive leaders in that state and voioing his earnest desire for a reunited
12
party.
During the month the oa.use of the Republicans was given aided
a.eouragement by the public a-batement of former Senator Albert J. Beveridge
ot Indiana. a foremost leader in the revolt of 1912, who stated that be not

only would support Hughes but that he was willing to take the stump in the

DOminae's interest.

13

By his reconciliation the Republican leaders were

t;reatly enC<luraged for they felt that the state of Indiana would swing to
~he

Republican column aad each addition to their side increased the solidar-

10. "Bidding for the Progressive Vote." The Literar,r Digest, July 22,1916,
175.

-

11. These Progressives were: George Perkins, Oscar Strauss, Chester Rowell.
Herbert Smith. James Garfield• and Everett Colby as found in The Chicago
Tribune, July 6, 1916, and New York Tribune, July 18, 1916. --12. !!.'he Chicago Sundl* Tribune. Jul'YT, 1916.
13. '!artoria1: The C istian Science Monitor, July 21, 1916; and The Chicago
Daily Tribuni; July 26, l9l6.
----
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14

itf of the party r8l'lk:s and the front it would. present to its opponents.

on the

same day on which Roosevelt issued his statement to the Progressives,

perkins issued a statement; that he and his aids had lined up for the
election of a Republican Senate which action would have far reaching effects
in that it would tend to make the contest for the Senatorial seats clear

out between the Republicans and the Democrats and, oonsequsntly, make it
tar easier for the Republicans to gain the nine seats necessary for party
15
eontrol of' the Senate.
Not all the Progressives had meekly returned to the Republican fold.

JfaDY, angered by the methods used at the National Convention, ba4 indicated
their intentioll of lining up under the banner of' the Democrats,

16

whieh

IUpport Dem.ooratio Chairma:a McOormiok announoed would be sufficient; to make
17
the re-election of President Wilson a certainty in November.
A third
group of Progressives under the leadership of John M. Parker had issued a
statement that the Progressive Party would hold a conference in Indianapolis

on August 3 at which time would be considered the question of whether or not
a eon:vention should be called to oom.plete the party's national ticket.
Parker and others were of the firm opinion that the nation should be made
aware that the Progressive Party was determined "••• to oonti:a.ue the fight
18
tor those principles which we have so strongly advocated," and only by
14. The New York Tribune, Jaly 21, 1916.

15. l'Drd.' JUly 22, 1916.
16. Editorials: The New Republic, July 15, 1916, 261; "Campaign Plan,"
The Amerioan,-evi-ei o? ReViews, August 1916, 14SJ "The Progressive Vote,
l'ni Utera~ Digest,"'""J"ul-y 22, l916, 175; and "The Progressive Vote and
the ReSlllt. The Nation, July 6, 1916, 17.
17. "The Progressive Vote and the Result," The Nation, July 6, 1916, 17.
18. The New York Tribune, Jaly 13, 1916. SiiDI!'ar statements found. in 'l'he
~iii Trib\iiie, July 29, 1916; and ~e Christian. Soienee MOiiftor,
'J'uiy 7, 9 •
-

Chroy
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_.ucing a formal party ticket. though probably a futile one. could the f'orm.er

followers of Roosevelt indicate their adherence to their principles and
19
purposes.
Dllrin.g the month Hughes was very busy holdi:ag conferences with the
officials of the Republican National Committee. with the members of the
Republican National Campaign Committee; and wri tixlg his formal speech of
aooeptance. to be delivered in Carnegie Hall on July 31.
~athering

Busily he worked

data, faots. and statisties which would serve as smm1nition for
20

his attack on President Wilson and the Democratic admiDistratioa.

His

three-fold task of placating the for.mer Progressives upon whose vote it

was conceded the election would hinge. of conciliating the irate regular
forces of the Republican Party. aJ:Id at the same time. of preparing a bold,
torcef'ul program to serve as an attack upon the party in power was, indeed.,
a mighty weighty problel'll.

By choosing outstanciing Progressives to serve on

the National Committee he appeased the spirits of' that group, yet his choice
rebuked the f'oroea or the 'Old Guard' only four of their members bei:mg
21
eeleoted.
Hughes, it was believed, thus indicated his unwillingness to
allow the 'Old Guard' to run the campaign.
former President William

However, conferences 'With

Howard Tart and Senator Albert B. Fall gave evi-

dence that Hughes planned to call upon the leaders of the Republican Party

22

to aid hlm in his c a m p a i g n . . . ; • - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 19. Ibid.
20. '!heChio~o Daily Tribune, July 21. 1916.
21. ""lR"dding:for the Progressive Vote." The Literary Digest,July 22, 1916,
175; and New York Tribune• July 11, Ms.
22. The ChicaFliil"iY Tribune, July 27, 1916; and New York Tribune, July 1,

ms.
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On the evening of July 31 in Carnegie Hall in New York City', Hughes

ga'V'e his foraal speech of acceptance.

23

Great erowds tillecl '\;he hall not

oJllY to hear the nominee• s speech but likewise to see the oaniidate• •
erstwhile opponent, Colonel Roosevelt, whose presence at the meeting had
been assured.

Technioally it was the

to rmal accepta.Dee of Hughes as the

presidential nominee, but actually it was the 'love feast' of the reunited
Republicans and Progressives and this bit of human interest was an added
attraction to the meeting.

The long speech

ot the nominee was a masterly

indictment of the national administration, a statesmanly message to the
,Aaarican people in which the major emphasis was plaoed upon the issues
taoing the nation and as suoh would serve as an outline or syllabus tor the

political oampe.ign.
-.ny problems

While Hughes earef'ully presented his viewpoint on the

ot the day he nainly stressed three which were: our relations

with Mexico, our European complications, and the problem of national preparedness.

Taking up each issue he, in a pun.gent manner, showed just where

he thought the Wilson administration had tailed and just where he stood
on each particular question.
Speaking on the pressing situation on the Mexican border Hughes
labeled our efforts to settle the problem as "••• a contused Chapter of
blunders.•

24

In his opinion the administration had not helped Mexico but

rather by its actions and vacillating cxmtradictory policy had succeeded in
23. Accounts of the speeoh fbund in: Editorials: "Mr. Hughes' Campaign
Outlined." The World's Work, September 1916, 483-483; ''Mr. Hughes
Accepts." ~Indepetide~August 14, 1916, 212-213; Mr. Hughes States
the Issue."""1.'lie outlook, August 9, 1916, 827-828; New York Tribune,
August 1, 19!'6;' and The Chicaf?l Dailt Triblme, August l,T916.
·
24. Republican Campaign :riXtbook, 9a6, 4
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a].ienati~~g

the friendship ot our southern neighbors.

This was regrettable

sinee the United States had no polioy ot aggression toward Mexico, had no
desire tor any part of' her territory, but rather on the contrary, our

25
:oation wished her to have "••• peace and stability and prosperity."
g0 wever, Hughes stated, that the United States expected Mexico, even while

disturbed internally, to protect the lives and property of' .Amerioall citizens

26
and "••. to protect our border from depredations."

Only by adopting a

oonsistent polioy-, only by convincing Mexico that our gover:rml8nt proposed
•. •• to insist in a flrm and candid manner upon the performance of'
international obligations," Hughes oontinnei would a basis tor friendly

27
relations be established.
More briefly Hughes touched upon the oomplication.s arising from the
warri~~g

situation in Europe.

He promised a f'i:rm and efficient foreign

policy and by implication he interred that our dif'tioulties with Germany
and England arose tram the blundering diplomatic policy adopted by the
Democratic regime.

It was his viewpoint that
• • • had this gover ment by the use of'
both informal and formal diplomatic
opportunities lett no doubt that When
we said ttstrict accountability" we meant
precisely what we said, and that we should
unhesitatingly vindicate that position,
I em confident that there would have been
no destruction of' American lives by the
sinking of' the Lusitania • • • Moreover,
a f'irm American policy would have been
strongly supported by our people and the
opportunities tor the devetopment of'
bitter feeling would have been vastly
reduced.28

ll.

Ibid. I 8.
26. I'bid.

27 •

28.

"'15'iet. I
1'6'l"d.
_,
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8•
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On the paramount issue of the day, national preparedness, the candidate

spoke at great length.

He stated anphatically that he believed the size of

the regular army was inadequate, as was demonstrated by oonditions on the
M~ican

border,

~nd

not only should the ar.my be increased in size, but also

that there should be a "••• first citizen reserve subject to call •••"
whioh should be
29

n

••• enlisted as a Federal anny and trained under Federal

authority."
The second part of his speech was confined to domestic affairs and
beo~e

a rather partisan political discourse on such topics as labor

problems, agriculture, the tariff, economic readjustment after the war, 811d
110]118.n suffrage, reported one paper.

30

Much attention was paid by the

nominee to the perplexing situation that wuld be inevitable after the
cessation of' war in Europe.

His most constructive proposal, in the opinion

of one editor, was the proposal of 'What Hughes called "••. an organization
of peace ••• " in which he advocated "••. an international tribunal to decide
controversies susceptible of judicial deter.mination; conferences of the
nations to formulate international rules, to establish principles, to
modify and extend international law so as to adapt it to new conditions;
the development

~f

instrumentalities of conciliation••• " and behind this

international organization, if it is to be effective, must be the
of the nations to prevent resort to hostilities before the appropriate
31
agencies of peaceful settlement have been utilized."
Concerning the
tariff the nominee took the usual Republican attitude of protection and
29. Ibid., 12.
30. New York Tribune, August 2, 1916.
31. '11Mr. Hughes Accepts. • ~ Independent, August 14, 1916, 212.
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tound the attempts of the Danooratio Party at tariff reform a failure.

He

turther accused the administration of inefficiency, extravagance, waste,
and

of violating the sound principles of civil service.

He briefly stated

ldS belief in woman su.t':f'rage for in his judgment efforts to defeat this
32

.avsaent would be unsuccessful.

Editors of magazines and newspapers in reviewing the speech offered
conflicting opinions on sections of the speech but the general tone of their
reactions seemed to be one of either frank, open disapproval or one of
impartiality.

33

One editor wrote: "The speech of acceptance of Mr. Hughes

was a disappointment to most Progressives, to many Progressive-Republicans
34

•• •• Y

another remarked that the candidate in his opening paragraph had

said.: ''We come to state in a plain direct mamer our faith, our purpose, and
our pledge," which pledge, the editor felt, Hughes had not kept for his
speech "•. • consisted chiefly of a clear and forceful sta tem.ent of the
35

reasons why the President should not be re-elected."

Another editor,

while agreeing that the speech would make an effective campaign document,
stated:

~. Republican Campaign Textbook

33. Editorials:

1§16, 17-18.
w.Mr. Hughes' Campaign Outlined." The World's Work,Septemher

1916, 483; the Nation, August 3, 1916, 96; ~Hughes Accepts," The
Independent, August f4, 1916, 212; ~y Hughes Finds Wilson Wantiii;"
1h8 Litera~ Digest, August 12, 1916, 336; "The Hughes Acceptance,• The
New Re~ublio, August 5, 1916, 4; ~r. Hughes States the Issue," The--'tJutloo , August 9, 1916, 827; and New York Tribune August 2, 19!6.'
34. E'clitorial:''Mr.
Accepts,"
~
~
14 1916, 212.

Editorial: "Mr.
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! 1aok of constructiveness seemed to be the chief fault of the address aDd
the editors in their reviews emphasized this grave shortcoming.

Hughes in

,. oomprehensive and impressive fashion had not told what he woultl do if
elected President but had devoted two-thirds of his 8000 word speech to
criticism of the administration.

On several issues Hughes failed to tell

explicitly what he would do if he were placed in the White House.

This was

quite evident in the section where he spoke on our relations w.i th the
JJ~.tions

of Europe.

While promising "... a firm and efficient foreign

policy • • •" and intimating " ••• that he 110uld be more drastic against &.Dy
English interference with our trade •••• " he failed to state what the irastie
aee.sures would be, reported one editor, and this same viewpoint was
expressed

bw the other editors.

37

For his stand on the issue of the hyphenates the candidate was
eritioized severely.

It had been hoped that he would utter a decisive worCI.

on German-American intrigue in our politics but his speech supplied that
4egree of vagueness which it was believed would enable the German-Americans
38

to endorse it and continue their campaign against President Wilson.

~

TOters were disappointed because Hughes bad stressed so briefly such important issues as the tariff and the Democratic extravagances which Republicans
1n New York felt Y«>uld be the big issue of the campaign, reported one
39
tditor.
Critical though they were of the speech the editors in the main
1916, 483.
36. Ibid; similar views taken by the editorials: "Mr. Hughes Accepts," The
lUQependent, August 14, 1916, 212; and The Nation, August 3, 1916,-sG.

Ibid.

---

mrt'orials: The Nation, August 3, 1916, 96; and
August 2, 19!'6':'"
New York Tribune, August 2, 1916.

-----

!!!!, ~ Tribune,
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agreed that while the speech had its drawbacks it had helped to clarify the
:tssues and if supplemented as the cam);8ign went on w.1. th affirmative and

.

nstructive proposals it would serve as a strong attack upon the record of
10
40
the administration.
Three prominent weekly magazines, while not openly critical in their
reViElW'S, of the speech, were not laudatory in their remarks and left the
reader with the impression that they were reserving their opinions.

41

One

eiitor felt that Hughes did wisely in making 'Anti-Wilsonism' the Republican
issue for, in his opinion, it was the one issue that would unite the dis00 ntented

groups and the one way ". •. of avoiding any dangerous oommitment
42

on any issue which will seriously divide the Republican vote."

The second

editor gave a clear, detailed review of the speech but he neither criticized
43
nor praised it.
In the article of the third magazine was found not a
rerlew of the speech but a consensus as expressed by the editors of the
prominent newspapers of the country.

Some of them 11'8re enthusiastic about

the speech, some were critical of portions of it, and others were less
44
impressed.

lb. Editorieis: "Mr. Hughes :Cam:taign Outlined." The World* s Work, September

1916, 483; ~.Hughes Accepts," The Indepenaent, August~ 1916, 212.
and New York Tribune, August 2, 1"§16.
41. Editoriars:-''Wliy Hughes Finds Wilson Wanting." The Literary Digest,
August 12, 1916, 336; "The Hughes Acceptance," "Tni New Republic, August
5,1916, 4; and~. Hughes States the Issue," T~outfook; August 9,1916,

827.
42. Editorials
43. Editorial:
44. Editorie.la
August 12,

"The Hughes Acceptance, tt The New Republic, August 4, 1916, 4.
"Mr. Hughes States the IsS'Ui,'11"'""flie Outlook, August 9, 1916,8
"Why Hughes Finds Wilson Wanting:-".!§! Literary Digest,

1916, 336.
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one Mid-western newspaper was wholeheartedly enthusiastic about the
speech, viewing it not as "••• a partisan document ••• " but "••• as a
statesmanly message to the American people •••" and expected that it would
beoa.me an outline for the campaign "••• which it may be hoped will be one

ot constructive debate, clarifying public thought and concentrating the
.American will on a course of definite and unvacillating policy in :f'oreign
45
and domestic af:f'airs."
This newspaper reported that the speech had made
profound impression in Washington Where Republican leaders were jubilant
believing that Hughes had put Wilson on the de:f'ensive and would keep him
there.
Theodore Roosevelt publicly praised the speech of Hughes, assorting
that it was an admirable speech and that Hughes was right.

The former

President was especially pleased with the manner in which the Republican
46

oandidate had exposed the folly of President Wilson's Mexican policy.

On the day follo•ving his speech of acceptance Hughes again attracted
the attention of the nation by issuing a statement in which he declared
himself in favor of an amendment to the Federal Constitution granting the

47
right to vote to the women throughout the nation.

While the Republican

Party had rather sidestepped the issue, the nominee came out squarely in
favor of woman suffrage and this action was important for it was known that
45. Editorial: The Chicago rily Tribune, August 2, 1916
46. New York Tri'Du'ne, Augus
, 1916; The Chioaio Da.ilz Tribune, August 1,
!9i'6; and 11Why Hughes Finds Wilson-wfi"nting. The Literary Digest, August
12, 1916, 335.
---47. The Christian Science Monitor, August 2, 1916; The Chicago Da.i~y Tribunt
Iugust 2, 1916; and New Yorli Tribuna, August 2,~6; "Mr. Hug es
His Stand on Sutfrag"i';"" 'Tlle"I.;iterazi Digest, August 12, 1916, 337; and
The Nation, August 10, 1916, 117

----
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the votes of women would be significant in the fall election.

The action

of Hughes would gratify the women in those states in which women suffrage
._, 8

already in practice.

It was a known fact that one-fifth of the total

vote cast for the Presidency and one-third of the votes necessary to elect
t;he President would come from the suffrage states whose total votes of
Jrl,nety-one would be important in the necessary majority of 266 in the
48

Blectoral College.

Women throughout the nation were pleased by the

DDminee' s statem.e:rrli and keener interest was stimulated in the conference of
the National \"Vomans' Party which was to be held in Colorado Springs on
49

.August 10.
On August 3 the swan song of the Progressive Party was heard.

The

leaders of the party in their conference in Indianapolis came to the conclulion that since Roosevelt had declined the Presidential nomination and since
in many states the Progressive Party organizations had disbanded that any

effort to choose another nominee 'WOuld be unwise.

However in every state

'Where there was an organization the name of John M. Parker, as nominee for
50
the Vice-presidency, would be placed on the ticket.
Veh~ently these
supporters of the Progressive principles in a public statement denounced the
actions of the Progressive National Committee, held on June 26, as a breach
of' trust and from Indianapolis came the announcement that a conference of
48. Suffrage states were: Illinois, California, Colorado, Wyoming, Utah,
Idaho, Washington, Kansas, Arizona, Montana, and Nevada. New York
Tribune, August 2, 1916.
-49. Ibid.
50. nrt'orial: "Progressives at Indianapolis. 11 The Nation, August 10,1916,
119; and~ Chicago Daily Tribune, August 4,1916.
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progressive leaders to consider the ways and means of continuing the

51
PrOgressive Party would meet attar the election in November.

However, in

the opinion of most thoughtful people the Progressive Party was dead and

thiS conclusion was heightened a few days later when Ray Robbins, Chair.man
of the National Progressive Convention, announced his intention of support

the Republican candidate, Charles Evans·Hughes.

Robbins stated that in his

opinion the voters had viewed the Progressive Party not as a new political
organization but as a mere expression of revolt against the actions of the
Republican Party.
ove~helming

The voters in the primaries of 1914 and 1916 had in

numbers abandoned the Progressive Party.

Therefore, Robbins,

believing in the "••• character and courage of the nominee of the Republican

52
Party •••" was willing to enlist under the leadership of Hughes.

This

announcement brought joy to the hearts of Republican leaders for it was tel t
tbat the sentiment of Robbins was typical of the belief of the majority of
53
Progressive voters.
During the first week of August the Republicans opened their active
~ign

for the election of Charles Evans Hughes.

which faeed the candidate was a long, arduous one.

The campaign program
On his first speaking

trip Hughes planned to start in Detroit, travel to the Pacific coast by
the way of Chicago and Minneapolis, return by the ·southern route, speaking

51. Ibid.
52. New York Tribune, and The Christian Science Monitor, August 6, 1916.
Editorials: ''RS.Yinond ROl>'bins and The Progressives." The Outlook, August
16, 1916, 882; and "Robbins Endorses Hughes." The NatiOn, August 10,
1916, 118.
--53. Ibid. and editorial: "Robbins Endorses."!!:! Independent," August 14,
'I'9'rn', 215.
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in Kansas City, St. Louis, Lexington, Kentucky, and reach Portland, Maine
on September 7.

54

The purpose of the trip was to lay the general foundation

tor the Republican campaign before the American people, to outline the
important issues of the crumpaign, to allay all feelings of bitterness among
the radicals of the Progressive Party, and, as was expressed in one paper,
Hughes intended to explain what he would do "••• if elected, in the way of
having constructive legislature passed to meet economic conditions that the
country will have to face after the war."

66

In Detroit on August 7 the opening gun of the Republican campaign was
fired.

Hughes spoke to six groups and his comments were enthusiastically

received by the men and mmen of' that industrial city.

66

In all his

addresses he severely criticized the Wilson adninistration for its disregard
of the Civil Service regime, for its disregard of' the rights of Americans
abroad, but his main attack was against the administration's failure in
handling the Mexican situation.

He agreed that our nation had a right to

demand certain things of' Mexico but there was a proper way of' demanding
them.

In one speech he said:
We should have insisted on the protection
we are entitled to from a government that
performs the f'umtions of a government.
We could have said we would not recognize
Huerata if his gover.nment could not discharge
these functions. But it is another thing to
wage war upon an individual and try and take
control of Mexican affairs.

54. New York Tribune, August 2, 1916.
55. Ibfd., and. similar statan.en:t in The Chicaff Daily Tribune, August 4,1916
56. Accounts of the speeches found iru-Tne ChiOe.go Daily Tri'&me, August a,
1916; and New York Tribune, August r,-1916; and The Christian Science
Monitor, August a, l9l6. Editorial: "Mr. Hughes and His Camp:~.ign."
!he Outlook, August 16, 1916, aao.
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The administration did a very wong thing
in abandoning its international attitude
and in taking an attitude no international
lawyer could understand. They said to
Mexico: 'We do not want to meddle with
your affairs but we will not let Huerata
be candidate for President.t67
As a consequence of the administration's policy, Hughes said, the
Mexicans were confused as to our attitude and protested, feeling we were not
sincere, especially after the advent of the 'punitive' military expedition
into Mexico •
Hughes intimated that if he became President he would adopt a just
position toward Mexico, state it establish the justice of our nation's
cause, and "••• let the Mexicans understand once for all that we do not
intend to meddle with their affairs, that we desire that they shall perform
their obligations to us,

w protect our citizens, to protect them. justly

in the enjoyment of their lives and property; that they will perform the

guarantees that they have given us, and then we shall have peace and happiness.

If they can establish a stable governmeJ.It, we will do all we can to
68
support it."
Hughes pledged, if nominated, that he would see to it that
• ••• all the rights of the United States are safeguarded and the name of

the United States in administration, in policy and execution is honored
69
throughout the world. n·
While his remarks were enthusiastically received by his audiences,
newspapers on the following day were not in agreement on the speeches.

Some

67 • The Christian Science Monitor, August 8, 1916.
68. New York Tri'6Uiie, August 8, 1916; and The Chicago Daily Tribune, August
8,1916.
6S. New York Tribune, August 8, 1916; and~ Christian Science Monitor,
XuguS'tlr, 1916.
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•ere agreeably impressed, felt that Colonel Roosevelt could have done no
better, while another felt that the statements of Hughes of how he would
GO
handle the Mexican situation had not been strong enough.
On the following day in Chicago, the Republica.B. candidate by his manner

and by his eloquent speeches made a favorable impression on his audiences.
He won the support of the people, although he jolted many political leaders,

by his announcement that he bad dedicated himself to the "•. • cause of
.American government;, not for Ifl,rty expediency, not for friends, not for
Gl
political support, but for the American people solely."
Once again the
major portion of his speech was an attack on President Wilson's policy towa
Mexico and his listeners voiced their approval of the

~4idate's

statement

that he stood for a "••• consistent policy that will make Mexico and every
other nation respect the United States."

62

While it was to be noticed that

he made no effort to expound his program for .fulfilling this aim he did
vehemently state that the policy of President Wilson had come dangerously
near to involving the United States in war.
Another statemem which 'WOn the approval of the people was his direct
appeal for scientific efficiency in governmental affairs, for the use of
the merit

~stem,

aervice.

He proposed to put an end 1x> the practice of displacing competent

and for the fitness of the men placed in the diplomatic

60. Ibid.; The Chicago Daily Tribune, August

a,

191GJ and an editorial:

""Mi:" Hughes and His Campaign." The Outlook, August lG, 1916 1 880.

61. The Chicafo Daily Tribme, Augu"ie9, 1916; and The Christian Science

ll0ni'€or,
62. Ibid.

ugust "9, 1916.

-
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Jllen because of a change in the administration.

He proposed to handle the

public's business in a businesslike way and. it was f'el t this his past recor
,.ere indicative that he would do that very thing.

He also stressed the

..aste and extravagance of the Democratic administration, aD. administration
Jll()re wasteful than any other administration, and he emphasized the great
need for protecting American industry from the demoralizing competition of
63
cheap foreign labor.
While in Chicago Hughes had an opportunity to display his ability as
a party leader.

Here as well as elsewhere during the campaign months the

bickering and squabbling among the local politicians made for an irksome
situation for the Presidential nominee.

HOwever, to the surprise of' many

Hughes avoided becoming entangled in the local situation and by his appeal
for loyalty and harmony he anphasized to the members of' the Republican Party
the need for wholehearted cooperation within the party i f success was to be
64

theirs in November.
In the twin cities on the next day he again held his audience by his
vehement denunciation of the a<hinistration, adding little to what he had
already stated in his earlier speeches.

However, he devoted some time to

substantiating a previous statement in which he had declared that the Democrats had been guilty of forcing out of office a competent man in the
65
Census Bureau.
In reply to Secretary Redfield (Democrat) of the truth of
63. Editorials: The Chicago Daily Tribune, August 9, 1916; New York Tri bum,
August 9, 1916; "Deserving Democrats and Republican Critics~ Litera
Diiest, August 26~916, 4S5; and ''Mr. Hughes and His Campaign.T'"flie
Ou look, August 16, 1916, 881.
64. 'The chicago Daa~ Tribune, August 9, 1916; !!! York Tribune, August 9,
1916; and The
istian ~cienoe Monitor, August--g;--1916.
66. E. Dana Durand, Director of Census Bureau.
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thiS accusation Hughes had produced a letter fra.m the ousted man as proof.
The incident had been taken up by the newspaper and the Republicans were
using it as evidence that Hughes definitely favored the Civil Service
1 ystem.

and the appointment of men to govermnental positioa who had special
66
training and ability, regardless of partisan considerations.
In these Middle-Western cities Hughes forcibly drove home his denunoiation of Wilson's Mexican

poli~

and anphasized the nation's dire need

of a more adequate preparedness program, citing the lamentable efforts of
the national guards to protect Americans on the Mexican border.

The

enthusiasm with which this statement was received disproved the belief that
the Middle-West, being far removed from the dangers of invasion, was not
1n favor of a reasonable preparedness program for Hughes' denial that the

American people were "••• too proud to fight" brought a thunder of applause
67
from his audience.
During the following four days, oontiming his westward tour across
the Dakotas, Montana, and Idaho the nominee made frequent speeches, many
from the rear platfonn of the train, and others in the cities of Fargo,
!lorth Dakota; Billings and Butte, MontanaJ and Coeur D'Alene, Idaho.
Forcibly and clearly he continued his denunciation of President Wilson,
hammering away at the administration's failure, shortcomings, incompetence,
extravagances, inefficiency in its foreign policy, failure to protect
66. The Chicago Daily Tribune, August 10, 1916; New York Tribune, August 10
T9'I6; The Christian Science Monitor, August YO; I'9!6; and editorialsa
The NatiOn, AUgust 17, 1916, 142; "Camtaign Controversies." The Ind.ependent, August 21, 1916, 261J and "The National Campaign." "!'he Ou'tiook,
August 23, 1916, 937.
--67. New York Tribune, August 10, 1916.

-----
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~erioan

rights; stressing the need for an expert budget system, for a

progrwn of reasonable preparedness "••• both of the heart and the individual
to meet any danand made in the upholding of the honor of the nation ••• "

and, lastly, reviewed the value

'
68
of establishing a protective tariff.

A short, concise statement of his beliefs was summed up in the brief
speech he made before several hundred people at Mandan, MOntana reported one
69
Here Hughes aaids
editor.
I propose, if elected, that men appointed
to the o :t'fiee shall be fit for the office
to which they are appointed. I propose
that the government shall be economical,
not wastefully and extravagantly administered,
and I propose that the American name shall be
honored throughout the world, because we
firmly stand for every American right.70

A new note, one of sectionalism, was added to his speeches.

In his

attack upon the spoils system Hughes elaborated upon the sectional control
of the Democratic Party in Congress, pointing out that the disproportionate

representation of the South in the chairmanships of important committees
in Congress gave that group the controlling power, and he concluded by

stating that the Republican policies, on the other hand, were for the
71
"••• benefit of the entire nation."
68. The Chica'C

Dait{

Tribune; August 11, 1916; New York Tribune, August 11,
19!6; The hris an Science Monitor, August IT; I'm'; and editorials:
"Appea!Iiig to the West. w The American Review of Reviews, September 1916,
254; "The National Campaign." The Outlook, luiUst 23, 191~, 937; and
"The Campaign." The Independenc;-August 21, 1916, 260.
69. Editorial' "The Campaign." The Independent, August 21, 1916, 260.
70. Ibid.
71. ~York Tribune, August 13, 1916; and similar statements in The
mll=istra'n Science Monitor, August 13, 1916; and editorials The-Nation,
August 17, 1916, 142.
-
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While the nominee's views on national defense were well received by
the people, to a greater degree, in fact, than had been expected by the
political leaders, yet his attacks upon the spoils system and his stand for
efficiency in

gove~ental

affairs, seemingly, had made a deeper impression

on the citizenry of the inland country was the opinion of two magazine
72

editors and of the newspaper writers.
·At the end of his first week of actual campaigning the nominee and
his IS-rtY were enthusiastic about the maDJl.er in which 'the people had
received Hughes and his program and a confidence that the Republican Party
would sweep the country in November was expressed.

The enthusiasm expressed

by the women in those states where their vote would be of vital importance

and the keenness with which the erstwhile Democratic state of Montana

received the Republican candidate added to the hopefulness of the Republican
cause.

73

The straightforward, sincere, and vital presentation of the

Republican case against the Democratic administration was so telling as to
change the "••• President and his advisors from complacent, contented
office holders to anxious, apprehensive politicians" was the opinion of
one e d ~•t or. 74
While his admirers were congratulating Hughes his critics were berating him. In their charges against him "they stated ~hat while he was very
72. Editorials: "Deserving Democrats and Republican Critics." The Litera~
Digest, August 26, 1916, 435; "National Campaign." The Out!O'Ok, Augus
23, 1916, 931; The Chicago Daill Tribune, August ll::r!', i9io; New York
Tribune, August-r!-15, 1916; an The Christian Science Monitor:-August
ll-15, 1916.
73. New York Tribune, August 13,14, 1916; and~ Christian Scienoe MOnitor,
Augu~3,14, 1916.
74. New York Tribune, August 14, 1916.

--

.
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thOrough in his attacks upon the policies of the gover.runent he, in turn,
offered no real, constructive policies in the program he was presenting to
75
the voters.
To this charge Hughes answered that the points enunciated
in his speeches were "••• the fundamentals of oonstruotive policies which
76
this nation is facing today."
Arriving on the Pacific Coast the Presidential nominee turned the
emphasis of his speeches from domestic problems to international policies.
In Tacoma, Washington, before a crowd of 15,000 he "••. explained em.phati77
cally his attitude toward the protection of American honor and rights"
and

his manner of hammering home his remarks made it apparent that he intended
them as his real message to those who greeted him on the coast, was the
78

opinion of one newspaper writer.

Hughes declared that the doctrine of

protecting Americans on our border was a good one and that he believed in
genuine.

He stated:

I do not think that in making it real we
will encounter the dangers of war. But I
would not shirk war if it came with the
performance of our obvious duty in the
protection of American rights. In the
protection of American citizens under international law we do not endanger our peace we conserve it. 79

oontinued that "••• there is no peace permanently secure to you
80

unless you have the respect of the nations of the earth."
However, he
75. Editorials: The Nation, August 24, 1916, 164; "Mr. Hughes on Tour."
The New R~ullic, August 19, 1916, 56.
76. The' Chris an Science Monitor, August 15, 1916; and~ Chicago Daily
"T'rlbune, August 15","!916.
77. 1ew York Tribune, August 16, 1916.

78. 'lbfd-:--

79. Editorial: "National Campaign." The Outlook, August 23, 1916, 931; and
New York Tribune, August 16, l916;and The 'Christian Science Monitor,
Iugustl6, 1916.
-
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believed that since all the nations were desirous of our friendship there
.,.ould be no danger of war if the Americans made it evident that they meant
,.nat they said and were prepared to back up their statements.

While the

remarks of Hughes were more 1nilitant than before yet they were received
enthusiastically by the largest audience he had addressed since his speech
81
of acceptance.
In the same speech he expressed his hope that the United States would
play a part in the international peace

organization~

in the establishment

of a World Court for it was his aim that the United States be known as a
nation of people that did not desire trouble and was not aggressive but
"••• let it be equally known that we are a people who will not stand trit'82
ling with our known rights, or rights of American citizens."
This viewpoint, likewise, was well received by his listeners.
In this speeoh and in others on the next day in Portland, Oregon, he
spoke of other matters.

First, of the responsibility our government had to

the Philippines, as a national obligation which we had assumed and were

bound to

as one which we could not rightfully abandon, as the
83
Democrats were planning to do.
To the business men he spoke of the need
d~soharge,

of re-organizing our entire government and our national industries in order
to be ready to faoe the struggle which would ensue after the war was over,

when Europe would make every efforb to regain its lost commerce.

Following

81. New York Tribune~ August 16, 1916
82. New York Tribune, August 16, 1916; The Chicago ;>a%lz Tribune, August 17,
ms; and editorial: "Progressives incampaign. he Independent, August
28~ 1916, 292.
--83. Ibid.
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thiS line of thought he stressed his belief in the need of a protective

tariff' which W>uld build up and maintain American industry tor the Democrats
since their advent in office had done nothing to reduce the high cost o£
living.

In a speech before 3,000 woman who applauded him for his views on

equal suffrage he expressed the same views as he had stated to the business
84

In California Hughes had the misfortune to arrive in the midst o£ a
bitter factional fight between the regular Republicans and the Progressives
who had lett the Republican Party under the leadership of Governor Hiram

Johnson in 1912 and who had returned to it with him after the tassing of the
Progressive Party.

In 1910 Californian politics had been notoriously

oorrupt and boss-ridden and Johnson had been elected governor upon a strong
ref'o:nn ticket.

In 1916 Johnson was a nominee for the United States Senate.
being opposed to him, they tried to eliminate him from

state politics and openly had announced their intention to wreak vengeance
upon the Progressives whom they charged with deliberately attempting to
S5
wreck the party.
The advent of' Hughes on the scene brought the state political diff'iculinto the national limelight and placed Hughes in a dilemma. He thought
84. New ~Jribune, August 15,16,17, 1916; The Chio~o Dailz Tribune,
Iugust 15 1 16,17, 1916; and The Christian ~ence
nitor, August l5 1 16,
17, 1916; and an editorial:--rii'ppeaiing to the West." The American Review
of Reviews, September 1916 1 254.
--85. Acoounts of the political situation in California found in editorials:
"Progressives in the Campaign.a The Independent, August 28, 1916, 292;
uThe Nation, August 24, 1916, l6"6;New York Tribune, August 18,21,1916;
Tnechioago Daily Tribune, August 18,2i';-l916; and The Christian Science
MOnitor, August 1s,21, 1916.
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to satisfy both groups by declaring his neutrality in the looal fight but

thiS attitude of his disappointed not only the followers of Governor Johnson
tor they had hoped that the Presidential nominee would publicly endorse
their claims but also the regular Republicans who had announced their
86

unwillingness to declare a truce.
both groups.

Hughes had expected the support ot

The Republicans had warned him that if he did anything which

might be construed as endearing Governor Johnson they, the conservative
87

Republicans, would throw their vote to Wilson.

Governor Johnson and the

Progressives while openly endorsing Hughes were disgruntled, annoyed
because they had been relegated to minor positions in the receptions and
speaking program arranged for Hughes.

The newspapers and magazines agreed

situation while a looal one, might have far-reaching effects.
Two editors, skeptical of the outcome, felt that the non-recognition

ot

Governor Johnson would make the Progressives feel that they had not received
the recognition due them and as a consequence, these editors believed there
might be a serious deflection of the progressive Republican vote in favor

ot President Wilson.

88

A newspaper wri tar, believing that the appeal of

Hughes for harmony in national politics would serve to unite both groups,
was

confident that

California would add to the Republican victory in

89

November.

A third attitude was taken by an editor who in the previous
critical of the speeches of Hughes.

This editor, while

86. Ibid.
87.

"''b!d.

88. 1CI'ftorials: The Christian Science Monitor, August 19, 1916; and~.!:!!!
Republic, August 26, 1916, 77
New York Tribune, August 19, 1916.

-----
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expressing the belief' that the Republicans and Progressives would unite to
elect Governor Johnson as Senator failed to give his opinion as to the stand
the Progressives

~uld

take in the Presidential election.

90

All in all it

,as a very baffling political entanglement which Hughes. the most interestecl

partY• had to encounter; and yet. his hands being tied• he could really

make no effort to solve the problem.
In his speech in San Francisco. Hughes addressed a large audience and
to them he presented the same salient points which he had uttered in his
previous speeches in the Middle West, dwelling on the necessity of a tariff
refor.m. on Mexico and the protection of Americans and American interests
abroad. on the need of a preparedness program, and on the need f'or efficiena,y in gover.nmental affairs.

little

His audience listened attentively but showed

applauding his declarations for military preparedness
91
but showing little approval of his stand on the Mexican problem.
enthusia~,

The day following this speech the Progressives who took their politics
seriously voiced their disapproval of the stand taken by Hughes that local,
92
t'aotional tights were not the concern of' the Presidential nominee.
While
the Progressives were willing 1xl abide by the truce, yet they indicated
quite definitely their desire that Governor Johnson 'Who was campaigning in

southern California should be invited to preside at a later political meeting in the southern part of the state.
90. Editorial: The Nation, September 7• 1916, 212.
91. New York TribUne, August 19. 1916; and The Christian Science Monitor.
lugu8IT9, 1916.
92. Ibid., August 20, 1916.

-
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The next important address was made in Sacramento on August 21.

Here,

in later speeches in the state, Hughes made a definite appeal to the
progressive vote.

For the first time he claimed the support ot that group

and anphatically repeated his approval ot several policies upheld by
Go'Vernor Johnson, 'Whom, as yet, he had not met.
r 8 tandpatism'

Hughes, speaking ot

placed it in the same category with demagogy as things not to

be desired in America.

He preached the Progressive 'social justice'

doctrine, demanded conservation ot women and children, talked about
e££ioiency in governmental affairs, and condemned the practice ot allowing
special privileges at the expense ot the people.

He won the people ot

southern California by his assertions on the Mexican situation, a problem
93
olose to the hearts of these citizens near that border.
First stating
that he was a man of peace he forcibly said "••• but I recognize the
necessity of compelling recognition ot our acknowledged rights as a means

ot forcing peace ••• We lost the esteem of Mexico as soon as we tailed to
adequately protest against the killing of American citizens ••• but I am
ready to lay down my lite to protect the nation's honor at any time such
94

aacriti ce may be demanded. "
The results ot his campaign in the pivotal state of California were
IWDned up with conflicting results.

Both Republicans and Progressives

&greed that he would carry the state, although his visit had failed to unite

the hostile groups.

96

The failure of Hughes to meet and confer with

9S. New York Tribune, August 22,23,1916; and The Chicago Daily Tribune,
Augu~2,23, 1916.
94. New York Tribune, August 23, 1916.

-
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Go'V'ernor Johnson irked the hearts of the Progressives.

One newspaper

reported that this group had felt slighted and md begun to question the
96
genuineness of the progressivism of Hughes.
His refusal to do anything
to recognize the Progressive Party and his failure to indicate clearly his
stand on many of the Progressive issues might oost him, this editor
believed, not only the support of the rank and file of the Progressives in
california, but might also impair the faith of the Progressives through-out
the country in the genuineness of his policies and his economic liberalism.

His speeches in the state fell short of those specific pledges to political
and economic regeneration that the Califbrnian Progressives wished to hear.
It was true that the people of California had attended the political meetings in large numbers, yet their response to the speeches of Hughes had not
been overly enthusiastic.

One newspaper reported the meetings as being

more in the nature of deliberative assemblies rather than the usual politica
97

meetings.

While Hughes had made an impression upon the voters by his

discussions on the tariff and the Mexican situation yet there remained
among the many independent voters in the state a strong sentiment for
98
President Wilson.
The Republioa.n leaders in the East, while definitely worried about the
complaints of the Progressives in California announced that the tour of
the Republican Presidential candidate in California had been a success and
from all indications the election in November would bring victor,y to the
99

104

Starting eastward. speaking in the states of Nevada. Utah. Wyoming.
and Colorado. Hughes delivered many speeches in which he again and again

refute the Democratic criticism that he was tearing
100
down the policies of the President and offering none as substitutes.
Hughes. however, maintained that his ideas were constructive and gave as
~ples

his Mexican policy, his attitude toward efficiena.y in governmental
his stand on military preparedness, his belief in a protective

tariff. and his proposed program for a world court.

The people in these

western states greeted him cordially and the Progressive and Republican
leaders assured Hughes that these states

~uld

add to the Republican victor.y

in November. especially as the women of these suffrage states were working
101
wholeheartedly tor the Republican candidate.
Yet on August 25. in Greeley. Colorado, in a typical speech Hughes
administration.

He said:

Our opponents said they would reduce the
cost of living. They haven't. They said
they would stand for the merit system.
They have shamelessly betrayed the merit
system. They said they were tor the maintenance of constitutional rights of American
citizens throughout the world. They le.:f't
our citizens to be murdered and their property
to be destroyed right here in Mexico, close to
our own boundary. They did say they were
opposed to a tariff for protection. This they
carried out with the resqlt that before the
European war broke out unemployed men were
walking the streets of our cities jobless,
asking for work, and having to be fed by
countless charitable organizations.l02
Account of this part of the candidate's trip found in: The Chicago
Daily Tribune, August 22-26, 1916; and New York Tribune~ugust 22-26,
1916.
-101. New York Tribune August 25.1916.
102. ~ Chi
Tribune August 27 • 1916.
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The next day in Denver the Republican delivered one of his 'Amerioa
First and America Efficient' speeches, which concluded his western speaking
tour•

He had traveled through twelve states, had addressed one hundred

and fi.fty audiences of over one-half a million voters and had expounded
103
hiS beliefs and views on the problems facing the nation.
For three weeks the citizens of the nation had beengiven the opportunity to hear or to read and to digest the import of the Republican candidate's speeches.

Whether the trip had been successful could not be agreed

upon by the editors of magazines and newspapers.

One editor maintained

that the influence of the campaign 'b:>ur had been far-reaching and that the
candidate had made a very favorable impression "••• by the simple device
104
of appealing to the reasoning powers of his audiences."
However, the
consensus of opinion on the part of the editors, seemed to be one of disappointment.

One criticism hurled at Hughes was that his attacks upon the

administration were non-constructive, while same "••• assert them petty
••••" although the same editor agreed that even the most far-sighted
106
candidate could not have been constructive about everything.
In
criticizing Hughes the editor wrote:
Mr. Hughes' procedure has been to take up

one act after another of the Administration
and denounce it without reference to any
fixed principles which would bring his
attacks into hanoony and unity. Many hoped
that the Republican nominee would translate
Editorial: "Hughes Stumps the West."..!!:!! Independent, September 11,1916
369.
Editorial: New York Tribune, August 27, 1916.
Editorial: 'Tile ration, August 24, 1916, 164.
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their own general dissatisfaction with
Wilson's record into one fundamental
criticimn as illuminating as a shaft of
light.l06
To this editor's way of thinking the nominee had failed to arouse any deep

teeling among the citizens of the nation and both friends and admirers were
107
disappointed in many aspects of the candidate's speeches.
Another editor, while agreeing that Hughes had been well received by
large and enthusiastic crowds and that the friendly manner of the candidate
had dispelled the myth which pictured him as being cold, reserved, and

108
austere stated, nevertheless, that Hughes had not come up to expectations.
The trouble (he wrote) is he has not told
the American people positively and concretely
just what he proposes to do if elected
President. It is not enough to demonstrate
President Wilson's sins of omissions and
connnission. The American people know them
already. It is not enough to promise to
install efficiency in the gover.nmental service
and to eliminate graft. Everybody knows
Mr. Hughes will endeavor to do this ••• • The
American people want to know what constructive
program Mr. Hughes has to offer them. They
demand of a leader demonstrations of leadership.l09
However, this same editor, a week later, praised Hughes for choosing

to emphasize in his speech of acceptance the 'ranote and colorless' subject,
the national budget.

The editor felt that Hughes had courage and insight

when he chose this topic, one which although very dull to the average Amariean, was an issue fer more important to our national welfare than half the
arty creeds as protection, preparedness or any other to ic which might so
• I i

•

107. E"al'iorial: The Nation, September 7, 1916, 214.

loa. Editorial: "An Anti-Campaign." The Independent, August 28, 1916, 289.
----

-

109. Ibid.

107
110
easily attract the voter's attention. and enthusiamn.
Another editor while reviewing the cwnpaign speeohes in a dispassionate
fashion did express the opinion that the critics of Hughes in asking him to
state what he would have done had he been the chief executive were demandint; more of the candidate than any human being could answer.

Yet, in

editor expressed the sincere hope that Hughes would expound
111
his views on our future international relationships.

An impartial resume of political opinion as expressed by the editors
of leadin g newspapers throughout the nation was given by a well known
112
It stated that the newspapers were reporting favorably on
the campaign on the personality and character of' the

Republican nominee,
113
and on the impression made on the people. by the candidate.
The political
leaders and party managers, according to press dispatches, were pleased
of' the western campaign and were claiming certain victory
California, Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, W.innesota, North
Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming, and a fighting chance in Montana,
114
On the other hand this magazine gave the political
and Colorado.
viewpoints of' several non-partisan or independent newspapers which were
11

decidedly unfavorable in their camnents on the success of' the Hughes tour.
While one newspaper stated that "••• Republicans as a rule are disappointed
in the campaign of' their nominee, Mr. Hughes," another editor felt that
109. Ibid.
110. mrt'orial: "The Real Service of' !h-.llughes." ~ Independent,September
4, 1916, 324.
Editorial: "The National Campaign." The Outlook, August 23,1916, 931.
Editorial: "Has Hughes Won the West?rr-nie Literary Digest, September 9,
1916, 593.
---113. Ibid.
114. "''b'!CT.
115. 1'61d.
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116
gughes in the latter half of the campaign would be a different figure.
A very glowing account of Hughes' campaign was given by a staunch
117
admirer of the candidate.
He was of the opinion that Hughes on his
•estern tour had accomplished much as was attested by the editorials in the
DEI!loore.tic journals whose editors in their columns sought "••. to criticize
118
and belittle the candidate and his speeches."
To the criticism that
in his speeches had failed to hold the interest of the people because
sameness of subject matter this writer replied that the fragmentary
excerpts in the newspapers each day gave the impression of repetition "•••
but it must be remembered in all fairness," he stated," that Mr. Hughes ·has
119
necessarily much the same general message to tell everywhere."
In his
opinion Hughes had planned to win the West and he had succeeded.
This likewise was the opinion of a correspondent who had been a member
120
In denying the hostile charges concerning the
of the campaign party.
apeeohes of Hughes this writer stated very amphatical+y that the West had
received the candidate very enthusiastically and that large, interested
had attended his speeches everywhere.

To them the candidate in a

sincere, personal fashion had delivered his messages on the broad
issues which faced the nation and his views more than satisfied his listenera, reported this correspondent.

In his magazine articles he earnestly

the aloofness of the candidate refuted the
the stories co
116. Ibid.
117. Jacob Schurman, "Mr. Hughes' Trip."~ Independent,September 4,1916,342
118. Ibid.

119. I'bl"l.
120. Trec!erick Davenport, "Across the Continent with Hughes." The Outlook,
September 13, 1916, 88-92. Similar views expressed a week-rater, "Hughes
and the People of the West," September 20, 1916, 141-146.
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oritioisms of the "••• hostile portions of the Atlantic press," and this
.riter by his enthusiasm and sincerity gave the impression that the people
121
o:f the West l'«>Uld vote the Republican ticket in November.
In the opinion of another editor the real political campaign had not

begun and just how it would develop remained to be seen although he believed
that it would be "••• concerned with large issues of public policy and with
national leadership in critical times," and that it would be decided upon
122
by the independent voter, many of them from the Progressive Party.
That the members of the Progressive Party would play an important
in the Presidential election seemed to be a well accepted viewpoint.
This was evident by national interest displayed in the state elections of

California.

There, early in August, Governor Johnson won the nomination for

the position as state Senator.

This victory was viewed in various lights.

The Progressives were jubilant; candidate Hughes sent a telegram of congratulations to the victor and Republicans and Progressives hailed it as
123

"••• an omen of national victory for a reunited party," reported one writer.

However, a Democratic paper saw in it a hope that the people of California.
would vote for President Wilson because many Progressives were still rankled
124
by the behavior of the Republican candidate toward Johnson.
The editor
of a non-partisan newspaper while aware that the

victo~J

of Johnson was

important, felt that "••• it -would be premature to undertake to say what
121. Ibid.
122. Editorial: "The Political Campaign. • The American Review of Reviews,
August 1916, 143. Similar viewpoint fotlnd in an editorial:fn The World'
---Work, August 1916, 359.
123.~son's Victor.r," The Litera~ Digest, September 23,1916, 731J Similar
views found in an e"ddtorial: The Admlnistration on Trial." The Independent,September 11,1916, 369; New York Tribune, September,l916;-!he
Chica&o Iaily Tribune, September 1,1916; and "The Field of PoliticS":""
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effect the California vote will have upon the vote in November."

125

He

inferrei that the Progressives, sinoe they were heartily eager to defeat
the Democrats would compromise and agree on Hughes.

126

However, he brought

out the fact that there were many Progressives who were disgruntled with
Hughes not only because of his actions while in California, but also were
displeased with his views on European and Mexican affairs.

As a consequence

they were earnestly working to convince the independeJII:; voters of the
state that "••• a vote cast for Mr. Wilson will better express the social,
economic, and political faith that is in them than a ballot cast for
127
:Mr. Hughes."
While the Republican candidate was campaigning in the West, party
leaders were busy in the East.

It was planned that Fairbanks, after his

notification on August 31, should make a whirlwind speaking tour, covering
128
practically the same ground as Hughes.
Colonel Roosevelt, too, was to
join the list of campaign speakers.

After a meeting with

Reptibli~

National Chairman Willcox it was announced that the Colonel would actively
~paign

for Hughes and although no definite schedule was announced other

than his speech in Lewiston, Maine on August 31, it was reported he "WOuld
129
be used wherever he was most needed.
This announcement plus the news that
123. The Outlook, September 13, 1916, 64.
124. wJohnson•s Victory." The Literary Digest, September 23, 1916 1 731.
125. Editorial: The ChristlUUi Science Monitor, September 15, 1916.
126. Ibid.
127. Editorial: The Christian Science Monitor, September 15, 1916.
128. New York Tr"i'6ii'zie, August 4, 1916
129. New "YY?'£ Tribune, August 25, 1916; and The Chicago Daily Tribune,
AuguSt'24, l9l6.
-
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Albert Beveridge would deliver a speech in ChicagQ on October 5, and the
nBW'S that Colonel Harvey, formerly a supporter of President Wilson, had
indicated his ~llingness to campaign for Hughes started "••• joy radiating
through the political circles and did much to push away some of the gloom
clouds caused by pessimistic reports industriously circulated as to
130
conditions in the West, a reported one paper.
Late in August the

~paigners

tor launching an aggressive

progr~

met in Indianapolis to prepare plans
all over the country especially in the

western sections which needed Republican attention.

'Americanism and

National Efficiency' was to be the campaign slogan.

Besides the candidate

and Colonel Roosevelt suoh prominent speakers as Senators Borah and Harding

were to deliver many speeches.

Their efforts "WOuld be directed toward

impressing the public that the campaign was not one of politicians or
131
localities, but of 'absolute nationalism' reported the papers.
As the first month of the campaign closed the center of attention was
directed toward the state of Maine.

Both major political groups were con-

oentrating their energies there in the hope of winning a victory in the Pine
state which was to hold its state elections on September 11.

Maine was

known as the barometer state and the trend of its early fall elections was

usually indicative of the results in
132
the state, reported one editor.

Nov~ber

for the nation as well as for

130. The Chicago ~ly Tribune, August 24, 1916.
131. New York Triune, August 27, 1916; and The Chicago Daily Tribune,
Augu'St""2"9, 1916.
132. Editorial: "Hughes Stumps the West." The Independent, September 11,
1916, 369.
---
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As had been planned Colonel Roosevelt delivered his first real campaign
speech in Lewiston., Maine on August 31.

In reporting on the speeeh one

editor said that the Colonel in his usual and characteristic fashion had
133
denounced the Wilson administration
while another stated that the address

.as an "••• appeal to the chivalr.y and oourage of' the American people ••• ;"
and one in which the Colonel attacked the hyphenates, reported a third
135
The reviews of the speech indicated that the major portion of'
the speech had been devoted to an attack upon the foreign policy of'

Preo~·~~··~~

wilson declaring., as wrote one editor., "••• that the timidity and vacilla
136
o£ the President had brought indelible disgrace upon the country."
Roosevelt in condemning the Danocrats for their slogan., ''Mr. Wilson Has Kepb
Us out of War," cited that the 'peace' existing between the United States

of' words only., for Roosevelt said:
These are the words. Now for the deeds.
During the war with Spain fewer Americans
were killed by the Spanish than have been
killed by the Mexicans during the present
'peace' with Mexico. Moreover, when the
war with Spain was thru, it was thru. But
peace still continues to rage in Mexico.l37
speech Roosevelt advocated an immediate increase of' the anny., the
creating of' "••• a system of' universal., obligatory military service in time
of peace, and in time of' war universal service in whatever capacity the man
138
or woman shall be judged most fit to serve the commonwealth."
133. Editorial: "The Administration on Trial." ~ Independent, September 11,
1916, 369.
134. Editorial: "Roosevelt's Maine Speech." The Outlook, September 6,1916,14.
135. The Christian Science Monitor, September-!, 1916.
136. Eartoria1: "The Adiiiinistration on Trial." The Independent, September 11,
1916, 369.
-
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The Colonel appealed to the people and gave his reasons Why in his
judgment it was a grave misfortune to re-elect Mr. Wilson.

He attacked

those who in his opinion were aiming to organize .Am.eriesn citizens along
tpolitico racial' lines and stated that "••• every citizen voting this year
shall consider the question fmm the standpoint of America and not from the
standpoint of any other nation."

139

In conclusion he contrasted the two

presidential candidates, picturing Hughes as a man of his "M.>rd and Wilson
140
as a man who had been tried and found wanting.
The speech was doubly important because it not only was a clear
indication of Roosevelt's views toward the fall election·but also showed
that the Colonel was wholeheartedly willing to campaign for Hughes.

It was

believed that his active participation would have great influence in "•••
keeping his fellow Progressives from straying off the ranch," reported one
editor.

141

Meanwhile Hughes to his listeners in Kansas City, Missour, on September
1 gave one of his usual speeches placing special enphasis on the need for
protection in its broadest sense.

On this topic he stood for the "•••

protection of American lives upon land and high seas and foreign lands, for
protection of workingmen throughout the country, for protection of all
American industries, for protection of the Treasury from raids of job se
142

and reckless legislators."
Hughes also appealed to the people to vote
The Chicago Daily Tribune, Septenber 1, 1916.
"Tiie Christian Science Monitor, September 1, 1916.

I'brd.

ECirt'orial: "The Administration on Trial." The Independent, September
11, 1916, 369.

----

The Chicago Sunday Tribune, Septanber 2, 1916;
§eptember 2,1916.

and~~

Tribune,
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into office a Republican House of Representatives and Senate in order to
143

haVe an administration that would be able to achieve results.
Upon reaching st. Louis, the home of many Germ.a.n-.Americans, Hughes was
directly confronted with the hyphenate problem and he met it in a direct
manner by subscribing to the utterances of Colonel Roosevelt as expressed
in his Lewiston speech.

In the congratulatory telegram to the Colonel the

Republican candidate said: "I heartily congratulate you on your speech at
Lewiston and warmly appreciate your support. •

144

Later when questioned as to

whether his telegram indicated his acceptance of the Colonel's views on
the hyphenates Hughes replied: "The telegram may be taken on its face value.
I mean just what I said."

145

Thus Hughes made it so obvious that he was

against any foreign-born citizen who placed his allegiance to another
country over his duty to his adopted land and that there could be no possibl
doubt of his meaning reported one paper.

146

As one editor expressed it,

the Ger.man-American group no longer had "••• a shadowy basis for a belief
that he favors in the smallest degree their views upon our relations with
147

Germaey.

Following up the subject Hughes stated that while he was not

too proud to fight he believed that there would be no occasion for fighting
~f

our rights were upheld.

The enthusiasm with which these straightforward

utterances were received by the audiences in St. Louis surprised the politi148
cal leaders, stated one newspaper.

m.

Ibid.

144. ~Field of Politics." The Outlook, September 13, 1916, 63.
145. Ibid.
l4o. New York Tribune, September 3, 1916.

147. Ecrrtorial: "Mr. Hughes and st. Louis. 11
148. ~ ~ Tribune, September 3, 1916.
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On the next day Hughes traveled to Nashville, Tennessee and his address
there was noteworthy on several scores.

One newspaper brought out the f'act

that it was the first tim.e a Republican Presidential nominee had entered the
149
territory f'or campaign purposes.
His hostile audience ridiculed,
heckled, and jeered his speech in which he criticized the administration f'or
its policies, argued f'or a protective tariff', and asserted, in a fir.m
manner, that he stood for the arbitration of all industrial disputes.

150

This last issue was a new note in the campaign due to the signing by President Wilson on September 3 of the so-called Adamson law which had been
hastily rushed through Congress in order to avert a threatened strike of'
railroad employees.

151

The methods used in the passage of the bill were

seized upon by the Republican candidate and criticized severely. Referring
to this bill Hughes asserted that he stood for two things, first, "••• for
the principle of' fair, impartial, thorough, candid arbitration; and,second,
152

tor legislation on facts according to necessities of the case •••• 11

To

this statement his audience cheered and agreed but in the middle of the
candidate's criticism of tho administration's Mexican policy one heckler
shouted: "What would you have done?"

To this Hughes quickly replied: "I
153
would have protected .American lives."
There was no more heckling and one
149. The Christian Science MOnitor, September 5, 1916.
150. Review of' speech found in New York Tribune, SeptElllber 5, 1916; The
Chicago_ Dail.z Tribune, September 5, 1916; and~ Christian Sci'ence
Monitor, September 5, 1916.
151. Bill signed on September 3, resigned September 5,1916. ~ Independent,
September 18, 1916, 403.
152. The Chicago Daily Tribune,September 5,1916; and !!! York Tribune,
September 5, l9l~.
153. Ibid.
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nev~spaper

writer reported that Hughes had turned "• •• an almost riot into

a personal victory," and in his opinion whether or not the speech won a
single vote for Hughes his audience had left the hall with a warm feeling
154
toward the candidate.
Republiean leaders and ~tars were pleased by
the candidate's 'flatfooted' declaration for arbitration in labor disputes
and felt that he had siezed upon a weakness in the administration which
155
.ould develop into a patent issue in the national campaign.
One editor
stated that this speech of Hughes "••• may well prove to be the turning
156
point in his campaign."
Not that the speech would necessarily determine
the election, believed the editor, but rather that the candidate in this
speech showed himself to be the man 'Whom the people had nominated, the man
with f'irm principles, dauntless courage and of whom it oould be said that
"••• not the power of wealth nor the pressure of populace nor the threats
of labor-unions will swerve him from following the dictates of his clear
157
convictions."
On the next day the crowds in Lexington, Kentucky were won over by the
speeches of Hughes in which he again openly attacked the President for his
railroad wage policy, for his humanitarian policy in Mexico, and for his
158
diplomatic appointments.
It was reported that there was a possibility
that the state of Kentucky might vote. "epublioan in the fall election due

------------------···-----------------154. New York Tribune, September 6 1916.
1

155.
156.
157.
158.

Ibid., an~e Field of Politics." The Outlook, September 13, 63.
Editorial: "The Issue of Character.~e Nation, September 4,1916, 251
Ibid.
'ifEiVTYork Tribune, September 6, 1916; and The Chicago Daily Tribune,
September 6, 19!'6.
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to the fact that the Progressives in the state had indicated their willing159
to endorse Hughes.

On September 7 Hughes invaded New England in an effort to swing the
state of Maine to the Republioans in the elections to be held on September

ll•

It was believed that the well known axiom 'As goes Maine. so goes the

union' while unfounded• -would prove to have a psychological effect on the
00 untry

at large and both major parties were anxious and deter.mined to make
160
a good showing in the voting in the state elections.
The Republican
oandidate toured the state speaking in many of' the smaller cities and giving
his main addresses in Portland and in Bangor on the following day.

In

Portland his address followed the lines of' those previously delivered by
161
him.
The high spot of' his speech was his attack on the President for the
enactment of' the Adamson bill.

In criticizing this so called eight-hour

act Hughes charged that the administration had substituted "••• the rule of
162
force" for "••• the rule of reason."
He objected very strenuously to

the methods used in the passage of the bill and declared that if he had
been the chief executive of the United States he would not have yielded to
force exerted by capital or labor short of a "••• fair examination of their
163
facts and a knowledge of 'What the ease demanded."
Further on in his
164
speech he stated: "This country must ne:v"er know legislation under oppression.:
159. Ibid.
160. Eariorial: The Nation, August 31; 1916, 192; and The Chicago Daily
Tribune, September io. 1916.
161. Accounts of speech found in The Chi~o ~bilz Tribune, September 8•1916
and The Christian Science Monitor, eptem er a. l916.
162. Ibid-;163. I'bl"l.
164. Ibid.

118
Again he reiterated that he believed in the peaceful settlement of all
grievances by arbitration and felt that the nation might "••• as well give
up Democratic govermuent i!' we are not ruled by reason, if we yield to
165
force."
In this address he also spoke on the grave need for protecting
.American labor, for making preparations for the economic oonditions which
would naturally arise at the end of the war in Europe, and on the need for
166
eaoh and everyone to work for the good of the nation, reported one paper.
An interesting sidelight of the occasion was the presence on the

platform of Raymond Robbins, former Progressive leader.

In his address he

gave his reasons for supporting the Republican candidate, namely, that he
believed that Hughes

~uld

carry out the ideals of the Progressive Party.

The reception given these remarks indica ted the presence of many Pro167
gressives in the audience.
On the next day in Bangor the newspapers reported that Hughes again
168
developed in a vigorous faShion his opposition to the Adamson bill.

In answer to his critics he made clear his attitude toward labor. He
replied that he was a friend of the laboring man and that he would be tm
first to give higher wages where the demand for higher wages was found to
169
be just after an examination of the facts.
His speeches in this state were reported as having been more vigorous,
more
165.
166.
167.
168.

to the

and this new zest ot the candidate

and added

Ibid.
~Christian Science Monitor, September 8 1 1916.

The Chicago Daily TrThune, September a, 1916.
Accounts of speeCh found in New York Tribune, September 9, 1916; The
Chicago
Tribune, Septem.ber--s;-1916; and The Christian Soia~
Monitor, Sap ember 10, 1916.
-

169. Ibid.
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cheer to the Republican leaders.

170

However, manywere skeptical of the

lf].sdom of making the Adamson law an issue, but Hughes being convinced of
its import.ance continued to nake it the high point of his speeches as he
campaigned in the New England states and in New York.

It was reported that

he had injected more vim and 'more vote-getting utterances' into his
addresses since he had first attacked the Adamson bill in Nashville.

171

The results of the election in Maine ware an overwhelming victory for
the Republicans for not only was a Republican governor elected but also two
172
United States Senators and four Representatives.
That the jubilant
Republicans regarded this decisive election as indicative of what

~uld

happen in the national election in November was reported by the newspapers
173
and magazines.
Clearly the Progressives in Maine had united once more
with the Republican forces and one editor stated that he believed this
amalgamation was "••• as complete the country over as it has now been proved
to be in Maine," and so to him and others the Chances of a re-election of
174
President Wilson were negligible.
While many agreed that the election
results proved conclusively that the Progressives of Maine had rejoined the
Republican Party yet the editors of several nagazines and newspapers
expressed the opinion that the merger in Maine was not indicative of a
similar realignment in other states in the union especially in the doubtfUl
175
states of the West.

170. The Christian Science Monitor, September 11, 1916.
171. NeW York Tribuna, September 9, 1916.
172. NeW York Tribune, September 12, 1916; and an editorial: ~Nation,
September 14, 1916, 247.
173. New York Tribune, September 12, 1916; The Chicago Dailz Trib~t!,Sept
ember-!2, 1916; The Christian Science Monitor, September 12, 1916;
"The Maine Election." The Outlook, September 20, 1916, 117 J "The
Message from Maine." The Literarz Digest, September 23,1916, 727-29;
and editori 1• '
Part "
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Candidate Hughes ending his first transcontinental campaign tour in
plattsburg, New York on September 12, expressed his gratification of the
results in Maine.

The returns convinced him, he stated, of the following:

that the party was reunited; that the people were satisfied with his
0 e.mpe.ign

methods; and that they approved and would endorse his views on the
176
Adamson bill.
Another feather in the Republican cap was the announcement by the
nationally known Progressive leaders, Gifford Pinohot, that he, following
the example of Roosevelt and Robbins, had chosen to join the Repu:bl.ioa.n
ranks.

In his statement he gave his reason .for so doing and in conclusion

stated: "I cannot vote for Wilson because I cannot trust him.

He does not

do what he says.

Hughes does. Therefore, my choice is Hughes and I shall
177
work and vote for him."
Approval of his stand was given by one editor
who wholeheartedly agreed with him and firmly believed that many people
178
felt precisely as Pinohot did.
Within the Republican Party there was a murmur of strife. Many
members of the 'Old Guard' were not satisfied with the campaign, felt it
lacked the vigorous spirit, believed that Willcox as National Chairman was
not sufficiently aggressive, and asserted that the speeches of Hughes were
Opinion, October 1916, 218.
•
174. Editorial: New York Tribune, September 12,1916; Th.e Chicago Dai~z T.ribune, September""TI'; 1916; ''Maine Election." The 'Outlook, Septem ar-m,
~. 116; and reports of the opinions of other newspapers found in:
"The Message from Maine.n The Literary Digest, September 23,1916,727-29
175. Editorials: "The Result in Maine." The Nation,Septem.ber 21,1916,271;
The New Republic, September 16,1916:-T49; ~ine Exhibits a Reunite4
Party." Current Opinion, October 1916, 218; and reports of the opinions
of other newspaper editors found in: nThe Message from Maine." The
Literary Digest, September 23,1916, 727-29.
--176. New York Tribune, September 13 ,1916; The Chicago Da%ly News,September
13'; 19I'lf; and The Christian Science MOiiTtor, Septem er 1"3";!'916
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not the kind to win the election.
west had been a failure.

179

In their opinion his tour of the

Hughes, however, quite satisfied with the way the

o(llll.pEioign had been managed, met with Willcox and assured him of his confi180
dance.
Hughes having finished his first campaign 1x>ur immediately arranged
for his seoond trip which would take him through the states of Illinois,
181
wisconsin, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey.
On
this tour he planned to speak in such leading cities as Milwaukee, Cleve}And, Pittsburg, New York, and Buffalo.

Great results were expected by

Roosevelt of Hughes' trip in the M1ddle-West, a section of the country
182
definitely Republioan in allegiance, reported one paper.
The Republican
leaders met and carefully perfected their plans.

While confident of victory

they anphasized the need of every political leader getting out and working
hard, the need for arousing the political interest in every state which
183
was doubtful.
According to the plans of Hughes he would continue his
drive against the Adamson law, and at the same time he hoped to make it
clear to the public that he was not opposed to the principle of an eight184
The major business interests of the Middle West such as
hour law.
177. Gifford Pinohot, ~Vilson's Record Should Make Every Progressive Vote
for Hughes." The Literary Digest, September 30, 1916, 852-53; and
editorial: "P~ot for Hughes," The Nation, September 20,1916, 116.
178. Editorial: "The Chicago Dailt Trioune, September 12, 1916.
179. New York Trioune, Septe.mber3, 1916; and The Chicago Daily Tribune,
September 12, 1916.
--"
180. Ibid.
181. TheChic,o rity Tribune, September 14,1916; and The Christian Science
MOnitor, ep an er 14, 1916.
182.
York Tribune, September 19, 1916.
183. Ibrd., September 14, 1916.
184. New York Tribune, September 19, 1916.
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£arming, dairying, shipping, and commerce were particularly interested

in

the subject of the Adamson act and, according to one paper, Hughes proposed
185
to remove the disguise from the measure and show it up for what it was.
LikeWise, the Republican candidate would earnestly refute the Democratic
~ilson

Kept Us Out of War," to argue that it would "••• have been
186
onlY a befuddling blunderer who could have pitched the country into war."
slogan:

Campaign speeches were to be made by many prominent Republicans.
Fairbanks was to take the stump traveling westward through Oklahoma and
)4i.ssouri, to be followed by Senator. Lewis.
~paign

in October in support of Hughes.

Taft and Root, also, were to
Beveridge was to cover the waste

sections in order to arouse and convince the Progressives and to swing th~
187
Roosevelt, too, was to speak in the West
to the standard of Hughes.
spots' where it was believed his fire and enthusiasm was
188
needed in order to turn the tide to the Republicans.
The Colonel,
reported one newspaper, was not as optimistic about the outcome of the
election as some for he realized that a hard fight was ahead, that stronger
efforts would have to be made in order to corral the Progressive vote in
the Middle West and West.

It was generally conceded, this paper stated,

that the election " ••• would be determined by that large element of former
Progressives who will return this year to one or the other of the two old
parties and to bring this now floating element back to the Republican fold
185. Ibid.,and The Christian Science MOnitor, September 19, 1916.
186. New York TrrOune, September 16, 1916.
187. The Clii'Oago Daily Tribune, September 19, 1916.
188. NeW York Tribune, September 15, 1916. Similar viewpoint as expressed by
lea~newspapers found in: "Progressive Leaven in the Republican
Camp." ~Literary: Digest, September 30, 1916, 818-19.
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is the task ahead of Hughes and his managers."
Beginning his second tour in Springfield, Illinois, Hughes spoke
before a large audience.
of his address.

Here again he made the Adamson law the chief topic

After pointing out the fallacies and weaknesses

bill he denounced it, criticizing the manner of its passage.

of the

In his

opinion there had been no need to rush the law through Congress, for by
appealing to public opinion the threatened railroad strike would never have
been called.

He said: "I am satisfied there could have been no strike.

We are still ruled by public opinion, and no administration need fear the
results if it stands firmly for essential principle."

190

He pointed out

that the bill did not establish an eight-hour workday nor did it have
provisions that would tend to bring the eight-hour

~rkday

into effect.

Granted that the law did give an increase in wages to certain groups of
railroad men and granted that this increase might have been justified by
facts, yet the fact remains, he said, that "••• it has been forced upon
Congress and the country by the President of the United States without
prior inquiry, in the face of an appeal for arbitration, and at the cost
191

of the repudiation of that principle and the shame of the national

Congres~"

Wilson's excuse that a dire emergency existed which made necessary the
passage of the bill, Hughes exposed as being false, because, he stated, the
189. New York Tribune, September 8 1 1916. Similar view held by editor of
The Nation, September 21, 1916, 268.
190. Accounts of speech found in New York Tribune, September 20, 1916;
The Chicago Daily Tribune, September 26,21, l916J editorials: '~r.Hughe
Oiltlie Eignt Hour Law." The Independent, October 2, 1916, 9; and
"Hughes and Wilson." The~terary Digest, October 7, 1916, 874.
191 •
Chicago Daily Tri'buiie,. Septeliiber 21,. 1916.

.!!!!

124

situation had been developing for months and neither the President nor
192
congress had done anything about it.
In an appeal to all wage-earners
he asked that they wisely consider all angles of the issue for in the end,
he believed, all wage-earners would lose because of the means used in the
passage of the bill.
At the State Fair in Peoria, Illinois, Hughes won the approval of his
listeners by his doctrine of protection.

He saidJ

We are devoted to the doctrine of protection ••••
We propose that American rights w.i. th respect
to life, property, and commerce shall be protected with respect to every nation on earth.
We are for protection of American peace.
We are not militaristic but we must be firm
and unflinching and prepared in such a manner
that none w.i.ll mistake either our disposition
our our ability to maintain our just rights.l93
He ridiculed the statement that others had kept us out of war and
again said that only a 'blunder' could get the nation into war for no
nation desired trouble with us.

He stated: "It is weakne.ss and vacillation

and permitting others to misunderstand us which brings us dangerously near
194
such an outbreak of resentment as may lead us to serious trouble."
All
matters he felt could have been handled in a diplomatic manner, but, he
195
declared, "••• we must be firm. We must be for America First."
These addresses were well received by the voters in Illinois, reported
papers.

196

Hughes had been more direct in his remarks and had driven

home his points w.i.th telling effect.

In this state he gained the enthusi-

astic support of the women Who were to vote for the first time.
Ibid.
193. New York Tribune, September 20, 1916.
194. Ibid-;-195. Ibi<l.
196. 1'Sfc!.

nz.
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The people in Wisconsin received the candidate and his views most
enthusiastically stated the papers.

197

In Milwaukee, notwithstanding the

fact that his audience was largely made up of naturalized Americans, Hughes
spoke directly of 'undiluted Americanism' and his 'straight fra.m the
198

shoulder' remarks were well received by his listeners.
In his many speeches throughout the state he stressed as issues the
199
tariff, 'Americanimn,' Federal Reserve Law, and the Shipping Bill.
Speaking on the failure of the Underwood Tariff he declared that only a
protective tariff could preserve prosperity by safeguarding business
interests and by keeping the wages up to the American standard.

On the

protection of American rights his remarks were the same as those in his
previous speeches.

Bringing the Federal Reserve bill for its place in the

crunpaign against the administration he stated that the Democrats had hoped
by its passage to gain friends from business interests.

Yet Hughes main-

tained that the greater part of this valuable act of legislation had been
taken from material supplied by a Republican Commission and a draft of a
Republican bill.

Therefore, it was really based upon Republican efforts
200
On the Shipping Bill ~ich the Democra
and upon Republican foundations.
called an aid to business and which Hughes declared a direct blow to Amari
therefore, should be removed, he said: "It unjustifiably
201
introduces the government into the shipbuilding business."

197. Ibid., September 21, 1916; and The Christian Science MOnitor, September
~1916.

198. Ibid.
199. 'ThTd.

200. !'Si(f.
201. 1'6Id.
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On the following three days Hughes carried his campaign into Indiana;

02

Before the voters of Richmond he spoke vigorously on the Mexican situation.
ffe charged the President with having done everything that should not have
been done in regard to Mexico and with having lett undone the things that
should have been done.

Hughes condemned him for having meddled with Mexican

affairs in a way "••• which forfeited to us the esteem we should have
enjoyed, and finally resulted in leaving Mexico to the ravages of revolution
203
without protection of our citizens or the citizens of any other country.
His conclusions were based on the authentic information Which Hughes said
he had received concerning the actual instructions given to John Lind,
204
Ambassador to Mexico, in relation to Huerta and the Mexican Presidency.
Hughes concluded that there was
one way and one clear way to secure the
respect of Mexico and of every other
nation and to maintain our prestige and
our influence; one way to be really helpful,
and that is tor America to recognize the
just demands of American citizenship and
protect American lives and property throughout
the world, and I stand here to say that so tar
as I am concerned, it entrusted with the
executive responsibility, !'·shall to the
utmost of my powers maintain American rights
on land and sea throughout the world with
respect to all nations, as to American
lives, American property, and American
commerce.205
Throughout the state of Indiana, to the thousands who wildly cheered
him Hughes contented himself with a review of his usual topics, hitting

202. Accounts of campaign found in The Chicago ~ly Tribune, September 22-2
1916; The Christian Science Monitor, Septan er 22-24, l916; and New
York Trrbune, September 22-25, 1916.
--203. EditOrial: "Mr. Hughes and the Administration. "The Independent, October
2,9.
John Lind had been authorized to state the following to a representative of another overnment: "Huerta will be ou
h
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hardest on Wilson's surrender of the principle of arbitration, on the failure of thetariff, on the betrayal of American rights, and on 'Americanism.'
The last two topics were enthusiastically received and approved by his
206
.
Republican leaders, pleased with the candidate's campaign in
audiences.
Indiana, reported that in their opinion the three states of Illinois,
Wisconsin, and Indiana were definitely aligned on the Republican side, and
that the speeches and manner
li'Orkers.

of the candidate had encouraged his political
207
New impetus had been given to tile campaign.

A critical editor, in reviewing this part of the campaign complained
that the Republican candidate had devoted himself "••• largely to domestic
issues and the Administration's Mexican policy •••" and had not undertaken
"••• to any great extent, to carry on a campaign of education of the
American people in the large questions of international obligations raised
208
by the European war.
In the cities of Dayton, Cleveland, and Toledo Hughes continued to
assail the President and the administration.
law were more severe.

His attacks upon the Adamson

In reply to the President's defense of it Hughes

declared that "••• there had been too much legislation just to get the votes
of one set of men or another and that such action led to civil war and if
209
continued would cost the nation its democratic form of government •••• "
that it is the preference of the President that it should be accomplished by domestic means if possible, but if it cannot be done by
domestic means other means adequate for the purpose ~11 be resorted
to." Editorial: The Independent, October 2, 1916.
205. Ibid.
206. Tlie"Chicago Dally Tribune, September 23,24,19il6; New York Tribune,
September 23,2 , 1916.
·
-207. New York Tribune, September 24,1916; and The Chicago Daily Tribune,
September 24, l916.
208. ¥~~torial: "The Presidential Campaign."~ Outlook,September 27,1916,

128
continuing, he stated that he believed that those who engineered the
passage of the bill never had thought of enacting an eight-hour day law,
and the administration by this misnomer, had endeavored to confuse the
210
Hughes and his campaign leaders believed, it was reported, that
public.
even in the industrial sections of Ohio where the labor vote was large if
the "••• issue is presented properly the people - labor and all - cannot
211
tail to realize 'What this sort of legislation means."
In Cleveland, Ohio, referring to President Wilson for the first time by
name, Hughes challenged him to deny the charges he had made that John Lind
212
had been instructed to put out Huerta if he did not voluntarily get out.
To the laborers in the steel mills of Pittsburg, to his audiences
throughout his stay in that city the Republican candidate expounded the
same points he had delivered in his speeches in the large cities on his

to~

He placed special emphasis upon the need for protecting the industries of
country and for

u •••

a prosperity that is not based on a European war

on sound policies which will protect industry when there is no European
213
war to give war orders."
Hughes stated his belief that a policy should be
adopted to insure work, security for the workingman, and, he stated, that
214
the Republican Party would insure that result.
His audiences cheered
209. The Chicago Daily Tribune, September 26, 1916.
210. 1'6Td.

211. New York Tribune, September 27, 1916.
212. 1'6I'd., and The ~hristian Science Monitor, September 27, 1916.
213. ~Christian-Science MOnitor, September 28, 1916. other reports of the
"S"p'eech found in: New York Tribune, September 2k, 1916; and ~ Chicago
¥bi~l Tribune, Septem~28, 1916.
214.

•
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biS statements and listened with equftl enthusiasm to his gospel of

t.AJ:nerice.nism.' and then in 'extra volume' to his attack on the Adamson bill,
215
In this city he addressed not only the Republireported the n6Wspapers.
cansbut also the Progressives and Hughes learned from his party leaders
that ninety per cent of the Progressives in Pennsylvania were working to
216
promote his success in November.
An angered speaker faced the audience in Saratoga, New York
217
reported the papers.
Hughes, incensed by the accusations of exsecretary of State, Richard Olney, that he, the for.mer Justice of the

court had doffed his

1

judicial ermine 1 to appear in the "... motley garb

of an ordinary seeker of office •••" defended his actions in running for the
218
office of the Presidency.
The fo~er Secretary of State had spoken in
of the President's actions in connection with the Adamson law and
defense Hughes replied in strong ter.ms.

He produced letters and

telegrams which broke down the President's defense of the Adamson law,
219
especially on the point that a crisis demanded the passage of the bill.
Hughes charged that the United States Chamber of Commerce had urged Congress
and the President to investigate the railroad situation weeks before and he

proved that they did have ample time and opportunity for inquiry but had
220
failed to use them.
Again his stand met with the approval of the men and
215. Ibid.
216. ~Chice.go ~ly Tribune, September 28 1 1916
217. llid., Septem er 29, 1916; and New York Tribune, September 29, 1916
218. ~Chicago Daily Tribrme, Septembe~, 1916
219. I'DTd.; and New York Tribrme, September 29, 1916.
220. Ibid.; and l'lle cru=rstiin Science Monitor, September 29, 1916.
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~men

in the audience and it was felt that the Adamson bill would become a
221
political issue in the East.
At this time critici&m was hurled at Hughes by the editor of a nonpartisan paper.

It was his opinion that Hughes had made a mistake in
222

stressing in his speeches the Mexican situation and the Adamson bill.
It was this editor's belief that the people had made up their minds on the
Mexican question and were satisfied that the President had done well in
keeping the United States out of armed intervention in Mexico.

Secondly,

public opinion, he stated, had accepted the eight-hour law as a just and
rational measure and so attacks on it were ' equally impolitic.•

He

suggested that Hughes stress a safer and sounder topic, the tariff, because
the administration could not refute it and the Republican candidate could
uphold it without much opposition from the Democrats.
At the close of his speech in Buffalo the Republican candidate ended
his second campaign tour. The general opinion of his managers was one of
223
approval.
It was felt that his tour had been remarkably successful,
enough even to gratify the most skeptical and it was believed that Hughes
on his second trip had made more progress than on his earlier one.

Repub-

lican leaders stated that Hughes had put more force and energy into his
addresses and had won the confidence of the people.

He had visited seven

221. Ibid.
222. Editorial: The Christian Science Monitor, September 29, 1916, and
similar views-expressed on October 5, 1916.
223. A review of second tour found in New York Tribune, October 2, 1916; and
~Christian Science Monitor, Oct'Ober 2, l9l6.
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states whose electoral vote of 178 was a large portion of the necessary

266.

Confidence was expressed that Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin

could be counted as Republican states and that while Ohio was debatable
the good impression made by Hughes in the State of' Indiana combined with

splendid political organization there would bring that state to the Repub224
11can column.
New York, too, would add to the Republican score and the
225
prospects of' victory in New Jersey were hopeful.
Hughes, the papers
stated, had squared off' the· issues emphasizing the following three: the
Adamson law, the tariff', and '.Americanism;' and he had forced President
226
Wilson to abandon his plan of a 'front porch campaign.'
Meanwhile Colonel Roosevelt again stirred the voters of the nation by
hour address to the people of Battle Creek, Michigan on September
The papers reported that the main points of' the Colonel's eaoquent,
speech were: the Mexican situation, the President's foreign policy
and the action of the President in connection with the Adamson law.

Presi-

dent Wilson in a speech had predicted war if the election was won by the
Republicans and to this Roosevelt replied: "Oust him and save the country.fi

In his speech the Colonel pictured Wilson as a coward and as a man whose
no

good.

He had termed the President "••. as a man of' furtive and

shirting political maneuvers •••• " and as one who was as "••• cowed by the
229

big labor leaders as he was by Mexico and Germany."
Roosevelt in this
224. Ibid.
225. "t'Eiic!.
226. "!66a.
227. ~speech and reports of it found in The Chica~o Sunday Tribune,October 1, 1916; and New York Tribune, October 1, 1 16. Reports or it found
in editorials: "~Campaign.~ Independent, October 9,1916, 57; and
"He Ke:pt Us Out of War." The Lfuraq Di§est, October 14,1916,933-934.
228 • ..IW1 ChJ.oa~o Sunday Tribuna, October ,-1 16
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speech f'ollowed his general indictment of' the President and his administration by specif'ic instances of'

~~eir

f'ailures.

One editor wrote that the

speech was a fighting one, the f'irst of' a series and if' the pace of' this
one was indicative of' those to follow it, it augured a 'calorie and inter230

esting' campaign.

A f'aw days later on October 3 a very interesting meeting took plaoe in
the Union League Club in New York City when three prominent men, Theodore
Roosevelt, William Howard Taf't, and Charles Evans Hughes, addressed a group
231
of Republicans.
Ostensibly the purpose of' the meeting was to welcome
the Presidential candidate but what attracted the attention of' the public
of' the two f'ormer presidents.

One editor reported:

The real signif'ioanoe of' it, however, lay in
the f'aot that many men who have dif'f'ered
radically with one another on certain aspects
of' domestic policy, and even more radically on
certain questions of' political morality and
methods of' political organization and control,
found themselves drawn together by the question
of' Nationalism, and particularly by that
question as it has been raised by perils in
our f'oreign relations. It was the principle of'
Nationalism that was the common subject of' the
three prinoiple speeches of' the evening.232
Both ex-presidents, Taf't and Roosevelt, in their brief' speeches commended the position taken by Hughes on the issues of' the day and "••• empha230. Ibid.
231. Accounts of' the meeting f'ound in New York Tribune, October 4,1916;
The Chioa~o Daily Tribune, O?tober 4, 1916; The ~hristi~ Science
Eronitor, ctober 4, 1916; ed1torials: "Republican Rally at union
League." The Independent, October 16, 1916, 94; "Tho Hughes Meeting."
The Outlo~ October 11, 1916, 293; and The Literary Digest, October 14
1]!6, 923.
--232. Editorial:"The Hughes Meeting." The Outlook, October 11, 1916, 294.
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sized the importance of the forthcoming election to good Americans,"
233
reported one editor.
Colonel Roosevelt in his address struck directly
at the President's foreign policy.

In referring to the rumor that the

Ger.man Reichstag was considering Whether or not to resume its U-boat warfare
Roosevelt declared: "And you can guarantee that there would be no debate on
that subject if they knew that we had as President of the United States a
234
man who would not tolerate any action of that sort."
The Colonel
denounced President Wilson's actions as an "• •• invitation to foreign Powers
to do whatever they wished because if he were in power they need not be
235
afraid."
The most significant passage of Hughes' speech, according to one
editor, was the one in which he answered President Wilson's declaration
"••• that to the Democratic policy of peace the Republicans had only one
236
alternative to present, namely, war.
This was the answer of Hughes:
We have heard in recent days that the alternative
of the policy of the present adninistration is
war. I think the alternative of the policy of
the present administration is peace with honor.
I am a man devoted to the pursuits of peace. We
cherish the ideals of peace. We entertain no
thought of aggression, we are not covetous, we
are not exploiters, but we are Americans and
American rights must be maintained throughout
the world. That is the cornerstone of our
security, that is the essential basis of our
peace. We ••. are not courting struggle, but I
do say with all seriousness that we have been
living in a period of' National humiliation.237
Editorial: "The Hughes Meeting."~ Outlook, October 11, 1916, 294.
Ibid.
Editorial: The Literary Digest, October 14, 1916, 923.
Editorial: "Republican Ra!ly at Union League." The Independent, October
16, 1916, 94.
237. ~Christian Science MOnitor, October 4, 1916.
233.
234.
235.
236.
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More -s-pace was given in the newspapers to an account of the meeting
of the three men than to their speeches.
one editor wrote that it was the

In commenting upon the meeting

c~paign's

'best omen' for it indicated

that "••• all forces of Republicans and Progressives are united in oppositi
to the continuance of the shame this country has endured ••• 11 and a reunited
party is marching on
238
traditions •••• "

"••

dedicated to the preservation of America's best

That President Wilson by statements regarding the Republicans and war
239
had stirred the nation was evident by the editorials in newspapers.
By his speech in Carnegie Hall on October 5, Elihu Root hurled his

challenge at the Democratic administration.

To those gathered before him,

Root, according to the newspaper reports, "••• arraigned the record of the
present adm.inlstration in the most clear-out indictment of the campaign to
date."

240

Root paraded before his listeners the important issues that he.d

occurred during the Democratic administration and "••• showed with masterful analysis the unsatisfactory tennination of every negotiation for their
241
settlement," wrote one paper.
He stressed the administration's failures
at home and abroad, its 'scuttling of American rights' which resulted in
238. The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 6, 1916.
239. Editorials: The Chicago '!5aily Tribune, October 5, 1916; New York
Tribune, October 3, 1916; and excerpts of editorials of newspapers of
the nation found in "H.e Kept Us Out of War, 11 The Literary Digest,
October 4, 1916, 933.
--240. The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 6, 1916. Other accounts found in
New York Tribune, October 6, 1916; and editorial: 11 Republi can Arguments:w-The Out!ook, October 18, 1916, 348.
241. The Chic~ Da.ilyYribune, October 6 1 1916.
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the slaughter of many American lives by German submarines and Mexican
bandits, the aaninistration's surrender to the railroad unions, and its
total inability to prepare the country against future dangers.

242

Of the administration's policy toward Mexico Root stated that the
Jllt\Dller of handling affairs with our southern neighbor had resulted in
making enemies of both Villa and Carranza and "••• no man in Mexico dares
243

to oall himself our friend."

The speaker in expressing his views tovfard

Germany stated:
Germany paid no attention to the bold and
weighty declaration of thd American government because upon her trained observation
and the estimate of the character of the
men who controlled the American government
she judged that they had not the nerve, the
courage and the resolution, to make their
threat good ••••" and so Germany continued
her program of sea. warfa.re.244
Root declared that

"•••

if our govermnent meant what it said when it de-

cla.red it would protect its citizens it should have had the capacity to
make Germany understand that it meant what it said and the Lusitania would
never have been sunk."

245

Speaking of the eight-hour law Root called it a 'holdup,' a piece of
legislation passed in submission to a threat and "••• if the attitude of
our government under compulsion of the railroad brotherhoods is to be the
attitude of the .American people we hold our lives at the mercy of the public
blackmailer."

244

242. New York Tribune, October 6, 1916.

243. rud-:--

244. ~ChicagoDaily Tribune, October 6, 1916.
245. ~d.
246. Ibid.
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His speech struck a new note of appeal, was a call to awaken the real
247
spirit of America which lay asleep was the opinion of one editor.
,Another editor believed that Root 1 s speech had stirred the DEIIlo erats, would
£orca Wilson to give an answer, would minimize the President's play to the
hyphenates, and, all in all, would weaken the Democratic campaign program.
As the

~paign

2

swung into its final weeks criticism and praise were

IDBasured out to the Republican Party and its candidate.

Hughes was criti-

oized for the organization of his speeches, for according to one campaign
manager the candidate repeated the same thing in all his speeches which made
it very difficult for the press to report on them.

As a result the candi-

date and his views received less space in the newspaper and secured less
249
publicity.
The suggestion was made that the candidate use one issue in
each speech, concentrate on it, for after all, the real audience was not
the immediate group in front of the speaker, but rather the large group
of voters who read aooounts of the speech in the newspapers and journals.

250

Another newspaper writer, while upholding Hughes tor his stand on the labor
issue, was of the opinion that it would be more profitable for the candidate
251
to change to another is sue.
A very comprehensive review of the eampaign up to date was given by the
252
editor of a leading newspaper.
He brought out the fact that Hughes on

!tz.

Ibid.
248. New York Tribune, October 7, 1916.
249. New~ Tribune, October a, 1916. Similar view expressed by the editor
or-~atlon, September 7, 1916, 215.
260. Ibia;-

251. "TlieChristian Science Monitor, October 5, 1916.
252. lrcf:ftorial: The Christian Science Monitor, October 12, 1916.
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his third campaign tour would make a definite, personal appeal which the
0~paign managers hoped would bring back to the Republican fold

.no had strayed away in 1912.

~he

voters

This editor wrote: "The election in November

'ffill hinge very largely on whether the Republican candidate succeeds or
tails in his efforts to strike a keynote to which the Mississippi

Vall~

253
will respond."

A review of the campaign revealed the fact that Hughes

on his first tour had anphasized the faults of the amninistration's Mexican
policy and was diverted .from this issue only by the enactment of the Adamson
law which he vigorously attacked and continued to attack with vigor.

In

his earlier attacks upon the bill Hughes had taken an extreme view but
later on he modified his language "••. so as to avoid the creation of an
antagonism to his candidacy in the ranks of organized labor," wrote the
254
editor.
Hughes in his later speeches attacked not so much the bill as
the manner used in its passage.

The editor .felt that on the Mexican issue

Hughes md maintained with "••• growing rather than diminishing vehemence
his organized indictment of Wilson's policy."

255

The campaign was given added impetus by the addresses mde by leading
figures in political circles.

Senator Lodge added the

~ight

of his

influence to the Republican cause, refuting Wilson and stating that the
Republican Party did not advocate war.

In fact, the party meant to keep

peace "• •• but it does not mean to keep it by humiliation and the cowardly
256
abandonment of .Am.erioan rights," declared Lodge.
Similar views were
?53. Ibid.
254. 1'brd.
255. 1'6I'Cr.
256. New York Tribune, October 8• 1916.
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eXPressed by Senator Beveridge in his address in Chicago.

He declared that

the Wilson regime had been a !'utile effort and the Wilson Mexican policy
257
a 'malpractice of statesmanship.'
The Republican managers having lost
some of their confidence of victory in the Middle West prepared an extensive
program of education.

It was one 'Which would almost be a man to nan canvass

of the voters in every line of industry, including the farmers, in the
258
crucial states of Ohio, Wisconsin, and Indiana.

Starting on the JAst swing of his campaign Hughes spoke in Philadelphia
259
on October 1.
Changing the tone of his speech he spoke not so much on
domestic issues as on diplomatic and foreign affairs.

According to news-

paper reports Hughes charged the President "••• with attempting to escape
deserved condemnation by trying to make the public think the alternative of
260
his policy is war."
Hughes believed that Wilson had not kept the nation
out of war, for during the Democratic administration the nation had been
261
involved in a war, a war without honor.
The candidate made it clear that
if he were elected he would enforce .American rights on land and sea.

He

outlined the Republican program in two respects as follows:
We do not propose to tolerate improper
interference with American property, with
American mails, or ~th legitimate commercial
intercourse.
No .American who is exercising only .American
rights shall be ~ut on any blacklist by any
foreign nation.2 2
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

The Chica'o Daily Tribune, October 6, 1916.

New York ribune, October 6, 1916.

"'!bfd:;Dctober To, l916J and The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 10,1916
New York Tribune, October 10,---rn-16.
Ibid-;-The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 10, 1916.
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!gain and again Hughes declared that had the American government left no
doubt that when it said 'strict accountability' it meant precisely that,
he was confident that there would have been no destruction of American lives
263
"Unfortunately," stated one editor,
by the sinking of the 'Lusitania.'
"such a statemenb left open to question just what Mr. Hughes himelf meant;
by ' strict accountability,' and gave some support to the charges of persons

politically unfriendly to Mr. Hughes that he was striving to hold the
support of German-Americans by a deliberate vagueness of statement."

264

The speech, in fact, became the cause of a political controversy for,
according to one paper, a leading political writer made the oharge that
this speech of Hughes had been written under the auspices of a prominent
265
New York German newspaper.
Three days later in Louisville, Hughes made one of the most brilliant
266
speeches of his campaign.
One editor felt that this speech was "••• the
most definite and significant statemenb upon the relations between the
267
United States and Germany which the candidate has yet given to the public."
The editor stated that while the Republican candidate had on many occasions
denounced President Wilson for "••• his weakness in handling the question
raised by the German submarine issue •••• • yet he had never stated except
268
in a general way what he would have done in the President's place.
263. Ibid.; The Christian Science Monitor, October 10, 1916; and editorial:
~t Mr;-Hughes Would Have Done." The Independent, October 23,1916,
1~.
-264. Editorial: ~Vhat Mr. Hughes Would Have Done." The Independent, October
23, 1916, 1~.
---265. Editorial: The Nation, Dctober 19, 1916, 363.
266. Accounts o~e speech found in New York Tribune, October 13, 1916;
..!!:.! Christian Science Monitor, Octo berl'3, 1916; ~ Chioago Da.ily
Tribune, October 13, 1916; and editorial: '~ihat Mr. Hughes Would Have
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In the midst of the candidate's discussion on the maintenance of
,AJnerica.n rights he was interrupted by a heckler who demanded, "What would
269
you have done when the 'Lusi tania' was sunk?"
Hughes quickly answered:
I would have had the State Department, at the
very beginning of the administration, so
equipped as to command the respect of the world,
and next I would have so conducted a:t'i'airs in
Mexico as to show that our words meant peace
and good will and the protection at all events
of the lives and property of American citizens.
And next, when I said strict accountability,
every nation would have known that that was meant;
and further when notice was published with
respect to the action threatened I would have
made it known in terms unequivocal end unmistakable
that we should not tolerate a continuance of
friendly relations through the ordinary diplomatic
channels if that action were taken.
And the Lusitania, sir, would never have been
sunk.270
After the applause the candidate continued his speech, dwelling on
the need for a protective tariff and on the •new freedom' advocated by
President Wilson in 1912 and now transmuted, reported one paper.
Reactions to this speech were varied.

27l

One editor disagreeing with

Hughes believed that the severance of diplomatic relations as indicated by
2$!
Hughes would not have been sufficient to cause Germany to cease her program.
In the editor' s opinion only a fear of war with us would have kept Germany
273
Another editor, while applauding
from resuming her 'policy of murder.'
Done." The Independent, October 23, 1916, 143.
267. Editorial: '1ffiit Mr. Hughes Would Have Done." The Independent, October
23, 1916, 143.
---~
268. Ibid.
269. ~Christian Science Monitor, October 13, 1916.
270. Ibid.
271. "I'61"d.
272. Eartorials ~ ~ Tribune, October 14, 1916.
273. Ibid.
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the oratorical mam1er of Hughes and while believing that southern Kentucky
had become an admirer of Hughes expressed his opinion that in November the
state of Kentucky would follow her usual practice of voting the Democratic
274
Nevertheless this editor felt as very significant the increased
tioket.
roroe of the candidate's appeal as demonstrated in his speech in Louisville.
The high praise given to the address and to the man who made it by an
editor unfriendly to Hughes indicated the spirit and vigor of the address.

275

All in all, it was regarded as quite certain, according to one paper, that
Hughes had gained strength all over the country by his 'Lusitania' state276
ment.
Meanwhile Colonel Roosevelt again taking up his

o~paign

October 14 to the miners in Wilkesbarre, Pennsylvania.

duties spoke on

In his scathing

arraignment of the administration and its policies the Colonel spoke on the
eight-hour law, and on the chaotic conditions in Mexico for which he held
277
Wilson, Gompers, and Carranza responsible was the report in the papers.
The Colonel devoted most of his address to an attack on the Adamson law and
the manner of its enactment which he contrasted with his ow.n actions in the
278
Anthracite Strike of 1902.
While the Colonel believed in the principle of
an eight-hour day and in labor unions, he believed the so called eight-hour
aot was not right, that it could not be applied to workingmen in all branches
274. Editorial: The Christian Science Monitor, October 17, 1916.
275. Editorial: ~Nation, October 19, 1916, 364.
276. New York TrTO'Une, Oc:Sober 14, 1916.
277. ~CEICago Sunday Tribune, October 15, 1916; New York Tribune, October
I5; 19l6; and The Christian Science Monitor, Oc:eober-!6~~6~
278. Ibid.
-
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of industry, that the law was not just to the railroads and that "••• it
was deeply prejudicial to the real and permanent interests of the laboring
279
JD8.n•"
Roosevelt in his address stated that he was championing Hughes "•••
because in every crisis Wilson by his public acts has shown that he will
yield to fear, that he will not yield to justice, whereas the public acts
of Hughes have proved him to be incapable of yielding in such a crisis to

any threat whether made by politicians, corporations or labor leaders."

280

According to the papers this audience cheered the Colonel's fiery oratory
in spite of the fact that President White of the United Mine Worker's Union
had declared the miners for Wilson.

281

One editor, in reviewing the speech,

praised Roosevelt for his remarks on the Adamson law but criticized the
282
Colonel for the abuse and insinuations he had hurled at the President.
To the voters of Joplin, Missouri, Hughes selected the protective
283
tariff' as the theme of his address.
With the end of the war would come
the end of' 'Good Times,' he stated, and so he earnestly urged the nation to
prepare innnediately for the economic oondi tions which would arise at the
termination of' warfare in Europe.

He viewed the current economic condition

with apprehension, as one 'resting on sand.'

That the exports of' the nation

had jumped to a fabulous figure he agreed, but he pointed out that this
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

New York Tribune, October 15, 1916.
The Chr'istian Science Monitor, October 16, 1916.
Ibid.

-

Editorial: The Nation, October 19, 1916.
The Chicago-suD.daz Tribune, October 15, 1916; and~~ Tribune,
October 16, 1916.
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trade was determined not by oondi tions of normal oompeti tion but by an
abnormal want in Europe.

When the war in Europe ended conditions would

change and labor in this oountry would have to meet competition from Europe.
Therefore, he stated, a protective tariff would be necessary and since the
opposing political party did not believe in a protective tariff those who
wished to see one in force would have to elect Republican leaders.
In his two day campaign of the rather 'doubtful' state of Nebraska.,
Hughes according to one paper, addressed himself almost exclusively to the
task of overcoming the apparent complacency of the farmers with Wilson's
234
He spoke to them and received tremendous ovation when he
policies.
assured them that legislation for their benefit would oontinue as it had in
the past under Republican leadership if that group was placed in power.

He

charged. that the agricultural interests had received scant consideration
from the Democratic Administration.

On October 14 speaking in Lincoln,

Nebraska, the land of Bryani~ and prosperity, he delivered a speech on
285
peace.
To the Democratic charge that a vote for the Republican candidate
meant a. vote for war Hughes said:
Did you ever hear a more preposterous proposition?
• • • • I am a man of peace. I have been spending my
life in maintaining the institutions of peace. I
desire in that way to promote interns. tional peace
• • • • I do not desire petty wars: I do not desire
war in Mexioo to satisfy personal vindictiveness
against a disliked ruler. I do not like that kind
of war.286
284. New York Tribune, October 17, 1916.
285. New York Tribune 1 October 15, 1916; accounts of the speech found in

~ChiCago Sunday Tribune, October 15, 1916; and editorial in Current

Gpfnion, November 1916, 2'96.
286. I'bia.
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I:Ie held that the correct policies meant peace, that "••. a correct policy
V(ould keep America out of war."

287

In the many speeches throughout the state he discussed nearly all the
issues of the campaign and the large crowds that came to hear him greeted h
enthusiastically and heartily endorsed his views.
in

Qme.ha

288

However, the people

while not very keenly concerned with the candidate's views on the

eight-hour day law were definitely interested in what he had to say on the
tariff.

They approved his stand that "••• there was a need of a protective
289
tariff to insure the safety of American industry after the war."
In this
speech, according to the papers, Hughes had cause to answer a charge of his
opponents who had inferred that his election might mean that an 'invisible
290
government' would be installed in the United States.
Hughes told the
audience that crowded the auditorium that as there had been no 'invisible
government' in New York while he had been governor there would be no invisita
government in the United States i f he were President.
On the next day in Sioux City,

I~1a,

hecklers offered Hughes the

opportunity to answer several charges against him circula. ted by the Demo291
cra.ts.
To the question of whether or not he would repeal the Adamson law
if he were elected Hughes

an~ered

at length.

He carefully explained that

it was impossible for any one to answer such a question and then proceeded
to explain What he would have done to avert the railroad strike.

Hughes

287. Ibid.
288. I'bid.
289. ~Christian Science Monitor, October 17, 1916.
290. 10rd; New York TribUne, October 17, 1916; The Chicago Daily Tribune,
"55't''berl7, 1916; and editorial: "RepublicailCampign." The Independent.
October 30, 1916.
--291. Accounts of speech found in New York Tribune,October 18 1 1916; The Chi-

--
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If arbitration had bean refused I should have
gone right to the American people. stated the
facts and put the responsibility where it
belonged •••• ! should at the same time have
secured a commission of inquiry so impartial.
so fair as to conunand the respect of the entire
country, and directed public opinion to that
end. There is no group of men in the United
States that would have dared to hold up the
292
instrumentalities of commerce if that were done.
In conclusion Hughes reviewed his record on labor and stated definitely
an.phatically that he was not "••• the standard-bearer of any group or
set," but the. t he was desirous of serving " ••• the whoihe .American people."

293

One editor believed that this speech showed clearly the differences between
President Wilson and Mr. Hughes; that the record of Hughes indicated that
his statements were 'solid truth' and not empty campaign talk and therefore
"••• there ought to be no question Which man should be at the head of a
government Which has never glorified surrender, in the case of the individual
294

or the nation."
The next important speech by the Republican candidate was given in
295

Youngstown, Pennsylvania.

Here, as in all his major addresses, Hughes

criticized the administration for its foreign policy, for its claim that it
had aided business, for the Underwood tariff, for its failure to observe the
merit system, and for its extravagance in governmental affairs.

In this

speech the candidate devoted more time to a discussion of the nation's
policy toward European countries. Secretary Baker in an address in Naw
cago Daily Tribune, October 18• 1916; and The Christian Science Monitor,
October 18, 1916.
292.Ibid.
293. Ibid.
294.Editorial: New York Tribune. October 19 1916
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Jersey had compared in an uncomplimentary way the soldiers of George Washington to the bandits of Mexico.

His remarks gave the Republican candidate

an opportunity to reiterate that he meant what he md said at Louisville
concerning the 'Lusitania' incident.

He still believed that if he had been

president the world would have been aware that he meant what he said and
that the United States would have had "••• a reputation for fir.m and correct
296
policies. Therefore, the 'Lusitania' would not have been sunk."
Thepapers reported that this speech had made a fitting climax to the
Republican candidate's third western campaign trip, that he had hit straight
297
from the shoulder, and that his audiences had been quick to respond to him.
On this trip he had visited ten states, had made thirty-nine speeches, and
had replied to the three questions of the Democrats which had threatened to
be the most annoying.

Hughes had declared what he would have done about the

'Lusitania' incident, about the Mexican situation, and about the railroad
298

strike.
The oandi date on his next and last campaign tour planned to cover the
four important states of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and New York hoping to

place them safely in the Republican column.

299

Beginning in New York City,

on October 24, he campaign all sections of the city, making'Americanism' his

theme.

300

295. Accounts of speech found in New York Tribune, October 20, 1916; The
Chica~o D ill Tribune, October 20, 1916; The Christian Science MOnitor,
October 2 , 916'; and editorial: "Hughes 'lfebukes Secretary Baker,"
The Independent, October 30, 1916.
296. '!'6!'d.
297. I'b!'CT.
298. ~ew York Tribune, October 21, 1916.
299. Ibid.; and The Christian Science Monitor, October 21, 1916.
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l:Ie declared that he was for an "••• .American policy in the service of
301

American interests."

He proposed, if elected, to have an administration

which "••• while dealing with all nations on a basis of the most absolute
302
fairness, will maintain .American rights on land and sea."
He declared
that he desired the support of every true American Who stood for the
principles expounded by him, and he did not wish the support of anyone who
303
had any interests "••• superior to that of the United States."
On the next day, addressing the young voters gathered in the Academy
of Music in Brooklyn he presented his entire case to them and to the people
304
of the nation.
Five thousand young citizens who were votin~ for the
first time crowded the hall to hear him and thousands of others jammed the
streets outsidethe music hall.

According to the papers Hughes appealed to

these young people with "••. a vivid word picture of the kind of United
States that young America hopes for ••••" and his address won for Hughes
305
"••• the most enthusiastic response of his crumpaign so far."
The candidate made an ardent appeal to his youthful listeners who he felt vvanted a
country respected throughout the world, a

count~J

country prepared for every emergency, and a

that desired peace, a

count~J

administered in an

efficient and businesslike manner.

His speech, though long, was reported as
306
being exceptionally good, vigorous, appeal~Eg, and wi_t_t~y~·-------------------The Chicago Sunday Tribune, October 25,1916; and The Christian Science
MOnitor, October 26, 1916.
Ibid.

"fb""'d.
!'EI'd.
Accounts of the speech found in New York Tribune, October 26, 1916;
The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 26, 1916; and The Christian Science
MSnitor, October 26, 1917.
Ibid.
~
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In Boston, Hughes was greeted by the largest, the most enthusiastic
crowd of his New .l!:ngland campaign.

The high point of his speech was his

declaration of the road he would travel if he were elected.

He said:

There are the principles which mark it. An
executive responsible to the whole nation, a
cabinet chosen from our ablest men, a foreign
policy that stands courteously but firmly and
consistently for American rights, a flag that
protects the American citizen in his lawful
rights, wherever his legitimate business may
take him, a preparation for trade competition
which shall protect all groups of American workmen, a goverrument supervision of business which,
while functioning to prevent abuses, will act
on the assumption that the average business man
is honest, and, finally, a domestic policy which
looks to industrial peace and cooperation, and
not to industrial war.307
In this address and in others given in the neighboring towns he spoke
clearly and in a straightforward manner which more than won the approval of
308
his audiences.
In his four speeches in Rochester, New York, Hughes in the most emphatic
and detailed fashion reviewed the econornic situation which faced the nation

the people of the nation that they must prepare to solve the
industrial problem which would arise at the end of the war.
the Republican protective doctrine was one means of solution.

In his opinion
309

Continuing

his tour he spoke in the cities of upper New York where he gave his usual
310
speeches.
However, to the farmers in this region he especially stressed
the tvro issues - the tarif£ and the Adamson law because the farmers were
.Accounts of speeches found in New York Tribune,October 27, 1916; The
Chicago Daily Tribune, October~,-r9!6; and The Christian Soience-Mo:J;litor, October 27, 1916. Also editorial: 11 The Hughes Campaign,., The
Independent, November 6, 1916, 222.
--308. Ibid.
309. ~
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were interested in

both~

They approved his views and it was reported trAt
311
this region of the pivotal state appeared well in favar of Hughes.

On the same day there appeared in the papers a short statement in
312
which Hughes summarized the points on which he stood.
Part of the declaration was similar to his statements made in Boston.

However, after outlining

his conception of the Presidency he brought out the fact that President Wilson viewed it in a different light, viewed it as the position held by the
•political leader and lawmaker of the nation.¥

Hughes had made this state-

ment of his views because he believed the people were entitled to know how
he felt on the issues.
On the following Monday Hughes entered the Middle Trest for a final
313
series of speeches to strengthen the loyalty of Ohio and Indiana.
If the
number of people who turned out to greet him in Ohio was indicative then
the Republican leaders were justified in stating that a 'great tidal wave

of Hughes sentiment 1 had begun in the erstwhile doubtful state.

In Col um.bus

and in the industrial sections of the state the Republican candidate stressed
a.nd emphasized the nation's need for planning and preparing for the "•••
314
commercial warfare that will be the bitterest and keenest in history."
Throughout the state of Indiana he stressed this point and reviewed his
attitude on the leading issues of the campaign. The candidate was. so very
The Christian Science Monitor, October 28, 1916; editorial: "The Hughes
Campaign. 11 The Independent, November 6, 1916, 22.
310. New York TribUne, October 29, 1916; and The Christian Science MOnitor,
Octooer-29, 1916.
--311. The Christian Science Monitor, October 30, 1916.
312. Ibid.; New York Tribune, October 30, 1916; The Chicago Daily Tribune,
October 30,--r9'16.
313. Accounts of speeches found in New York Tribune, October 31,1916; The
Chicago Daily Tribune, October~,-r9!6; The Christian Science Monitor,
October 31~ 1916: also editorials: "Mr. Hu011As on '!Onh.,.,..~o of Arms."
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pleased by the hearty greetings extended to him in the state that, in a public statement, he assured the people of his confidence of a party victory in
315
November.
The final week of the campaign was devoted to the state of New York.
Speaking in Albany and in many cities in the Hudson River valley the candi316
date did little but repeat hisprevious addresses.
In his 'Whirlwind
tour of Brooklyn he addressed three large groups, me.king his theme '.Ameri317
canism.'
At last came his final address in !&adison Square Garden in New York
318
City.
The newspapers were filled with accounts of the speech. They
reported that 65,000 people marChed in the monster parade which preceded the
speech, a parade which was one 'continuous and tumultous ovation' for the
candidate.

When Hughes did reach the auditorium he was cheered for forty

minutes by the 15,000 who had jammed the hall to hear his final campaign
words.

In his address Hughes covered all the issues that he had madepromi-

nent in the course of his campaign, laying particular stress upon 'American-

ism,' American rights, the tariff, 'war prosperity,' the Adamson law, the
319
administration's attitude toward business at home and abroad.
The papers
reported that although he talked on the same topics he set his "••• declaraThe Outlook, November 8, 1916, 526; and "The Hughes Campaign." ~
Inttependent, November 6, 1916, 222
314. New York Tribune, October 31, 1916.
315. I'Sfd-:-316. ~unts of speeches found in New York Tribune, November 3,4,1916; The
Chicago Daily Tribune, 3,4,191"6;"""'a'il.d"'"Ylie Christian Science Monitor,Novelii'ber 3,4,1916.
.
317. Ibid.; and editorial: ~r. Hughes." The Outlook, November 9, 473.
318. New York Tribune, November 5, 1916; The Chicago Daily Tribune,November
s;-1916; and The Christian Science Monitor, Novemb~r 5,1916.
New York Tribune, November 5,1916.

151

tions off in determined, vigorous phrases so that the Garden throng kept
320
punctuating his speech with applause every few minutes.•
In closing his address he stated:
If I am elected President - and I expect to be we shall have an administration which has no
interests but the interests of the United States,
which knows no policy but the supreme welfare of
the people of the United States. It will not be
coerced by threat from any quarter. It will not
be deflected by an alien machination. It will not
be made to subserve any ulterior purpose •••• There
is no hope for .America if American citizen a~here
in the world is not as proud a title as a man Gall
bear.321
Thus, Charles Evans Hughes brought to a close his campaign for the
Presidency, a campaign which had lasted three months, had carried him into
thirty-five states, an intinerary covering 30,000 miles which made it one
322
of the longest campaign tours on record.
It was estimated that about two
million people had heard his addresses and that he had been greeted by
323
probably five million more.
One paper reported that the campaign had
been the most strenuous for a Republican Presidential candidate for many
324
years.
During the last month of the campaign Roosevelt participated most
325
actively and wholeheartedly in it.
His part consisted of a twelve day
tour of the middle and southwest and included addresses in Chicago and New
320. New York Tribune, November 5, 1916.
321. ¥bid.; and The Christian Science Monitor, November 6, 1916.
322. lreW""York Tr!Oune, November 4, 1916; and The Christian Science Monitor,
NOVe'iiib'er 6, 1916.
323. Ibid.
324. ~Christian Science Monitor, November 6 1 1916.
325. 'fhe Chicago Daily Tribune, October 18, 1916; New York Tribune,Ootober
1"8'; 1916; and Meyers, 424.
-
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York.

Speaking first in Louisville, Kentucky, on October 18 he again used
326
the Democratic slogan, He Kept Us Out of War, as the text of his speech.
In his usual vigorous fashion he flailed the President for his foreign
policies and made it very plain that he wondered what 'outrage' would have
to arise before the President would be willing to fight.

Continuing his

journey westward he stopped in Kansas City to chat with William Allen White
327
who assured him that Kansas would vote for Hughes.
In Phoenix, Arizona, an unusually large number of people from the
surrounding territory gathered to greet the Colonel whom they loved and
328
To the people on the border he spoke of the lamentable mistakes
admired.
made by President Wilson in his handling of the Mexican situation. Roosevelt
forcibly told his listeners what he would have done, how he would have
replied, and how he would have acted.

It was his firm conviction that the
329
President's foreign policy had been "••• without plan or purpose."
~nile
the greeting extended to the Colonel in Phoenix took on the nature of an
'old home week' and the people enthusiastically cheered his remarks yet Re330
publican leaders adnutted that Wilson would carry the state of Arizona.
Two days later in Albuquerque, Roosevelt made Secretary Baker the center of
his attack on the administration.

The Secretary in his speech in New Jersey

had made a comparison between the soldiers of the American Revolution and the
326. New York Tribune, October 18, 1916
327. The "'C'i1'ristian Science Monitor, October 20, 1916
328. ACCounts of speech found in New York Tribune, October 22,1916; The Chicago Sunday Tribune, October 22,1916; The Christian Science MonTtOr-,-October 23, 1916; and editorial: "The Republican Campaign," The Independent, October 30, 1916, 186.
--329. ~York Tribune, October 22, 1916.
330. The "ChhCago Sunday Tribune, October 22, 1916.
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and the Mexican bandits of 1916.

331

Speaking of the Secretary, Roosevelt

with unusual emphasis said: "The man who professes such doctrines is wholly
unfit to stay in the Cabinet and the President who retains him is wholly
332
unfit to remain President of the United States."
The crowd cheered his
strong words.
To the inhabitants of

De~r

who turned out in large, boisterous numbers

Roosevelt repeated his now familiar condemnations of the Wilson administra333
One paper reported that in this speech the Colonel was at his
tion.
334
satirical best in what he called the 'sham' of the Democratic slogan.
In Chicago Roosevelt's two speeches were centered around the issues
of '.JI.meri canism,' loyalty, and preparedness.

Although it was reported that

efforts had been made "... to tone down the Colonel's doctrine of '.JI.Inerican335
ism,' "he, in his speech, hammered away at the hyphenates as hard as ever.
He stated that while he condemned the efforts of professional German-America

people "••• to shape our policy in the interests not of the Uhited States
but of Germany •••• 11 he would just as strongly condenm the efforts of any
336
large group of hyphenates.
Sternly and at great length he showed the
inaccuracy of the Dan.ocratic slogan, he appealed to the men and women of
Illinois to vote so as to show that they put "••. duty and service and
337
national honor first."
331. Secretary Baker denied that such a comparison had been intended.
332. New York Tribune, October 24, 1916; and ~ Chicago Daily Tribune,
October 24, 1916.
333. New York Tribune, October 24,1916; and~ Chicago Daily Tribune,
Octo~24,l916.

334. The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 25,1916.
335. NeW York Tribune, October 27, 1916.
336. TheTihiOago Daily Tribune, October 27, 1916.
337. TbTd.
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In

Brookl~m

and severaldays later in Cleveland, the Colonel gave a

.
. 338
repetition of his 'searchingarraignment' of the President's fore1gn pol1cy.

The papers reported that his remarks brought 'roar upon
from his audiences.

roa~of

approval

339

On November 3 in Cooper Hall in

N~l

York City Roosevelt made his

supreme plea to his fellow citizens to vote for Hughes for the Presidency.

340

He called upon the voters to place in the Vlhite House "••• the upright
Justice, the fearless Governor of New York whose whole public record has
been that of a man straightforward in his thoughts and courageous in his
actions, who cannot be controlled to do what is wrong and who will do what
341
is right no matter what influence may be brought against him."
Taking as his subject 'Our Nation's Crisis,' the Colonel admitted
having criticized the President but maintained that everything he had said
was absolutely 'accurate and truthful.' "I have criticized," he declared,
"because I believe he has·dragged in the dust what was most sacred in our
342
past and has jeopardized the most vital hopes of our future."
Then after
adroitly pulling apart one of President Wilson's campaign speeches Roosevelt
concluded:
If we elect President Wilson it will be
serving notice on the world, that the
traditions, the high moral standards, the
courageous purposes of Washington and Lincoln
338. New YSrk Tribune, October 29, November 3 1 1916. Review of speeches given
1n ~oosevelt Discusses the President."~ Outlook, November 8,
1916, 528.
339. Ibid.
340. Aocounts of the speech found in Nmv York Tribune, November 4, 1916;
The Chicago Daily Tribune, November 4, 1916; The Christian Science Monitor, November 4, 1916, and editorial: "End of Republioa:m. Campaign, r~·--
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have bean obscured and in their stead
we have deliberately elected to show
ourselves £or the time being a sordid,
so£t, and spinelassnation, content to
accept; any and every insult; content to
pay no heed to the most flagran·t
wrongs done to the small and weak;
allowing our men, wor.J.an, and children
to be murdered and outraged; anxious
only to gather in every dollar that we
can; to spend it in luxury, and "00
replace it by any form of money making
which we can follow with safety to
our own bodies.343
The Colonel in this speech exhibited his bld time fire' stated one newspaper
344
and his large audience received his message with frenzied cheers.
Roosevelt's last speech was given to the people of his ovm conununity
345
at Oyster Bay on the eve of the election as was his custom.
One editor
in reviewing Roosevelt's part in the campaign wrote that the Colonel had
played as active a part in the campaign as had the candidate and that the
346
Colonel's speeches had been "••• more vigorous if less diplomatic."
During the final weeks of.the campaign political leaders, party
officials, prominent poli·bical figures, newspapers, and journals

we~e

busy giving out predictions as to the £inal results on November 7.
--------------~-------------

very

347

These

----~----·------

The Independent, November 13, 1916, 271.
341. New York Tribune, November 4, 1916; and The Chicago Daily Trib~,

'0

No'Ve'iil'b'e"r 4;-19f6.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

Ibid.

1'5ic!.

The Chicago Daily Tribune, November 4, 1916.
Science MOnitor, November 7, 1916.
Editorial: "T"he End of the Iiapublican Campaign." The Independent, November 13, 1916, 271.
--347. New York Tribune, October 15,16,20,21,24,29, November 5,6,7,1916;
The~cago Daily Tribune, October 15,16,18,21,29,30,31, November 4,5,6,
1916; The Christian Science Monitor, October 23,24,25,31, November 7,
1916; ecri"tor~als: "the Republican C'ampaign," The Independent,October 30r,
1916, 186; Current Opinion,November 1916,294.-:rrso 11 30,000 Straw Votes,'
~Christian
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predictions varied £rom an assurance o£ oven¥helming success to skepticism
and a feeling that victory would come only by a very close margin.

Early

in October it was forecasted that Hughes was sure o£ 210 votes in the
Electoral College, Wilson certain o£ 149 votes and o£. the remaining 192 1
348
Hughes must only obtain 56 in order to receive the necessary 266 votes.
one newspaper editor felt that the Republicans would get the necessary
number o£ votes by simply carrying the nor.mally Republican states and dis349
The five states 'Which 1"J'ere most r~gularly
regarding the doubtful states.
placed in the doubtful column and which could

the election one way or
350
the other were N'ew York, Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Ohio.
The
~ing

editor o£ a prominent weekly magazine listed the doubtful states as Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, New York, and New Jersey whose combined electoral vote
351
numbered 127 which was nearly one hal£ o£ the necessary 266 votes.
This
magazine took a 'straw vote' o£

so,ooo

subscribers in these states.

0£ the

30,000 who replied Hughes received 17,938 votes, Wilson received 10,646,
352
In comparing the votes o£
and the miscellaneous votes totaled 1 1 236.
these citizens with their choice in 1912 it was learned that the Republican
Party in New York, New Jersey, and Indiana had gained £rom the opposing
parties and in Ohio the Democrats had gained. In Illinois, the shifting o£
353
the votes just about balanced.
~Literary Digest, November 4, 1916, 1155
348. Editorial: The Chi~a~o Daily Tribune, October 18, 1916
349. Editorial: New York ribune, October 24, 1916.
350. Ibid.
-351. ~000 Straw Votes."~ Literary Digest, November 4, 1916, 1155.
352. Ibid.
353.

'!'O'l(!.
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While some Republican soothsayers saw a hope of victory in New York,
Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin very few were optimistic enough to place
354
the pivotal state of Ohio in the Republican column.
That this state
should be doubtful was one of the most surprising developments of the crun355
paign reported one editor.
Two explanations were offered for this
situation.

According to one report the farmers of the state were so pros-

parous, so contented and no one could tell whether they would be interested
356
enough to vote on election day.
Another newspaper stated that the section
of the state around Cleveland wasstrong for Wilson due to the fact that the
war industries of that community were enriching the inhabitants.

357

However

this editor believed that it was folly to forecast election results for
while the politicians knew how the active partisan stood they could not
358
learn the political alignment of the silent voter.
The final predictions as given out by the chairman of the Republican
national Committee concluded that Hughes would receive 366 electoral votes
359
which number included the state of New York and Ohio.
The Republican
newspapers were not so optimistic.

vVhile they predicted a victory for
360
Hughes they placed the number of electoral votes under 300.
As the campaign drew to a close all efforts were bent toward impressing
upon the voters that Charles Evans Hughes was the wise choice for the
Presidency. Every possible means of approach was used - speeches, articles,
354. The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 30, 1916; and The Christian Science
MOnitor, Octo1ier 23, 1916.
355. Editorial: The Nation, October 26, 1916, 386.
356. New York TrfSUne, October 29, 1916.
357. The Christian Science Monitor, October 23, 1916.
358. Ibid., October 25,1916
359. "N"ei(york Tribune, November 5,1916; ~ Chicago Sunday Tribune,November 5
3so.
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pictures, cartoons, and advertisements.

The daily newspapers carried

detailed accounts of the campaign activities, reporting on all the speeches
of the nominee and on the speeches and actions of the party leaders and
managers.

The weekly magazines kept their readers abreast of the news by

giving resume's of the campaign tours and of the nominee's speeches.

The

monthly magazines devoted their pages to special articles on the main issues
and problems of the campaign and to the progress of the campaign as a
whole.

A review of these articles presented a good, overview of the

campaign.
One magazine placed the situation before its readers in the for.m of two
questions, namely: Which of

the two great parties at this particular juncti

in our progress as a nation is the better fitted and the more likely to
render the highest public service?

Secondly, which of the two designated

leaders is the more certain 'to preserve, protect, and defend the constituti
1 361
of the United States?
To these questions the editor of the magazine
answered without a degree of hesitancy, the Republican Party and Charles
Evans

Hughes.

In his opinion the Republicans being more capable, more

experienced, were better suited to solve the'weighty problems facing the
nation.

A prominent Republican leader in a magazine article, gave his reasons
for sponsoring Hughes.

382

It was his belief that our nation should prepare

itself for the economic struggle in world trade which ~uld begin when war
361. 'Editorial: "For President." The North American Review, October,l916,496.
Similar view expressed in an~toria1 in The Independent, November 6,
1916, 213.
--362. William R. Willcox, Chairman of Republican National Committee. "Why
Hughes Should be Elected." The Forum, October 1916, 430-438.
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ceased in Europe; that our nation should adopt a foreign policy, one by
which the American citizen was guaranteed protection throughout the world.
Since the Republican Party stood for these principles and since Hughes by
his record had proved his worthiness to high office, the Republican Party
363
and Hughes should be the choice of the people.
In an eloquent call to the citizens of the nation Roosevelt briefly,
oonci sely reviewed in a magazine article the faults of the Wilson administration and WTOtes
We cannot undo what has been done. But we
can repudiate what has been done. We can
regain our own self respect and the respect
of other nations :for this oountry. We can
put in povter an administration which will
throughout its term of power protect our own
citizens and live up to our national obligations.364
Between the two candidates which should be .Placed at the helm :for the
following four years, Roosevelt wrote "• •• the man who has been actually
tried and found wanting,or the man whose whole career in public affairs is
365
a. guarantee of his power and good faith."
Naturally, to Roosevelt, the
answer was Hughes.

An editor in expressing his views on the Presidential

o~paign

stated

that the campaign had been unusual in that it had :failed to revolve around
366
According to him one
one issue, in fact, it had spread to many issues.
outstanding characteristic of the campaign had bean the emphasis placed on

'S'a3. Ibid.
364. 'Tn"8o"dore Roosevelt. "America Needs Hughes." The American Review of
Reviews, November 1916, 577. Same declarations appeared as an adVertisement in~ Literary Digest, October 28, 1916, 1133.
365. Ibid.
366. 'Editorial: "Interesting Features of the Presidential Campaign." Current
0 inion, November 1916 293.

-
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our foreign relations, especially with Mexico.

The Adamson law and the

tariff had been the only two domestic issues dominent in the campaign and
"• •• even the tariff has been discussed almost entirely in its relations to
the European war and the industrial effects likely to follow it •••• " he
367
wrote.
In his opinion the campaign had centered mainly around the claim
that the President had kept us out of war and the Republican's countercharge
that it was not a question "••• between peace and war but between peace
368
with honor and peace without honor."
Another editor reporting the campaign as having been clean, as having
been conducted with unusual vigor by the major parties, declared that the
369
campaign, however, had not brought forth any clear-cut iss·ue.
The three
high spots of the campaign, as he

vi~ed

tham, were first, the Democratic

record of legislation which the Republicans are 'chary of attacking' because
of its 'unusual fullness and excellence;' second, the administration's
foreign policy which had been so strongly attacked by Hughes and Roosevelt;
and third, the Adamson law and its manner of passage which had received
370
thorough criticism from the Republican candidate.
On the personal side,
concluded this editor, Hughes had been a disappointment to many because he
had been 'attacking and

crit~cizing'

constructive program of his
367. Ibid.
368.

crwn."

and had not set forth "••• a big

3?1
However, at a later date this editor

l"Sici.

369. Editorial: "Closing Campaign, 11 The Independent, October 30, 1916, 179.
370. Ibid.; similar view held by editor of The North American Review,October
1916, 496.
--371. Ibid. Similar view held by the editor of The Nation, October 19,1916,367
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again reviewed the polioital situation on the eve of the election.

He

characterized both candidates as being 'high minded' and 'fearless of conviction,' he reviewed the weaknesses of both the Democratic and Republican
campaign programs and in his conclusion stated that it would be up to the
372
independent voter to decide the election.
One editor viewed the political situation quite differently.

He claimed

that the campaign had been unusual for the reason that "••. the country its
373
has recognized no platforms, no issues, no parties.•
In his opinion some
legislative acts of the Democratic term had been originally Republican and
at least one, the banking and currency reform bill, had not been the work
of either political pa. rty but rather "... the direct outcome of the study
374
and work of our financial and business leaders."
By a careful, impartial
review of the salient issues of the campaign this editor attempted to clarify them for the voters and left them to draw their own conclusions and to
decide whether Hughes or Wilson should be at the head of the government.
Those editors critical of Hulibes and his campaign berated him on many
scores but principally for his continued attacks upon the administration,
without offering a constructive program, and for his failure, in the earlier
375
stages of the campaign, to take a definite stand on the hyphenate question.
With the nearer approach of the election the politicians became busier
but 'listlessness' still seemed to mark the public's attitude toward the
372. Editorial: "The Independent Voter on November 7," The Independent,
November 6, 1916, 213.
--373. Editorial: "Progress of the World." .!!:! American Review of Reviews,
November 1916, 467-483.
374. Ibid.
375. Editorials: "The Disappo~nting Candidate." The Nation, October 19,1916,
367; and ''Mr.Hughes on the Stump." The World 1 s Work, October 1916, 605.

-

-

162

campaign was the view of several editors, one of Whom reported that this
376
~iewwas held by other journalists.
That the

~rogressives,

the independent voters of the nation would be

the deteimining factor in the election was a fact most generally agreed upon
by the political writers and observers.

Both the Democrats and the Republi-

cans, with this in mind, earnestly and definitely worked so as to gain the
support of this group of voters, both parties aimed to prove that their
377
candidate was the most progressive in viewpoints and in beliefs.
The
Republicans, citing the splendid record of Hughes as Governor of New York
and as Justice of the Supreme Court endeavored to prove that their candidate
378
stood for real progressive principles.
The Republicans after the Maine
elections were quite confident that as the Progressives in Maine had returned
to the Republican fold so would the Progressives all over the nation.
According to one prominent Progressive the 'ignominious failure' of the
President and the Democrats especially in regard to the Mexican situation
and our foreign relations made it impossible for the Progressives to vote
379
for the reelection of Woodrow Wilson.
Yihile writers and editors disagreed as to which issues or, if any, were
the outstanding features of the political campaign yet during the Republican
cwnpaign certain issues were stressed. The Mexican situation, our foreign
376. Editorials: The Nation, October 26,1916, 385; Current Opinion,Novem.ber
1916, 294; and The Christian Science Monitor, November 7, 1916.
377. Jacob Schur.man,~y Progressives Want Hughes." The Independent,
October 2, 1916, 14.
--378. Ibid.
379. Charles Bonaparte, ''Thy I Must Vote for Mr. Hughes." The Outlook,
October 11, 1916, 332-333.
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relations, the Adamson law, the role played by
c~~paign,

tl~

laboring group in the

the economic conditions of the nation and the Republican attitude

toward the tariff, the Federal Reserve law, and the part played by the women
in the

c~paign

program.

A review of these topics should help to crystallize

the views, beliefs, and principles of the Republican Party as expressed in

the Presidential cwnpaign of 1916.
From early in August until the eve of the election Hughes and the
Republican speakers and leaders made the Mexican question a paramount issue
380
of the campaign. This was the opinion of many writers and editors.
A thorough criticism of Wilson's policy t~~ard Mexican affairs was outlined
381
by one staunch Republican supporter.
Vlhile praising President Wilson for
endeavoring to give the Mexicans what he deemed they needed - a constitutional government - this writer criticized the President for ignoring, first,
the primary duty of a President which was "••• to respect the independence
of other nations and to abstain from all interference with their domestic
382
concerns."
Second, it was the right of the President "••• to secure
protection for the lives and property of Americans lawfully resident under
383
foreign jurisdiction."
Wilson, according to this writer, had violated
"••. the sovereign independence of Mexico and interfered in her internal
affairs," and he had failed to protect the lives and property of Americans in
384
After summarizing our relations with Mexico during Wilson's term
Mexico.
380. Editorial:'~exioo as a Dominant Issue." Current Opinion. September 1916,
146; "For President~" The North Auericlm Review~ Octo'ber 31, 1916,481514; "li:exico as a Repu"66'rcan Issue." Tl'ie L1'te"rary Digest,August 19,1916,
397; The Chicago ~ribune, September lg;-1916; and "Keeping Us Out of Wa~
The American Review of Reviews, November 1916, 473.
381. "JaCob Scliurman, "wiison' s Mexican Failure." The Independent,October 16,
1916, 103-104.
--382. ~·
383. Ibid.
384. Ibid •• 104

l

-
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e.s President the writer concluded:
The nemesis of his unwarranted conduct
has been the destruction of sane billion
dollars' worth of American property, the
impoverishment of thousands ot American
citizens, the murder ot hundreds of American
men, and the outrage bitterer than death of
an uncounted number of helpless American
women.3S5
There appeared to be a unanimity of approval in Republican circles in
regard to Hughes• strong criticisn of Wilson's Mexioaa policy.

386

One

writer summarized the general opinion: "In disasterous consequences to the
nation the vacillating and ineffective course pursued by President Wilson
in dealing with the Mexican problem is without parallel in the history of
387
the Republic."
As a consequence of our Mexican relations one editor
wrote: "The united opposition now appeals to the countr'l.r 1x> dislodge the
Administration upon the grounds of criminal blundering with respect to
Mexieo."

388

Praise and criticimn were heaped upon the Republican candidate because he
chose to make the Mexican diplomatic problem an issue in the campaign.
Danocrats and independant newspapers criticized him tor stressing this issue
389
before the people, reported one editor.
It was said in Democratic circles
385. Ibid.
386. VfeWpoints of newspaper editors as .found in~ Literary Digest, August
19, 1916, 398.
387. Editorial: The Chioafo Dailz Tribune, September 19, 1916.
388. Editorial: "'TTr Pres dent. if The North .American Review, October 1916, 481.
389. Editorial: "Mexico as a Repu'bi'Ican Issue. 11 The· Literary Digest, August l~
1916, 397.
---
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that Hughes was using the Mexican situation as a battle cry because t:he
Republicans would be able to denounce it to their heart's content "••• withou
offending any o£ those voters who might be sensitive to frank criticism of
the administration's foreign policy as applied to Europe."

390

These Republi-

can ori tics pointed out that while Hughes fervently denounced Wilson' s
Mexican

poli~

he had "••• tailed to give the faintest outline of What his
391

policy would be it he were in power."
To these criticisms Republican newspapers replied, according to one
report, that the

Maxi~

situation was a 'live issue,' one of "••• great

importance to the welfare of this country and to Mexico," especially since
"••• the inherent detioiences of President Wilson are revealed nowhere so
clearly and so conclusively •••" as they are in the handling of our diplomaii
392
relations with Mexico.

In meeting the cries of the opponents that the Republican candidate
offered no constructive policy one editor pointed that Hughes in his speech
o£

acceptance had clearly indicated his intentions of carrying out the

Republican diplomatic policies as outlined in the platform. of the

pa~.

393

Throughout the campaign the Republican nominee and his party in no uncertain terms criticized the actions and policies of the Democratic admin•
istration in regard to the foreign relations of our~try during the
390. Ibid.
391. Ibid.
392. 1011.
393. 'I<Ill'oria1: "The Campaign. 11 ~ Independent, August 21, 1915, 250.
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term of otrice. While the criticism. of the ];arty in power was direct

and often caustic the Republicans. on their part. found the task of determining their foreign policy a difficult one. While direct in their criticisms they were very evasive in their constructive suggestions.

When forced

to give answer as to what they would have done or proposed to do • their
replies usually were couohed in terms most general.
The Republicu Party in ita platform stated:
We declare that we believe in and will
enforoe the protection of every American
oitizea in all the rights secured to hfm
by the Conati tution. by treaties and the
law of nations. at home and abroad, by
land and sea •••• We desire peaoe. the
peace of justice and right. and believe in
maintaining a straight and honest neutrality
between the belligerents in the great war in
Europe •••• The Republican Party believes
that a fir.m, consistent and courageous
foreign polioy• always maintained by Republican Presidents in accordance with .A1:J!e rican
traditions. is the best, as it is the only
trtte way, to preserve our peaoe and reatore394
us to our right.:t.Ul place among the nations.
One editor in reviewing the foreign polioy as stated in the Republican
platfor.m expressed his belief that while more space had been given to it

than in former years, yet the platform was less outspoken and less specific
on the topic due to the tact, no doubt, that conditions in Europe had made
it unwise for the political leaders to indulge in definite expressions of
395
~pathy and partisanship.
394. Republican Campai~ Textbook 1916. 48.
395. §Ci!'torial: "'The European Polioy of Alllerican Parties." ~Independent,
October 23, 1916, 140-43
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Hughes in his speech of acceptance saida
At the very beginning of the present
administration. where in the direction
of diplomatic intercourse there should
have been conspicuous strength and
expertness we had weakness and inexpertness. Instead of assuring respect. we
invited distrust of our competence and
speculation as to our capacity for fir.mness
and decision. thus entailing Ill9.ey' difficulties which otherwise easily could have been
esoaped.396
Later on the subject of the maintenance of American rights he said:
We are unreservedly. devotedly • wholeheartedly for the United States. That
is the rallying point for all Americans.
That is my position. I stand for the
unflinching maintenance of American rights
on land and sea. 397
He maintained that had our government lett no doubt that when we said
'strict accountability' we meant. precisely what we said then. in his opinion,
there would have been no destruction of American lives by the sinking of the
398
'Lusi tania. 1
Hughes said: "Moreover, a firm American policy would have
been strongly supported by our people and the opportuhi ties for the develop399
ment of bitter feeling ~uld have been vastly reduced."
He criticized the
Administration for its laxness in protecting American property and commerce,
400
and stated that as a result of' this negligence the nation had suffered.
396. Jacob Schurman. Addresses of Charles Evans Hughbs. G.P. Putnam's Sons.
New York, 1916, 10; and RepUDlican Campaign Test ook 1916 • 4.
397. Retublioan Campai~ Textbook 1916. 9.
---398. tb
399. "'bbCT.
400. lb!d•• 10.

a.

-

168

During the months of the campaign the problem of evolving a satisfactory
position as to the issue of a toreign policy

be~e

more and more difficult.

Cleverly and effectively the Democrats played up their campaign slogan: 'He
Kept Us Out of War.'

The Republican editors bent all their efforts toward

showing the reading public that the slogan really was not a correct expressiaa

401
of' the Danocratic actions, that slogan actually was a misnomer.

It was

the belief of one editor that it was "••• almost inconceivable that any
President could have so mismanaged affairs as to have forced us into a

402
European war when both sides are so amcious to maintain our good will."
He continued: "We Americans have no quarrel with any country and we wish all
men of all nations peace and prosperity ••••"

403

He believed that the

nations were extremely eager tor our friendship and that only by our own
404
sho eking mi smanagem.ent could we be dragged into a war-.
Another writer felt that the slogan was inapt, that there was no purpose
to saying that the President had kept us out

ot

war since there was no

406
reason for our being at war.

Therefore, the Administration had no right

to expect merit on this score.

However, a dilemma faced the Republicans.

If' they had attacked the slogan

too earnestly the,y would have implied an intention, a willingness to take
the nation into a war.

It the,y had failed to attack the Dem.oc rats• slogan,

401. Editorial: "Keeping Us Out of War." The American Review of Reviews,
November 1916, 471; David Hill, "Pre"Sl<<ent Wilson's AdiDiiii'stration of
Foreign Affairs." The North American Review, October 1916, 574; The
Chicago Daily Tribune, October 7, 1916; and Pringle 587.
402. Editorial: WKeeping 't1s Out of War." The American Review of RevieW's,
November 1916, 471.
403. Ibid.
404. 'f6I'a.
405. ~d Hill, "President Wilson's Administration of Foreign Affairs, 11 ~
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such a failure

~uld

have implied satisfaction with the Administration and

would have given a stamp of approval to the acts behind the slogan.
The Democrats saw and wsed the situation to their own advan.tage.

Presi-

dent Wilson in one of his speeches stated that the inference he gathered
from the addresses of Hughes was that the Republicans contemplated a change
in the nation's foreign policy. Wilson saidt
There is only one choice as against peace,
and that is war. Some of the supporters
of that pa.rty, outspokenly declare they
want war, so that the certain prospect of
the success of the Republican Party is that
we shall be drawn in one form. or another
406
into the embroilments in the European war •• ••
The Republican candidate openly refuted the inferences made by the
President and "••• charged the President with attempting to escape deserved
condemnation by trying to make the public think the alternative of his
407
policy is war.
In his campaign speeches Hughes again and again expressed his attitude on

foreign relations but always spoke in generalities.

He failed to bring

forward a real positiveprogram. One editor felt that the candidate and his
managers by their actions and words failed to set before the people the real
truth about the nation's relations with foreign countries, and, therefore,
many citizens "••• derived the impression that Republican leaders thought
408

that we ought to have gone to war."
North American Review, October 1916, 471.
406. Editorial: Current Opinion, November 1916, 295.
407. Hughes' in a speec"h in Philadelphia on October 9, 1916. ,!!! ~
Tribune, October 10, 1916.
408. lditoria1: The .American Review 2_! Reviews, December 1916, 582.
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Hughes by his very words and actions definitely indicated his belief
that the Adamson law was a major issue in the political campaign.

In an

article written on this subject Hughes stated:
But there is one fundamental issue that
has such far-reaching significance for the
future of the American people, one occasion
on which the present Administration,by its
surrender of a vital principle, has so gravely
threatened the soundness of our national
409
government that I am glad to anphasize it again •••• "
Clearly he stated his belief that the passage was "••• not only a serious
misuse of official power, but a deplorable abdication of moral authority."
Criticizing the bill he stated that it was a mistake to call it an eighthour law for it did not provide for an eight-hour workday, in fact, it
simply provided that eight hours should be "••. deemed a day's work, and the
411
measure or standard of a day's work."
Therefore the act became only a
wage bill and as such it sboula be judged.

On this basis the legislative

bill became only an effort on the part of a oertain group of railroad men
to demand an increase in wages and "••. the administration in advance of
412
legislation surrendered to this demand," claimed Hughes.
That, to him,
was the crux of the situation.

In his opinion, the railroad situation

should have been thoroughly investigated, and in due time the proper action
taken.

Those who sponsored the bill claimed a crisis had arisen which :made

the bill a necessity. Hughes believed this untrue for he claimed that the
409. Charles Hughes, "Shall Force or Reason Rule."~ Independent, October
9, 1916, 62-64.
410. Ibid.
411. 1'61'<!.
412. Ibid., 63.
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Administration had been made aware of the situation but had failed to act.
Hughes claimed that arbitration would have been the means for solving
the problem.

He statedt
I stand for the principle of arbitration
in industrial disputes. Labor least of all
can afford to have that principle surrendered
•••• The essence of the matter is a fair and
reasonable hearing of all parties concerned
and a iust determination according to the
facts. ~13

To him 'force' would never be the correct means for the solution of a
problem.

He declared

~en

force is proposed and arbitration is refused

there is but one stand to take, and that is to appeal to the judgment of the
country, to vindicate the processes of reason."

414

Hughes firmly believed

that if the chief executive of our country had gone at once to Congress
"••• for immediate authority to secure prompt and thorough investigation of
the stated grievance

in~

advance of action and he had thus made instant pro-

vision for an inquiry so entirely competent as to command the respect of the
country, I em satisfied there could have been no strike.

We are still ruled

by public opinion and no administration need fear results if it stands
firmly for essential principle.•

416

In conclusion Hughes reiterated that the issue of the Adamson law was
important, was fundamental for
••• the multiplying activities of the government would be intolerable if we did not proceed in accordance with judgment based on an
e:xem.ination of the facts. OUr problems in
the future are likely to be, in the main,
economic problems end they will severely test
our capacity, but we shall find solution if
we are open minded and thorough in our investigation.
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We can stand mistakes in our policy if
we are sound in method, but we cannot
yield force to reason. That is the path
of sure disaster. I should not take the
first step in that path.4l6
While some editors and wri tars agreed with the stand taken by Hughes
417
others did not.
Criticisms of the Adamson law were based not on the
question of whether an eight-hour law was justifiable, necessary, or

correc~

but rather on the manner by which the law was so hurriedly passed through
Congress and signed by the President.

That Congress after a very brief

consideration of the bill whose passage muld have far-reaching economic and
social effects, that our chief legislative body in response to the threatening demands of a certain group of railroad workers, voted on the issue,
was the cause of the great stor.m of protest which was heard throughout the
418
nation.
-In this campaign as no doubt in others, the vote of the laboring group
proved an important factor.

The passage of the Adamson law with the ensuing

controversy concerning its passage combined with the active participation
of Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, in the
re-election of President Wilson served to focus political thought on the
•
419
pol1tical alignment of the laboring group.
One editor stated that "•••
it rests with the labor element in this country to decide the turn this
420
In August political observers remarked that the
campaign will take."
413. Ibid.
414. Ibid. J 64.
415. 1"6'ICJ.
416. 1'6ld:'.
417 • Articles and accounts of the law found in John Fitch, "Settling a StrikE!
by Congressional Enactment." The Surv!Y, September 16, 1916, 599-600;
editorials: "Congress Stamped8Cr." The Nation, September 7,1916, 213;
"Hughes and Wilson on the Eight Hour-Law." The Literarl Digest,October
7, 1916, 875-876; ~. Hughes and the Rail~ Issue." The Outlook ,
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Republicans were slow in appreciating the tendency of the labor vote to
421
drift toward President Wilson.
However. two months later Hughes made a
definite bid for the support of organized labor.

While not overconfident

of its support his attack on the Adamson law, his exposition of what he
regarded "••• as its menacing effects upon the maintenance of the principles
for which organized labor has always fought, made a decided impression upon
422
the labor communities which he (Hughes) visited," reported one newspaper.
According to this paper the friends of the former Supreme Court Justice
believed that the labor group after it had thought over the Adamson act, and
had looked beneath its surface, would give to the Republican candidate in
423
November at least the normal percentage of the labor votes.
Late in
October the efforts of Samuel Gompers to misrepresent the labor record of
Hughes for the purpose of influencing organized labor in the interests of

418.

419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

October 11, 1916;~542; "For President." The North American Review,Octobe
1916, 503-509; The New Republic. Ootober~6, 297; *Progress of the
World." The Amenoa'ii"'lreview of Reviews. November 1916, 475; "The Fighting Hughes." Current Op!Dlon:-october 1916, 217; and Samuel Dunne, "The
Threatened Railroad Strike." The North American Review, October 1916,
573-88.
--Protests to the Adamson law were found in the followingt "Hughes and
Wilson on the Eight-Hour Law." • • Literary Digest, October 7, 1916,
875-76; John Fitch, "Settling a~rike by Congressional Enactment." The
Survey, September 16, 1916, 599-600; Samuel Dunne, "The Threatened Railroad Strike." The North American Review, October 1916, 573-588; and
"The Fighting Hughes." CUrrent Opinion, October 1916, 217.
The Chicago Dailz Tribune, October 28, 1916; and Samuel Gompers,
American Labor and the War, George Doran ana Co.' New York, 1919 I 548.
Editorial: 6 Politicar-Etfects of the Labor Victory." The Literazz
Digest, September 16, 1916, 651.
The Christian Science :Monitor, August 29 1 1916.
New York Tribune. 6ctober 21, 1916.
Ibid;--
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the President caused Republican editors to repudiate these charges by calling
attention, in their columns, to organized labor's own support of Hughes when
424
he bec~e Justice of the Supreme Court in 1910.
Hughes in a stirring speech in Terre Haute, Indiana, defied the efforts
of Samuel Gompers and the railroad brotherhood chiefs to swing the vote of
organized labor to the President.

In speaking on this subject he said:

I understand that word has gone out through
labor circles in official channels to vote
against me, and I know perfectly well that
I am saying a profound truth, and every
union labor man knows it - that nobody can
direct or control the labor vote of the country.
That vote is going to be cast according to its
sound judgment, according to what the men
think is right and fair.
This is an American Government and our workingmen are the best citizens we have because
they are producing and working, and I have
the utmost confidence in the freedom of their
judgment, according to their conscience,
uncontrolled by any power.425
The approval and enthusiasm which this audience gave these remarks more than
426
pleased the Republican candidate.
An interesting feature of the eampa.ign was the use of the medium of

advertising in order to bring the Republican message to the attention of the
voters.

During the last weeks of the campaign large advertising cartoons,

often tull page, appeared in the newspapers.

They directed the attention of

the voter to Hughes• opinions on labor and labor questions, and to organized
427
labor's opinion of the eandidate in 1910.
424. Editorials' New York Tribune,October 23,1916; The Chioajo Daily Tribune,
OotGber 24,1~;-and Th8 Independent, October ~1§16, 9.
425. New York Tribune,Nove.mber.2,1916; The Chicago Daily Tribune,November 2,

ms:--

426 • ..ill£,.

-

-
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In his demand for the return of' a protective tariff' policy Hughes

stressed the fact that the country was enjoying a greater prosperity than it
had witnessed in many years yet, in his opinion, the prosperous conditions
were based on weak, false foundations.
perity was true.

That the country was enjoying pros-

Reports on the nation's export and import trade during the

first seven months of 1916 surpassed the amazing figures of the previous
428
year was the report.
Reports from leading industrial firms were extremely
favorable and the stock market began in September a rise in prices. 429

In

the last weeks of the campaign, leading newspapers carried the work on their
financial pages that the slump in business and in the stock market which
430
usually preceded a Presidential election had not taken place.
One editor
expressed the opinion that

If

••• probably never in the history of' business

in the United States has a national political contest had less influence upon

c~pe.ign

1

now drawing to a close~
432
This viewpoint was held by editors of' other newspapers as well.
While the
general trade than during the Presidential

political contest had been heated it had "••• not hampered business nor
caused any slackening of' business so f'e.r as can be noticed," wrote one
financial editor.

433

So it would seem that business and especially Wall

Street had not been espeoially concerned w.tth the outcome of' the Presidential
427. New York Tribune, October 3l,November 1,2,3,6,1916; and The Chicago
iifty:lribUne, October 29, November 1,2,6,1916.
--428.
1 orla1s: ,Our Enormous Foreign Trade." The American Review of' Reviews_,
October 1916, 373; "The Specter of' an Impen4rng EUropean War upon
American Industries." Current Opinion, November 1916, 300; The Nation,
August 3 1 1916, 97; and The Christian Science MOnitor, September 36,1916
and October 28, 1916. --429. Ibid.
430. ~Chicago Daily Tribune,October 31,1916; The Christian Science Monitor
OCtober 3i,November 4,1916; and New York TribUne, November 4,19T6.
431. Financial editor: The Christian ~e~ November 4,1916
432. l,dito,ri~lq: 1Jg ~Tribune, November 7 ,1916; and Chicago Daily Tribune
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election.

It was reported, however, by one newspaper that those on Wall
434
street favored the candidacy of Hughes.
This belief was also held by the
opponents of the Republican candidate.
That business interests were
Chicago.

In

beh~nd

Hughes was at least evident in

that city an organization known as

~Hughes

Business :Men's

League had been formed and had held many meetings, some of them in the
industrial houses and plants were the political speakers reached the working
people directly and carried to them the message of w~ Hughes should be
435
elected.
In P~iladelphia a leading merchant publicly gave his reasons for
supporting Hughes and the Republican managers were confident that his efforts
436
would "••• prove potent in enlarging Republican vote."
However, the Republican candidate in his speeches toward the end of the
campaign argued that the prosperous condition of the country was one of the
serious problems facing the American voter.

In his opinion the economic boom

caused by the unprecedented demand for American products and commodities by
European countries had resulted in a false prosperity in the United States,
437
a prosperity which would collapse at the cessation of war in Europe.
When
European workers went into the trenches, leaving idle their places in the
factories, mills, and mines, an extraordinary opportunity was created for
433. The Christian Science MOnitor, November 4, 1916.
434. l'li8 Chicago Daily Tribune, November 3, 1916; and Norman Hapgood, "Wall
~eet for Hughes." The Independent, October 16, 1916, 102.
435. The Chio:!i Dail~ Trllnine, October 22, 23,24, 1916.
436. 'J'Olin: Wanaker. ew York Tribune, October 31, 1916.
437. New York Tribune-;-c1ct'O'Oir 28, 1916; The Chicago Daily Tribune, October
~~;and The Christian Science MOnitor, October 23, 28, 1916.
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'

American enterprise.
produce.

Europe stretched out £or everything America could

Rov1aver, after the war this demand would stop and American labor

employed to meet this demand would be without employment.

Asa result labor

in America would compete with labor and the purchasing power o£ the workers
would be reduoad and the soldiers in Europe returning to their peace time
438
o ocupations would produce more than aver, Hughes declared,
The oandidate
said: "It is perfectly idle £or work:nlen to think there is a future tor them
with continuous employment at good wages unless we sat about protecting
439
American industry.''
In words o£ warning Hughes frequently admonished his
audiences to consider the graveness of the situation, to realize that the
nation must prepare to meat the economic oondi tiona which would come after th:
4i0
war, and that the nation must "••• builld and maintain a. new American policy."
He said "... and I tell you at this time you have got to apply the Republican

441
doctrine of protecting American industries."
Hughes disagreed with his critics who maintained that European nations
would be too weak, too devastated to stage a. comeback for at least a. year.
Re believed that the European nations would be able to put up keen competitia:
with the labor of our country shortly after the war ceased.

442

In order to proteot American industries and the American standard of
living the Republican candidate and his party advocated a protective

tariff~~'

438. Ibid.; and editorial: "Prosperity and the Campaign." The Nation,October
26, 1916, 390. Also, Jacob Schurman, ''Vfe Want Hughes." The Inde;eendent,
November, 1916, 228.
439. The Christian Science Monitor, October 28, 1916.

440. 1'6Id.
1'6I<J.

441.
442.

New York Triblm.e, October 28, 1916.

443. Eartoria.ls: The Christ~n ScienQe Monitor October 17 1916; "Dissatis-

faction and ~tection~CurrentiJpi~on, ~ctober 191~,218; and Republicac
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A tariff which would be adequate and sound, one which would insure safety to
the American industries.

Hughes in addressing the mine-m>rkers in southern

Indiana painted a picture of the economic conditions caused by the war and
said:
It is a perfectly absurd thing that any
intelligent man should stand before an
American community and talk about tariff
for revenue only. You cannot run the United
States that way. The nations on the other
side are learning the necessity of protecting
their interests •••• Of course theywill
seek our markets and then what will happen?
Either their products will sell here and our
products won't sell or our men have got to
take less money in wages. Now that is all
there is to it.444
Hughes felt that the governments in the European countries had ne.de every
effort to stimulate business interests and after the war would adopt a policy
of protecting their industries through a protective

tarif~.

A banker in New

York, holding a view similar to Hughes', predicted that unless protective
legislation was provided before the termination of the war "••• American
manufacturers will find both their
445
foreigners."

~xport

and domestic trade in the hands of

In most of his speeches in the campaign Hughes discussed the conditions

which made a protective tariff policy a necessity and in one speech he made
this concluding statement:
If you want protection to American industry,
the protection of the American wage scale,
then put in power those who believe in the
protective principle, not those who did not
bali eve in it • 446
Campaign Textbook, 1916, 5o.
444. Tlie Chlca~ Daily TrlbUiie, November 2 1916.
445. New Yorkioune,October 28 1 1916.Simiiar view held by Representative
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One newspaper editor while stating that the nation had never enjoyed
"••• a protracted prosperity except under Republican protective tariff ••• "
expressed his fir.m belief in a protective policy by

stat~

that "••• a vote

for a Democratic legislator or executive is a vote for a return of hard
447
times."
That the Republican leaders were extremely anxious to bring the tariff
issue before the public was evident by the fUll page advertisement which
448
appeared in a New York newspaper.
It was oa.ptioned: "Back to the Bread
Line if Wilson's Tariff is not Repealed."
addressed to President Wilson.

Below this appeared a message

In this message the facts were brought out

that only the war had saved the nation trom the ruinous effects of the Wilson
tariff and t..l]at with the cessation of the war the work of ruining .Amerioa.n
industry, because of the Democratic tariff, would be completed and American
worlanen would return to the breadlines.

449

Similar advertisements appeared

not only in the New York paper but also in a Chicago paper.

They called

attention to the advantages of a protective tariff, gave statistics on business conditions, showed graphs which illustrated the upward.climb of the cost
of living, and by means of cartoons and pictures called upon the readers to
450
"Vote for Hughes" and the protective tariff.
Rodenberg (Illinois) as found in New York Tribune, August 26, 1916.
446. Schurman, The Independent, November 631" 1916, 229.
447. Editorial:~e Christian Science Monitor, October 17, 1916.
448. New York Tri'6Une, October 3d, 1916. This advertisement was put in the
pape~ the Republican National Publicity Committee.
449. Ibid.
450. TheChica§o l)l.ily Tribtme, November 2,4,5,6, 1916; and New York
"T'rrbune, ovember 4,5,6, 1916.
--
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During the oa:mpa.ign Hughes and other Republican speakers had givan
little attention in their speeches to an important item in the Wilson administration, that is, to the Federal Reserve law of 1913.
had begun his second tour did he bring this

Not until Hughes

piece of legislation
451
into his addresses, and then only in an incidental fashion.
In Milwaukee
~ocratic

on Septe1p.ber 9, Hughes in speaking of the Federal Reserve act expressed his
belief that this bill, from whose passage the Democrats had hoped to gain
452
political friends, had been primarily a Republiean accomplishment.
He
maintained tm t the greater part of this valuable act had been taken from
material supplied by a. Republican Commission and from a draft of a. Republican
453
bill.
In his co.mments on the bill Hughes stressed these facts and likewise added that the bill as first presented by the Danocra.ts to Congress
"••• was faulty and objectionable.

The ranova.l of the worst of these defects

was due to Republioa.n criticism on the floor of Congress, notably from
Senator Root," reported one editor.

454

In the opinion of this editor Hughes

had not only used unsound reasoning in his remarks on the Federal Reserve
act but had neglected to point out that Republican Congresses for several
years ha.d failed to consider the matter while they were in power.

455

A noteworthy and interesting angle of the political campaign was the
active part played in it by the women of the nation.

Ten days after Hughes'

announcement that he favored an amendment to the Federal constitution which
451. Editorial: "Federal Reserve Law.• The Nation, September 28,1916, 293.
452. The Christian Science Monitor, September 21, 1916.
453. I'Ofd., "Why Hughes §li'ould Be Elected." The Forum., October 1916, 436.
454. Eariorial: "Federal Reserve Law." The Nii:fon, September 28 1 1916, 294.
Similar view expressed in an editorials "For President." The North
.Amerioa.n Review, October 1916, 494.
455. Ibid.
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vrould give the right of suffrage to women, a oont'erence of the National
Womans' Party was held in Colorado Springs.

456

This group pledged itself

for the defeat of President Wilson and commended Hughes for his attitude
457
toward woman suffrage.
From. then on the women worked actively and with
great fervor planning, organizing, and financing their own campaign for it
was believed, stated one paper, that the
458
million women voters.

~men

could best deal with the four

That the women of the nation had risen to importance politically, that
they could wield power in political affairs was a fact not to be denied.
The women in half the territory of the United States had the franchise.

459

It was estimated that four million women would vote in the November election
410
in the twelve states whose electoral count totaled ninety-one votes.
Writers agreed that the

~men

were to be an important factor 1n the Presi-

dential election and wise politicians, early in the campaign, were advised to
461
give heed to the woman angle, especially in the western states.
In September the National American Woman's Association met in Atlantio

City.

Since an amendment to the Federal Constitution needed the support of

both major political parties the group decided to maintain its traditional
non-partisan attitude and to work for "WOman suffrage without alienating eithe
462
the Democrats or the Republicans.
456. New York Tribune, August 12, 1916; and~ Chicago Daily Tribune, August

!2; I91T.
457. Editorial: '~fomen at Colorado Springs." The Independent,August 21,1916,
261.
458. New York Tribune, August 25, 1916.
459. Harrm. Laidlaw, "The Womans' Hour." The Forum, November 1916, 531.
460. Editorial: ~r. Hughes Surprises the Country. 1 Current Opinion,Septamber
1916, 44.
461. ~·; Laidlaw, 540; Senator Helen Robinson, "About the Woman's Party."
The IndErn_enden~. September 11.1916, 381: and The Chioa.e:o Iailv Tribune
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Early in October the 110m.en began their five week trans-continental
463
trip.
They were ready and eager to vote for Hughes not only because of
his definite stand on woman suffrage but also because of his views on other
import;ant issues. 464 The 'WOmen traveled westward in their private train
addressing large groups of men and women in such important cities as Detroit,
465
Chicago, Billings,Montana, and then on to the Pacific coast.
On their
return trip they held parades and meetings in such cities as Kansas City,
Springfield, Chicago, Baltimore, and New York.
stressed the reasons why the men and

V«~men

In their meetings they

of the nation should cast their

ballot for the Republican candidate. While Republican leaders were willing
to admit the vrorthwhileness of the woman's campaign tour and while large,
often enthusiastic groups gathered to hear the women speakers, yet the tour
was not entirely successful.

In mny instances the reception given to the

women was not always a friendly one.

Political opponents of Hughes fre-

quently staged unfriendly receptions or by their heckling attempted to
466
interrupt the political gatherings sponsored by the women.
On

their return to New York these women Calllpaigners had traveled over

11,000 miles, had addressed 191 meetings in twenty-eight states, and it was
467
believed that their trip had been successful in changing many votes to Hughes.
October 21, 1916.
462. "The Woman Suffrage Convention." The Independent, September 8 1 1916,648J
"Feminine Political Strategy." The Literary Digest,September 23,1916,730
and The Christian Science MonitOr';" September 7, 1916.
463. The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 3, 1916.
464. Jacob Schurman, ~r. Hughes' Trip." The Independent,September 4,1916,342;
and New York Tribune, October 3, 191"6."'""
465. Acco\Uits~the trip found in T.he Chicago Daily Tribune,October 16,18,
and November 105, 1916; New YorK:Tribune, October 16,18,19,20,23,30,31,
November l-6,11, 1916. - 466. New York Tribune, November 6 1 1916.
467. ~ mi!'Oago Daily Tribune, November 1, 1916; ~ ~ Tribune,Novem.ber 4.

,.
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The importance or the woman• s vote mounted as the campaign drew to a close
for it was generally agreed that their vote would be a deciding factor in
the Presidential election. was the report:.

468

1916; and The Christian Science Monitor. November 4• 1916.
468.New York Tri'&tiie, November 6, 1916; anCI Tl}e Christian Science Monitor.
NOVember 5.7, 1916.
---
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SUPPLEMENT
Primarily the purpose of this thesis has been to set forth the
attitudes and activities of' the Republican Party in the election of' 1916.
With the close of' the campaign to all practical purposes the scope of' this
work was concluded.

No effort has been made to present a detailed analysis

of' the vote, no great attempt has been made to examine the polled results
in order to determine, if' possible, the alignments of' the polled vote and
to learn the causes and ef'f'eots of such alignments.

To make such an attempt

would present a problem or problems more in the nature of' another thesis.
However, a

br~ef'

report of' the election is here presented in order to

complete the picture of' the political situation in the Presidential election
of 1916.
On Tuesday, November 7, 1916, the citizens of' the United States went
to the polls to decide whether the affairs of' the nation should continue
under the direction of Woodrow Wilson or be committed to the administration
of' Charles Evans Hughes.

The election was outstanding in as much as the

result of' the count was not definitely known until the third day after the
election.

1

1. Accounts of' the election found in New York Tribune~ November 8-14,23,1916;
The Chica~o Datly Tribune, November 8-l4,23,l9l6; The Christian Science
iO'iiitor, Novem er 8-14,23,1916; editorials: "Presidential Elections."
The Independent, November 20, 1916, 302; "Presidential Elections."
!he Outlook, November 15, 1916, 573; and Xbe Nation, November 9,16, 1916,
43'1',453.
-
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The early reports on Tuesday definitely gave the Republican candidate
victory in the state of New York, in six of the New England states and the
reports from Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana were so encouraging that two New
York papers conceded the victory to Hughes.

On Wednesday morning the

reports from the Middle West and far West changed the story and as the day
advanced it became very evident that the victory would not be decisive after
all.

On Thursday the victory was still undecided.

Wilson seamed assured

of 251 electoral votes but the count for Hughes varied from 243 to 252.
The three states remaining doubtful were California with its thirteen votes,
Minnesota with its twelve, and New Mexico with its three.

2

By Friday morn-

ing Wilson was assured of his re-election, having received 276 votes to
Hughes' 255.

HOwever, because of the recounts in California the Republican

Party did not concede the election to the Democrats until November 23.

3

On

that day Hughes acknowledged his defeat and sent a congratulatory telegram
to President Wilson.
The Democrats in their victory claimed thirty states, leaving eighteen
states for the Republican column. Wilson had carried the South and the
West.

4

In the main he had carried every state west of the Missouri River

and South of the Ohio or, as one editor expressed it, by the "••• solid
5

South and the insurgent, progressive and radical West." According to him
2. Reports from these three states came in slowly because of the voting
methods used, or due to the fact that it took time to obtain the election
results from the men stationed on the border, or because the results were
so close.
3. New York Tribune, November 23,1916; and The Christian Science Monitor,

Novamoer 23, 1916.

---

4. Meyers, 427. For detailed account of electoral vote by states see Append

D.

.

5. Editorial: "The American Election." The Fortnightly Review,Decamber 1916,
1056. (These totals were changed later to 277 and 254.)
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the election was "••• as complete an expression of the popular will as could
probably be secured in a country with a population of one hundred million
people."

6

In the record of the popular vote Wilson received 9,116,296 votes

and Hughes polled 8,547,474, roaMing the Democratic plurality 568,822.
It was reported that this was the largest popular vote f!1Ver cast.

8

7

In

accounting for this large number several reasons were given such as increased
population, woman's suffrage, and a widespread interest in the campe.ign.
The

re~eleoted

9

executive, although a majority President, had received the

smallest margin of electoral votes sinoe 1876, and the mnallest popular
10
margin since 1892 reported one editor.
However, the popular vote received
by Wilson represented better than 49% of the total vote while that of Hughes
11
represented 46% of the popular vote.
The consensus of opinion was that
the election had been a definite tribute to the President, personally,
12
rather than a victory of the Democratic Party and its policies.
Congressional election returns remained uncertain for

~

days after

the election.

The final count indicated that the Democratic majority in
13
Senate had been reduced from sixteen to twelve.
In the HOuse the Democrats

.,

6. Ibid., 1057.
7. Meyers, 427. The Tabulations as found in the .American Year Book 1916, 170,
were as follows: Wilson, 9,128,837 and Hughes, 8,536,~---8. Editorial: "Presidential Elections." The Independent,November 20,1916,302t
9. Ibid.
10. Ea!'torial: "The Election Looks Ahead."The Independent,November 20,1916,29'l
11. Davids. Muzzey, The United States of liiiBrioa II, dinn and Company,Boston
1924, 628; and AiEEUr N'.HOioombe, Tlie Poli ticarParties 2!. Today, Harper
Brothers, New York, 1924, 292.
12. Holcombe, 293; New York Tribune, November 10,1916; editorials: The Nation
November 16, 19!6'; 4B'S7 and "The Election." !E!, Independent, November 26,
1916, 297.
13. American ~ ~ 191~, 46.
l
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controlled 215 seats and the Republicans 215.

The remaining five seats

were scattered among the Progressives, Socialists, and Independents.

14

While the Democrats had been successful in re-electing President Wilson
their control in Congress was definitely ended.
Once the election was over it evidently ceased to be of great interest
to the American reading public.

In the days immediately after the election

the newspapers and the magazines nade some efforts to review the election
and to summarize its results.
No attempt has been made in 'this :raper either to analyze or evaluate
~he

results of the election, or to explain the alleged drifts of sectional

sentiment and opinions as sho-wn by the popular vote tor such an attempt •
as one editor expressed it• would be 'absurd' because of the inability to
15
obtain accurate information on such election results.
However, many
writers seemed to agree on certain outstanding and apparent results of the
Presidential race.

The conclusion most commonly commenl;ed upon was the
16
new, regional alignment of the political parties.
Repeatedly it was
observed that the far West had given Wilson his victory or, as expresseQ
by one writer, "•.. the scepter of power is passing to the West in conjunction with the South and the South-West."

17

Forcibly the East was made to

realize by this election that the Atlantio States were not the United States
14. Ibid.
15. Editorial: "t!he Election." The American Review of Reviews, December 1916•
582.
16. Editorials: "Changing the Political Map of the United States." Current
Opinion, December 1916, 365; "East is East and West is West." The Independent, November 20, 1916, 298; New York Tribune, November 14~~
The Chicago De'tly Tribune, November lr;-!9!6; a! so "Why Wilson Won." The
litera~ Diges , November 18• 1916, 1312; "Re-Election of President --Wi!son. The Nineteenth Century, December 19~6;1186; and "The American
Presidency;" The Livipg Age, December 16,1916, 700.
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and that no longer could the West be ignored in political affairs.

18

One writer in summing up the reasons for the Republican defeat outlined
19
four significant elemenlis.
First, he pointed out that the West approved
Wilson's success in 'Keeping Us Out of' War;' second, he felt that the women
in the suffrage states except for Illinois and Oregon had given their
support to the Democratic Party; third, the Progressives had favored Wilson
and his policies; and last, he was of' the opinion that the Republicans had
failed in their campaign to develop any kind of positive app:~al to the voter
20
of' the nation.
Many other editors and writers expressed views which
21
coincided on the whole with the above summarization.
The last reasonwas
enlarged upon by several writers.

One editor felt that Hughes' defeat was

due to his failure to put words of courage, self respect and 'old-fashioned
patriotism' into the hearts of the people, and his absolute refUsal to meet
22
the great questions of the campaign fairly and squarely.
In the defense
of Hughes one historian expressed the belief that no Republican candidate
23
had faced a more difficult task than had Hughes.
In his campe.ign the
former Justice had been drawn one way by Roosevelt, another by the hyphenats
and still a third by the radical element of the former Progressives.

There-

17. '~{hy Wilson Won." The Literary Digest, November 18, 1916, 1312.
18. Editorial: "East is-last and West is West.• The Independent, November 20,
1916, 298.
19. Editorial: "The Election."~ Independent, November 20, 1916, 297.
20. Ibid.
21. ~rials: New York Tribune, November 11, 1916; The Nation, November 23
1916, 502; ~American Review of Reviews, December 1916; 583; also,
Meyers, 42sr-Ibdd, 189; Sey.mour;-368; Hiioo.mbe 292-293; and ~y
President Wilson Was Elected." The Outlook, November 22, 1916, 636-38.
22. New York Tribune, November 11, M6. Similar view held by editor of The
Clircago-:oaily Tribune, November 11, 1916.
23. Dodd, 1s9.
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fore, stated this historian, "••• the outcome was a weak appeal on every
24
.
vital matter that was before the public.•
Another historian commented
that the plans and procedure used by the Republican candidate indicated that
either he had lacked courage or else his campaign manager had ordered him
' 25
"••• to offend no one."
Consequently he had failed to commit himself on
the campaign issues and had based his hope of victory on the belief that the
26
Republican vote of the country would be large enough ~o elect him.
A poll
of the press of the nation as to the causes of the Republican defeat not
only stressed those already mentioned but added several others as, the
prosperous condition of the country, especially in the agricultural regions,
the power of Wall Street, and the failure of the Progressives to unite with
27
the Republicans.
As one. editor expressed it, there were as many reasons
as there were groups, sections, interests, and political parties concerned
28
in the outcome.
One phase of the election to which the writer paid particular attention
but on which no effort was made to reach a conclusion concerned the part

I
'

played by the state of California in the Presidential election.

The politi

situation which existed in that state was explained in an earlier chapter.
The final election results in California revealed that while Governor Johnso
had received a plurality of 300,000 votes in his senatorial contest, the
Ibid.; similar view held by Meyers, 425.
Seymour, 368.
Ibid.
~President Wilson Was Elected." The Outlook, November 22,1916, 638;
similar views held by Meyers, 425. 28. Editorial: "Why Wilson Won."~ Literary Digest, November 18,1916, 1312.
24.
25.
26.
27.

I
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Republican Presidential candidate had lost the state by a plurality of
29
3 1 800 votes.
This count revealed that the state 'Which was strongly
Progressive had voted for Johnson but bad failed to vote for Hughes.
thirteen

ele~toral

If the

votes of California had been cast for Hughes he would

have been elected by a margin of three votes over Wilson stated one
30
historian.
That the count was very close ~s indicated by the fact that
31
a difference ot 4 1 000 votes ~uld have turned the scale for Hughes.
The final results in California raised a hue and a cry across the
Johnson~

nation.

Republicans accused

~paign

for Hughes in California.

32

stating that he had failed to openly
In retaliation Johnson accused the

'Old Guard' and the local campaign managers for the part they had played in
33
the state campaign.
One editor stated that Hughes would have won in
California if "• .. these groups had not created a spirit of distrust among
34
the rank and file of the Progressive voters."
This was the view taken by
a newspaper writer 'Who believed that not only had the petty politicians
misrepresented the Republican candidate to the people of

California~

but by

making him appear as a confirmed reactionary they had affronted the pro35
gressive~nded voters in California.
On the other hand the Progressive
29. Editorial: The Nation, November 16~ 1916, 453; and American~~
1916, 44. 30. :Muzzey~ 629.
31. Editorial: "The Election." The Independent, November 20~1916~ 297.
32. Ibid., 303.
--33. 'ib!'Ci.; Fred Davenport., "The Last Stand of Political Bou:bbonism." The
<5UE'!ook, November 22, 1916, 644-46; and New York Tribune, Novem.ber-!'2,

1916.

--

34. Editorial: "The Election." !he Independent, November 20, 1916
similar view held by Meyers:-425.
35. ~ ~ Tribune, November 11,12~ 1916.

303;
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leaders charged that Hughes by his failure to meet and confer with Johnson
36
had lost for himself the thirteen electoral votes of the state.
HOwever.
the fact remained that a sufficient number of californians cast their ballot
for Wilson to give him the thirteen electoral votes of the state.
Likewise. in the nation as a whole a large enough number of citizens
had so marked their ballots as to voice their desire to keep Woodrow Wilson
at the helm of the government and had indicated their demand that the
Democratic administration remain in office.

36. The Christian Science MOnitor, November 13, 1916; similar views found
~~y Wilson Won." The Literary Digest, NOvember 18, 1916, 1312; and
Seymour, 368.
----
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
In the preliminary reading on this topic a careful search for all
possible material relating to the subject we.s made.

The amount of source

material to be found in book form was disappointing.

Good biographies of

all the leading figures could not be found, or as in the case of Roosevelt,
was incomplete on the period covered in this thesis.

The writer concluded

that the wisest procedure was to use daily newspapers and periodicals in
order to obtain the best source material.

Newspapers
In using the newspapers the writer carefully examined and read each
issue from February 1 to

~ovember

25, paying attention to news items,

editorials, special articles, advertisements, and cartoons.

The following

newspapers were consul ted:
New York Tribune
The Chic&§O Daily Tribune
The Christian Science Monitor (Boston)
For the period of the conventions additional material was found in:
Chicago Examiner
Chicago Herald
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!!!~Tribune,

listed as a Republican paper,

1

indicated early in

February its allegiance to Charles Evans Hughes and throughout the year
continued to sponsor his candidacy and worked for the success of the
Republican Party.
~Chicago

Daily Tribune, listed as an Independent-Republican paper,

was an uncompromisingly Republican paper.
against the Democrats.

2

It was definitely prejudiced

Its daily reports and its editorials were colored

by its political allegiance.

As the campaign drew to a close the editorials

against the Administration and the Democratic Party were extremely critical
and hostile.
The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), listed as an independent
paper,

3

reported the political news from February through November in an

impartial, calm manner.

The editor, on occasions, criticized the Republican

candidate or his pe.rty, but on the whole was very fair in reporting the
political news.

However, it was observed that during the last weeks of the

campaign the paper seamed rather indifferent toward the political

activitie~

Periodicals
The periodicals were carefully consulted, issue by issue, from January
through December of 1916.

Special care was taken to check and read the

editorials, news items, special articles, letters from subscribers, and
cartoons for all possible data referring to the topic of this thesis.

A

wealth of material was found in these periodicals, especially in the weekly
1. N.w. Ayer, American Newspaper Annual and Directory, N.W.Ayer and Son,
Philadelphia, 1916, 186.
--2. Ibid. , 64.
3. "''66I. , 115 •
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journals.

In view of the great quantity of material in these periodicals

the writer believed that it would be out of place to list the individual
references in the critical essay but has carefully footnoted them in the
thesis proper.
The periodicals mve been grouped as weekly or monthly.

The weekly

magazines in their cOlumns reported the political activities week by week,
stressing the high points in the campaign and in the speeches of the
Republican candidate.
The Independent, The Independent Corporation, New York, a weekly
magazine, made every effort to present both sides of the political situation
but became quite sympathetic toward the Republican cause in the later part
of the campaign.
~

Literary Digest, Funk and Wagnalls Company, New York, a weekly

magazine, ranained neutral in its viewpoint.

While it seldom reported on

the political activities of the campaign it was especially valuable for its
presentation of the views of editors and citizens from all parts of the
nation.
~

Nation, The Nation Press, Incorporated, New York, a weekly magazine

declared itself to be neutral in the earlier weeks of the campaign and aimed
to present both sides of the questions.

However in October and November,

it became definitely critical of Hughes.
~~Republic,

The Republic Publishing Company, New York, a weekly

magazine, was Progressive in its complexion in June and by September had
indicated that it was anti-Republican.
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~Outlook,

The Outlook Company, NEWt York, a weekly magazine leaned

toward the candidacy of Roosevelt in May and June, and remained neutral
during the remaining months of the campaign.

It reported the campaign trips

fairly although at times very briefly.
The monthly magazines while not reporting on the conventions and the
c~paign

tours in great detail yet they did present splendid, general

accounts of the political situation and carefully reviewed the important
issues of the

~paign •

.!!:! .Am.eric~

Review~

Reviews, edited by Albert Shaw, the Review of

Reviews Company, New York• a monthly magazine, while definitely for Roosevel
in June, attempted in its later issues to report impartially on the political
situation.

Toward the close of the campaign while reporting the Republioan

activities in an openminded fashion yet the tone of its columns indicated a
leaning toward the Democratic side.
Current Opinion, edited by Edward Wheeler, The Current Literature
Publishing Company, New York, a monthly magazine, devoted considerable space
to accounts of the Presidential campaign and to the campaign issues in an
impartial manner.
The North American Review, edited by George Harvey, American Review
Corpo~tion,

New York, a monthly magazine favored Root or Roosevelt in the

months before the conventions but indicated in July that it would sponsor
Hughes.

During the last two months of the campaign this magazine earnestly

worked for the election of the Republican candidate •

.!!!! World's

~.

edited by .Arthur Page, Doubleday, Page and Company,
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was definitely prejudiced against the Republican Party and its candidate.
The following monthly magazines were consulted and some naterial was
found in them: .!!:,! Forum, The Forum. Publishing Company, New York;

.!!:,! Fortnightly Review, edited byW.L. Courtney, Leonard Scott Publishing
Company, New York;

~Living A~

The Living Age Company, Boston;

.!!:!

Nineteenth Century and A:f'bar, Leonard Scott Publishing Company, New York;
and

.!!:!

Century Magazine, The Century Company, New York.

The following monthly magazines were consulted but the political
material in them did not directly relate to the scope of this thesis:
Harper's Monthly Magazine, Harper and Brothers, New York;

and~

Contmnpo-

.!!:!1: Review, The Contemporary Review Company, London.

Source Material
Republican Campaign

Textbook~'

issued by the Allied Printing Trade

Council, Washington, D.c., 1916, contained the Republican Party platform
and several of the more important political speeches of the convention and
the campaign.
Selections
Lodge,

It did not have a report of the Republican Convention.
from~ Correspondence~

~~ ..

Theodore Roosevelt

~Henry

Cabo1

II, edited by Henry Cabot Lodge, Charles Scribner's Sons,

New York, 1925, proved useful in providing a general background for the
topic.

However, the value of the book was lessened because it contained

very few letters pertaining to the period of this thesis.
Theodore Roosevelt,

.!!!! Works

of Theodore Roosevelt,!Y!.!_, Charles

Scribner's Sons, New York, 1926, national edition, proved of little value.
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Joseph B. Bishop, Theodore .:.;Bo;;;..o..,.s_ev_e_l_t
~Letters,

~~ ~

- ;!! Shown

~ ~

Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1925, was written at the

request of Roosevelt and based on his letters.

However, the book did not

prove very valuable because the period between January and November of 1916
was hardly touched upon in the book.
A splendid account of the life of the Republican candidate prior to
1916 was found in Addresses

~

Charles Evans Hughes, 1906-1916, introduction

by Jacob Schurman, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1916,

It also had copies

of the more important political addresses of Hughes.
Samuel Gompers, American

Labor~~~'

George Doran and Company,

New York, 1919, was especially helpful in presenting the part played in the
campaign by the labor leader.
A very good account of the Democratic plans to defeat the Republican
program, and a negative view of the Republican activities was presented in
The Intimate

Papers~

Colonel House

-~Neutrality~~. ~-~·..!!.•

arranged by Charles Seymour, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 1926.

Secondary Material
General Histories: The following books presented a general overview of
the period and were especially valuable because of their bibliographies:
Preston Slosson,

~Great

Crusade

~After,

1914-1928, The Macmillan

Company, New York, 1928; Arthur Schlessinger, Social Growth of the United
States, 1852-1933, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1935; and David

s.

MUzzey, The United States of America from the Civil War,II, Ginn and Com-

-

pany, Boston, 1924.

-

--

--
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Relating

~ ~

Good but brief accounts of the

Republican Party:

subject of this thesis ware found in: William Starr Meyers,

~

Republican

Partz, The Century Company, New York, 1928; Arthur N. Holcombe, ,.!!!! PoliticaJ
Parties

~

Todaz, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1923; and Newton Wyeth,
~

Republican Principles

Policies, The Republican Press, Chicago, 1916.

Copies of the Republican platform and statistical results were found in
Republicanism 2!_

~~

edited by Frank Hendricks, The Journal Company,

.!!:!, Evaluation!:!_ American

Albany, New York, 1920; and Edgar E. Robinson,

Parties, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1924.

A splendid, detailed

bibliography of magazine articles relating to the topic of this paper was
found in P.Onnan Ray,,.!:!! Introduction to Political Parties, Charles
Scribner's and Sons, New York, 1924.

The material for the election of 1912

was found in Edward Stanwood, History

~the

Prasidenc;r, Houghton, Mifflin

Company, Boston, 1912; and William·J. Bryan, !_

~

2!_

Two Conventions,

Funk and Wagnall s Company, New York, 1912.

Relating

~ ~

Political Leaders:

The following books were

but proved ot little value: Claude G. Bowers,

!::!•

consult~

Beverid~e ~~Progressive

Houghton, Mifflin Company, Cambridge, 1932; John J. Leary, Jr. Talks

~Theodore Roosevelt~,!!:!

Diaries 2!_

~~Leary,~··

Houghton

Mifflin Company, New York, 1920; Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt,!_
Biography, Harcourt Brace and Company, New York, 1931; Oscar K. Davis,
Released tor Publication, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 1925; William
R. Thayer, Theodore Roosevelt, Houghton, Mifflin Company, Boston, 1919;

---------

William Dodd, Woodrow Wilson and His Work, Doubleday Page and Company, New
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York, 1920; and William Ransom, Charles E. Hughes, E.P. Dutton and Company,
New York, 1916.

Miscellaneous
.American Newspaper Annual and Directory, N.YV. Ayer and Sons, N.w.
Ayer and Son, Philadelphia, 1916; The American

~

Book,

~~

edited by

Francis G. Wiokware, D. Appleton and Company, New York, 1917; and The World
Almanac

~Encyclopedia,

1918, The Preas Publishing Company, New York,l918.
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Appendix A
Hughes Accepts - His Forceful and Comprehensive
Telegram to Chairman Hardingl
Mr. Hughes• telegram to Chairman Harding of the Republican

National Convention, formally accepting the Republican nomination for
the Presidency, was as follows:
Ron. warren G. Harding, Chairman Republican National
Convention, Chicago, Ill.
I have not desired the nomination.
the bench.

I have wished to remain on

But in this critical period in our national history I

recogmze that it is your right to summon and that it is my paramount
duty to respond.
You speak at a time of national exigency, transcending merely
partisan consideration.

You voice the demand for a dominant,

thorough-going Americanism, with firm protective upbuilding policies
essential to our peace and securityJ and to that call, in this crisis,
.I cannot fail

to answer with the pledge of all that is in me to the

serviee of our country.

Therefore, I accept the nomination.

Stands for Americanism
I stand for the firm and unflinching maintenance of all the
rights of American citizens on land and sea.
motives nor underestimate difficulties.

1. Republican Campaign Textbook,

~.

30-31.

I neither impugn
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But it is most ragettrably true that in our foreign relations
we have suffered incalculably from the weak and vacillating course
which has been taken with regard to Mexico - a course lamentably
wrong with regard to both our rights and our duties.
We interfered without consistency; and while seeking to dictate
when we ware not concemed, we utterly failed to appreciate and discharge
our plain duty to our own citizens.
Brave Words Stripped of "Force"
At the outset of the administration the high responsibilities of
our diplomatic intercourse with foreign nations were subordinated to
a conception of partisan requirements, and we presented to the world
a humiliating spectable of inaptitude.
Belated efforts have not availed to recover the influence and
presti~e

so unfortunately sacrificed; and brave words have bean

stripped of their force by indecision.
I desire to see our diplomacy restored to its bast standards and
to have those advanced; to have no sacrifices of national interest to

partisan expediencies; to have the first ability of the country always
at its command here and abroad, in diplomatic intercourse; to maintain
firmly our rights under international law; insisting steadfastly upon
all our rights as mutual and fully performing our international
obligations, and by the clear correctness and justness of our position
and our manifest ability and disposition to sustain them to dignify
our place among the nations.
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Knows No Ulterior Purpose
I stand tor en .Americanism that knows no ulterior purpose;
for a patriotism that is single and complete.

Whether native or

naturalized, of whatever race or creed, we have but one country1
end we do not intend to tolerate any division of allegiance.

I believe in making prompt provision to assure absolutely
our national security.
I believe in preparedness, not only entirely adequate for our
defense, with respect to numbers end equipment, in both army and navy,
but with all thoroughness to the end that in each branch o:f' the service
there may be the utmost efficiency under the most competent administrative heads.

Urges Proper Preparedness
We are devoted to the ideals o:f' honorable peace.

We wish fu

promote all wise and practioe.l measures for the just settlement of
international disputes.

In view of our abiding ideals, there is no

danger of militarism in this country.
We have no policy of aggression, no lust for territory, no zeal
:f'or strife.
It is in this spirit that we demand adequate provision for
national defense, and we oondamn the inexcusable neglect that has
been shown in this matter o:f' first national importance.
We must have the strength which self-respect demands, the strength

203

of an efficient nation ready for every emergency.
For Readjustment of Tariff
Our preparation must be industrial and economic as well as military.
Our severest tests will come after the war is over.

We must make a fair

and wise readjustment of the tariff, in accordance with sound protective
principl~,

to insure our economic independence and to maintain American

standards of living.
We must conserve the just interests of labor, realizing that
in democracy patriotism and national strength must be rooted in
even-handed justice.

In preventing, as we must, unjust discrimin-

ations and monopolistic practices, we must still be zealous to assure
the foundations of honest business.
Particularly should we seek the expansion of foreign trade.

We

must not throttle American enterprise, here or abroad, but rather
promote it and take pride in honorable aohievemmts.
Stands for Civil Service
We must take up the serious problems of transporlation, of
interstate and foreign commerce, in a sensible and candid manner,
and provide an enduring basis for prosperity by the intelligent use
of the constitutional powers of Congress, so as adequately to
protect the public on the one hand, and, on the other, to conserve
the essential instrumentalities of progress.
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I stand for the principles of our civil service laws.

In

every department of govermnent the highest efficiency must be
insisted upon.

For all laws and programs are vain 'Without efficient

and impartial administration.

Fully Indorses Platform.
I cannot within the limits of this statement speak upon all the
subjects that will require attention.

I can only say that I fully

indorse the platform you have adopted.
I deeply appreciate the responsibility you impose.

I should

have been glad to have that responsibility placed upon another.

But

I shall undertake to meet it, grateful for the confidence you express.
I sincerely trust that all former differences may be forgotten, and
that we may have united effort in a patriotic realization of our
national need and opportunity.
I have resigned my judicial of£1ce, and I am ready to devote
myself' unreservedly to the camJ;aign.
Washington, D.c.
June 10, 1916
CHARLES E. HUGHES
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Appendix B
Mr. Hughes to Progressive Committee

1

Hotel Astor, New York City,
June 26, 1916
O.K. Davis, Secretary Progressive National Committee, Blackstone
Hotel, Chicago, Ill:
I welcome the support of Progressives.

We make common oause in

the interest of national honor, of national security, of national
efficiency.

We unite in the denll.'nd for an undivided and unwavering

loyalty to our country, for a whole hearted patriotic devotion overriding all racial differences.
a nation restored.

We want a reviyal of the American spirit,

We insist upon prompt and adequate provision for the

common defence, upon the steadfast maintenance of

al~

the rights of

our citizens and upon the integrity of international law.
The most serious difficulties the present Administration has
encountered have been due to its

o~nweakness

and incertitude.

I am

profoundly convinced that by prompt and decisive action, which existing
conditions manifestly called for, the Lusitania tragedy would have been
prevented.
We strongly denounce the use of our soil as a base for alien
intrigues, for conspiracies and the fomenting of disorders in the
interest of any foreign nation, but the responsibility lies at the
door of the Administration.
1. Republican

C~paign

The moment notice is admitted responsibility

Teatbook 1916, 39-40
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is affixed.

For that sort of thing could not continue i f the Admin-

istration took proper measures to stop it.

That responsibility the

Administration cannot evade by condemning others.
Indictment of Mexican Policy
It was officially stated by the Secretary of State in the Mexican
note of June 20, 1916, that "for three years the Mexican Republic has
been torn with civil strife; the lives of Americans and other aliens
have been sacrificed; vast properties developed by American capital and
enterprise have been destroyed or rendered non-productive; bandits have
been permitted to roam at will through territory contiguous to the
United States and to seize, without punishment or without effective
attempt at punishment, the :rroperty of Americans while the lives of
citizens of the United States who ventured to remain in Mexican Territory or to return there to protect their interests have been taken, in
some cases barbarously taken, and the murderers have neither been
apprehended nor brought to justice.
What an indictment by the Administration of its Mexican policyl
And still we are unprepared.

That unpreparedness in the midst of

perils, and after the experiences of three years, is a demonstration
of an unpardonable neglect for which the Administration is responsible.
The Govermnent now has and must have most emphatically the
unstinted and patriotic support of
gency.

eve~

citizen in the existing exi-

But unquestioning, loyal and patriotic support of the Govern-

ment is one thing; approval of the fatuous course which the Administra-
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tion has followed is quite another.

I cannot in this message

adequately review that course; that I shall do later.
Renews Plea for Protection
No intelligent man is deceived by the temporary prosperity due to
abnormal conditions. and no one can fail to appreciate the gravity of
the problems with which we shall be faced when the war ends.

We are

alive to the imperative necessity of assuring the bases of honest
business.

I am in deep sympathy with the effort to ilr.\prove the con-

ditions of labor; to prevent exploitation; to safeguard the future of
the nation by protecting our women and children.

I believe in workmen's

compensation laws; in wise conservation of our national resources so
that they may be protected, developed and used to the utmost public
advantage.

But underlying every endeavor to promote social justice

is the indispensable condition that there shall be a stable foundation
for honorable enterprise.
American industry must have proper protection if labor is to be
safeguarded.

We must rescue our instrumentalities of interstate and

foreign commerce, our transportation tacilities from uncertainty and
confusion.

We must show that we know how to protect the public without

destroying or crippling our productive energies.
Has Not the National Outlook
To what agency shall we look for the essential constructive
programme on "Which our seouri ty and prosperity must depend?

It is
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vain to expect it from the Democratic Party.
the national outlook.
are fatal handicaps.

That party has not

Both its traditions and dominating inf'luences
I have no sectional word to utter.

elect a President of the whole country, not of a part.

We are to
The South,

as well as the North, East and West, will be the gainers from our
endeavors.

But it is sober truth as I see it that as we go forward we

must make the Republican Party the instrument of our advance.

We

want deeds, not words; far reaching national policies.
The Progressives have insisted on responsible, not invisible,
government; on efficient administration.
demand.

I yield to no one in that

I am eager to call the best ability of the country to our aid.

For the conduct of the great departments the Executive is directly
responsible and there is no excuse whatever for the toleration of
incompetence in order to satisfy partisan obligations.
I am deeply appreciative of your indorsement.

I find no

difference in platfonn or in aim whichpreoludes the most hearty
co-operation and the most complete unity.

It is within the party that

the liberalizing spirit you invoke can have the widest and most
effective influence.

I solicit your earnest effort for the common

cause.

CHARLES E. HUG!m3.
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Appendix C
1
Mr. Hughes Tells Colonel Roosevelt of Nation's Debt to Hfm

Hotel Astor • New York Ci
June 26. 1916
My Dear Colonel Roosevelta
I warmly appreciate the cordial letter
of indorsement which you have sent to the Progressive committee.

No

one is more sensible than I of the lasting indebtedness of the nation
to you for the quickening of the national spirit• for the demand for
an out and out one hundred percent Americanism. and for the insistence
upon the immediate necessity of a thoroughgoing preparedness. spiritual.
military and economic.
I am. in the campaign because of my conviction that we must not
only frame but execute a broad constructive programme. and that for
this purpose we must have a united party 1 a party inspired by its
great traditions and reconsecrated to its loftiest ideals.

I know

that you have been guided in this emergency by the sole desire to be
of the largest s'ervice to the United States.
the trumpet that shall never call retreat.

You have sounded forth
And I want you to feel that

I wish to have all the aid that you are able and willing to give.
want the most effective co-operation with all those who have been
1. Republican Campaign Teatbook

~~

40-41.

I
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fighting by your side.

Let us work together for our national security

and for the peace of righteousness and justice.
I enclose a copy of my telegram to the committee, in which I have
set forth my attitude.

I shall later undertake a full discussion of

the issues of the campaign.
Hoping that I may have the pleasure of seeing you at an early
day I am, my dear Colonel Roosevelt, with cordial regards,
Faithfully yours,

CHARLES E. HUGHES

Appendix D
Electoral Vote In Presidential Election of 1916

State
Wilson
l.Alabama
12
2.Arizona
3
3.Arkansas
9
4.Calii'ornie. 13
5.Colorado
6
6.Connectiout
7.Delaware
8.Florida
6
9.Georgia
14
~.Idaho
4
~.Illinois
~Indiana
~3.Iowa
~4.Kansas

10
5.Kentuoky
13
~6. Louisiana
10
7. Maine
118- Maryland
8
~9. Massachusett:s a>. Michigan
21. Minnesota
122. Mississippi 10
~3. Missouri
18
~4. Montana
4
25. Nebraska
a
126. Nevada
3
27. UewHampshire 4
~8. Uew Jersey
29. New Mexico
3
~o. New York
31. North Carolina 12

Hughes

7
3

29
15
13

State
Wilson
32.North Dakota
5
33.0hio
24
10
34.0klahoma
3I.Oregon
36.Pennsylvania
37 .Rhode Island
38.South Carolina 9
39.South Dakota
40.Tennessee
12
4l.Te:xas
20
42.Utah
4
43.Virginia
44.Washington
7
45.West Virginia
1
46.Wis oonsin
47.Wyoming
3

1

Hughes

-

5
38
5
5

4

7
13

6
18
15
12

-14
45

1. The World Almanac and Encyclopedia, 1918, The Press Publishing Company,
New York CitY, l9la;-827.
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